04/15/2015
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleKennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., No. 2014-1350 (Fed. Cir. March 25, 2015).
Issues
[Anticipation] Because all the limitations of Kennametal’s claim are specifically disclosed in Grab, the question for the purposes of anticipation is “whether the number of categories and components” disclosed in Grab is so large that the combination of ruthenium and PVD coatings “would not be immediately apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1361.
Kennametal, Inc., at *10.
[Obviousness] Kennametal claims that the Board failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. Because of the problems relating to cobalt capping, Kennametal contends, it would not have been obvious to combine ruthenium binders with PVD coating.
Id. at *13.
Holdings
[Anticipation] Grab’s express “contemplat[ion]” of PVD coatings is sufficient evidence that a reasonable mind could find that a person of skill in the art, reading Grab’s claim 5, would immediately envisage applying a PVD coating. Grab col.4 l.59. Thus, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Grab effectively teaches 15 combinations, of which one anticipates pending claim 1.
Id. at *11.
[Obviousness] [B]ecause a person of skill in the art reading Grab would readily envisage the combination of ruthenium binders and PVD coatings, it would have been obvious to that person that these two could be combined with a reasonable expectation of success. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that this express teaching was not significantly undermined by the problem of cobalt capping, especially in view of the similar teaching of Leverenz.
Id. at *15.
 
 
04/11/2015
Category: Administrative Law 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleExela Pharama Sciences, LLC v. Lee, No. 2013-1206 (Fed. Cir. 26, 2015).
IssueThis appeal presents the question of whether a third party has the right to challenge, by way of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a ruling of the Patent and Trademark Office reviving a patent application that had become abandoned by failure to meet a filing schedule established by the Patent Cooperation Treaty and its implementing statute.
Exela Pharama Sciences, LLC, at *2.
HoldingWe affirm the dismissal, on the ground that PTO revival rulings are not subject to third party collateral challenge, thereby precluding review regardless of whether Exela’s claims were time-barred.
Id. at *3.
 
04/07/2015

Category: Infringement 

  

By: Abby Lin, Contributor  

TitleAqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, No. 2014-1263 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).
Issues
[1] We deal here only with a challenge to the soundness of the district court’s particular use of IPC’s profits in its rationale.
Aqua, at *10.
[2] Aqua Shield appeals … the finding of no willfulness that led to the denial of enhanced damages and attorney's fees.
Id. at *2.
Holding
[1] Contrary to Aqua Shield’s broader contention, therefore, the district court did not err in considering IPC’s profits. But it did err in treating the profits IPC actually earned during the period of infringement as a royalty cap. That treatment incorrectly replaces the hypothetical inquiry into what the parties would have anticipated, looking forward when negotiating, with a backwardlooking inquiry into what turned out to have happened. See Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (expectations govern, not actual results).
Id. at *10.
[2] [The district court improperly applied Seagate's two part terms for willfulness analysis by relying on EDNY's denial of Aqua Shield's motion for preliminary injunction based on personal jurisdiction and incomplete analysis on if IPC's design around was implemented. ] We therefore vacate the court’s decision that IPC did not willfully infringe and remand for an analysis that conforms to Seagate’s standard. 497 F.3d at 1371. We do not reach an ultimate conclusion ourselves. We observe, however, that Seagate’s first requirement focuses on whether the infringer’s defenses, as ultimately presented to the court, were reasonable. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1008. [...] we note that the objective baselessness of an infringer’s defenses, assessed on the litigation record, may have a strong bearing on whether the “objectively defined risk” of infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 [...]
Id. at *14-15 (text added).

 

 

 

04/03/2015
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleVersata Soft., Inc. v. Callidus Soft., No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2015).
Issue[The Fed. Cir. issued opinion on appeal, but joint petition to dismiss case submitted to the district court was not presented to CAFC until after opinion on underlying appeal issued] Due to the unique timing and sequence of events, we stayed issuance of the mandate and directed the parties to respond whether the circumstances require that we vacate our prior opinion.
Versata Soft., Inc., at *2 (text added).
HoldingBecause the parties’ voluntary and unconditional dismissal mooted the appeal before the release of our prior opinion, we vacate the opinion and dismiss the appeal.
Id. at *2.
 
 
Editor Note
This case vacates a previous CAFC precedential opinion issued on the merits of the case, and prior to the controversy being settled. Previous opinion available here.
 
 
 
 
 
03/25/2015
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor
 
TitleABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA (Fed. Circ., Dec. 17, 2014).
Issue[…] the only issue we need to address is whether the district court erred in dismissing the trade-secret claim against TurboUSA and Willem Franken.
ABB Turbo, at * 6 (text added).
HoldingWe reverse [the district court’s ruling dismissing the trade-secret claim against the defendants], concluding that the district court relied on judgments about the merits that go beyond what is authorized at the complaint stage. We remand for further proceedings.
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
 
03/21/2015
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor
 
TitlePresident & Fellows of Harvard v. Lee, No. 2013-1628 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2014) (Non-Precedential).
Issue[Is there] evidence that [Harvard] had [not actually] paid the requisite terminal disclaimer fee [for U.S. Patent No. 5,087,571 (the '571 patent)] and that, as a result, the terminal disclaimer was not legally entered into the prosecution history for the ’571 patent and was therefore invalid.
President & Fellows of Harvard, at *4.
HoldingWe conclude that the evidence as a whole provides a rational basis for the PTO’s conclusion that the terminal disclaimer fee was paid. As such, we find that the district court properly concluded that the PTO’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Id. at *9.
 
 
 

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