04/14/23

Volume 103 Issue No. 1 is now available, with a new cover design!

 

08/17/22

Volume 102 Issue No. 3 is now available! See the below cover page for its articles:

 

 

04/08/22

Volume 102 Issue No. 2 is now available. See the below cover page for its articles:

 

03/03/22
The Journal of the Patent and Trademark Society is pleased to announce the electronic publication of Dr. Toshiko Takenaka's review of Research Handbook on Design Law (edited by Henning Hartwig Edward Elgar).
 
Although recent US case law significantly increased the value of design patents, the European industry has long acknowledged the commercial value of product designs and developed EU-wide protection for the designs regardless of registration. According to recent statistics, both US and EU design patents and community design rights outperform utility patents on validity and infringement. The result of the community design rights is particularly surprising because both registered and unregistered design rights issue without any examination of substantive requirements. Effective product design protection is a key to success for consumer goods manufacturers to complete in the global market. However, there have been only a few books to examine design protection by different types of intellectual property rights in multiple jurisdictions. The Research Handbook on Design Law addresses the need by collecting comparative studies of product designs authored by the world’s leading practitioners and scholars. The book mainly focuses on the EU and the US, but various chapters cover the major jurisdictions including Japan, China, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey. Topics are carefully selected by Dr. Henning Hartwig, a leading design law practitioner involved in the landmark decisions of the Court of Justice for European Union (CJEU), based on his extensive experience in litigating community and German design rights and other related rights for both German and US clients. Overall, it bridges academic theories and a practice strategy for procuring and enforcing multiple IP rights on product designs in the global market.
 
Read the full review here!
12/30/21

Volume 102 Issue No. 1 is now available, hot off the presses! See the below cover page for its articles:

 

12/09/21

Forgot to report on this due to the fact that Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594 U.S. ___ (2021) was decided by SCOTUS several days after U.S. v. Arthrex (precisely eight days later, which also cited us on page 2 of its majority opinion - see below), but Justice Amy Coney Barrett cited us on page 5 of her dissent, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, specifically the article of Lechner, Estoppel Against Patent Assignors—The Scott Paper Company Case, 28 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 325, 330 (1946)! Check out the citation below.

The first page of Justice Barrett's dissent: 

 

10/12/21

Morgan Lewis Logo

Attorney for Trademark/Copyright Pratice Group 

Morgan Lewis, one of the world’s leading international law firms, seeks to hire a highly qualified attorney to join our trademark/copyright practice group in the Washington, DC office. This position could also be resident in Boston and San Francisco. This is a non-partnership track position and compensation is commensurate with experience.

10/12/21

 

Morgan Lewis Logo

Attorney for Trademark/Copyright Pratice Group 

Morgan Lewis, one of the world’s leading international law firms, seeks to hire a highly qualified attorney to join our trademark/copyright practice group in the Washington, DC office. This position could also be resident in Boston and San Francisco. This is a non-partnership track position and compensation is commensurate with experience.

09/15/21

We would like to highlight an incredible article from Volume 101, Issue No. 4, Serving America: The USPTO’s IP Attaché Program by Bratislav Stankovic and Dominic Keating. We have also uploaded the article online and you can read it by clicking the below image or here. We hope you enjoy the article's explanation of the USPTO's highly coveted "IP Attachés", who are able to perform duties in different countries across the globe as part-diplomat and part-IP-attorney. More information about the program can also be found at its official website!

 

 

09/01/21

Volume 101 Issue 4 is now available, hot off the presses! See below for the articles in it:

 

08/31/21

MorganLewisLogo

Patent Agent - Technology 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, one of the world’s leading global law firms with over 4,000 lawyers and staff in 31 offices is seeking a Patent Agent for their award-winning IP Team.

08/30/21

 

MorganLewisLogo

Patent Agent - Technology 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, one of the world’s leading global law firms with over 4,000 lawyers and staff in 31 offices is seeking a Patent Agent for their award-winning IP Team.

08/04/21

Check out the Past EICs page (you can also click on the text in the header banner immediately above to the right) to see biographical data compiled of the first fifteen Editors in Chief of the Journal: George P. Tucker, William I. WymanE.C. ReynoldsW.B. JohnsonV.I. RichardC.C. PidgeonMax W. TuckerHoward S. MillerDr. Joseph Rossman, Ph.D.P.J. FedericoEdwin M. ThomasJohn H. MerchantMilton WeissmanGerald H. Bjorge, and Louis Zarfas

 

Truly a group of remarkable and outstanding individuals, each of them having fascinating backgrounds and life stories: from the very first EIC who held a LLB from George Washington University and an LLM from American University (George P. Tucker), whose son, eight years later, served as the seventh EIC (Max W. Tucker), to an Army Captain having to leave the EIC post when called to active military duty to serve in WWII and who later became a JAG Lieutenant Colonel (Edwin M. Thomas), a Lehigh Civil Engineering graduate who "was employed on important engineering projects in New York State and elsewhere, including the Niagara Power and Development Company project and the great ship canal from Lake Erie to the Hudson River" (E.C. Reynolds), a regular contributor to Scientific American, who won first prize in a 1913 essay competition held by the publication on the subject "What Are The Ten Greatest Inventions of Our Time, and Why?" (William I. Wyman), a mathematician, Examiner-in-Chief, author of 56 JPTOS articles and co-drafter of the Patent Act of 1952 (PJ Federico), a 1915 University of California graduate who received a Master's degree in Physics at that institution and a Bachelor's degree in Electrical Engineering from Syracuse University (Howard S. Miller), a former Organic Chemistry Professor who was head of the Chemistry Department at DePauw University (Wellington B. Johnson), a Primary Examiner with over thirty years of examining experience who famously testified to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1973 regarding the Hart Bill (Milton Weissman), a prolific author with a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from the University of Pennsylvania, a LLB and MA from George Washington University, and a Ph.D in Psychology from American University (Dr. Joseph Rossman, Ph.D), a former Treasurer of the Patent Office Society - as it was called back then (C.C. Pidgeon), a past Library of Congress employee who "obtained a working knowledge of library science" (V.I. Richard), a trademark expert who served as EIC for the longest period of 25 years (John H. Merchant), a previous Associate USPTO Solicitor, BPAI Chief Examiner and founder of the Federal Circuit Bar Journal (Gerald H. Bjorge), and a MIT graduate known as, according to Patently-O, the "primary examiner associated with the most issued design patents" (Louis S. Zarfas). Later EIC bios forthcoming soon!

07/11/21

The U.S. Supreme Court cited a Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society article on page 2 of its U.S. v. Arthrex opinion, which was decided on June 21, 2021. The article is by former Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, former Examiner-in-Chief of the Board of Appeals, and co-drafter (with Judge Giles S. Rich) of the Patent Act of 1952, Pasquale Joseph ("PJ") Federico (See also Pasquale Joseph Federico, Wikipedia), entitled "Operation of the Patent Act of 1790," 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 237, 338-239 (1936). This is a concrete affirmation of the standing JPTOS holds in the field of IP & Patent Law, and further motivation for publishing a forthcoming "Arthrex Issue" as well. You can see the citation below: 

 

 

06/16/21

Volume 101 Issue 3 is now available!

03/23/21

Knobbe Martens Logo

Patent Counsel – Medical Devices

Prominent IP law firm seeks motivated candidates to join our team.  

 

12/19/20

Knobbe Martens Logo

Patent Scientist – Electrical Engineering

 

Knobbe Martens provides an opportunity for engineers and scientists to further their professional growth and career development in exciting, challenging ways. Put your technical degree to work on issues involving science, technology, and the law. The candidate will assist with the successful procurement of patent protection for innovative technologies, evaluate the designs of new products, and assist with the evaluation of competitor products.

 

Each client brings novel and diverse technologies to our firm. Therefore, the candidate will learn about a variety of new technologies, learn to identify inventive features, learn to describe the inventions, and learn to convince the Patent Office to allow a patent for the technology. The position also requires a candidate to possess the ability to explain and describe new technologies in a way that is concise and descriptive. 

05/04/20

Preambles: Form over Substance

Roy Y. Yi

Patent claim preambles perplex and confound even the most seasoned patent practitioners. Ranging from inventors to Federal judges, understanding the purpose and meaning of a patent claim preamble is elusive; primarily in determining whether the preamble limits the scope of the patent claim. The Federal Circuit developed a framework to facilitate in determining a limiting preamble in Catalina Marketing International v. Coolsavings.com. The framework, however, does not recite any clear rules or tests for practitioners to performmaking preamble determination subjective in nature. This framework may leave a patent drafter feeling insecure that the preamble he writes will not be understood properly. Likewise, the USPTO also has difficulty in assessing the limiting or non-limiting nature of a claim preamble. Examiners use a non-legal authority manual during examination which is called the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). With the MPEP, the USPTO tries to describe and reduce legal principles into manageable and digestible pieces of legal information for the examiner. But like the Catalina framework, there are no clear rules or tests for the examiner to use; therefore, each examiner must determine the nature of preamble subjectively. 

04/13/20

I Wrote This, I Swear!: Protecting the “Copyright” of Fanfiction Writers from the Thievery of Other Fanfiction Writers

Narisa Bandali

People who write fanfiction do so to explore, sustain, and contribute to content to which they feel a connection––content that is generally protected under copyright. The legal status of fanfiction in comparison to copyright law is a gray area, but fanfiction is generally considered to be transformative. Regardless of how a court may view fanfiction, writers of fanfiction invest time, effort, and passion into works that can sometimes be longer than a normal published novel. While fanfiction is currently a topic of discussion in the legal world, plagiarism of fanfiction tends to be ignored. Similarly, plagiarism within the fanfiction community does not currently have any real regulation besides social pressure, like online shaming. 

03/30/20

Vanda v. West-Ward: Swinging Back the Pendulum for Patenting Natural Phenomena

Kevin A. Sforza, Ph.D.

Since the Human Genome Project was completed in 2001, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office granted patent protection to nearly sixty thousand DNA-based patents, about twenty-six hundred of which are for isolated DNA. However, the rulings of two Supreme Court decisions, Mayo in 2012 and Myriad in 2014, put an end to the laissez-faire environment for DNA-based patents. Under those decisions, natural gene and protein sequences are per se ineligible subject matter. The Court’s decisions left the USPTO and many DNA-based patent-holders bewildered. While the Court attempted to define a bright-line rule proscribing natural phenomena, known as the Mayo/Alice framework, its lack of clear guidance on how to apply the test left the lower courts to wrestle with its practical administration. The Supreme Court rightfully aimed to avoid preempting researchers and the public from using natural phenomena, but in doing so gutted the patent incentives for modern research. This Note argues that in a recent decision, Vanda v. West-Ward, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit misapplied the Mayo/Alice framework when analyzing a method patent involving a natural relationship. However, the Federal Circuit was justified in redrawing the bounds of patentable subject matter requirements for pro-patent and pro-scientific research reasons. The current patentability statutes under 35 U.S.C. bleed together, and clarifying the requirements may require Congressional and Supreme Court intervention and cooperation. 

03/09/20

Computer-Generated Inventions

Michael McLaughlin

Technological advancements in artificial intelligence have threatened the axiom that conception, the mental part of invention, is a function exclusive to the human mind. Recently, machine learning technologies have allowed artificially intelligent computers to compose patent claims that amount to patentable subject matter. This technology is similarly used by innovators to optimize design configurations beyond the scope of human capacity. The type of patent protection to be afforded to computer-assisted and computer-generated inventions with minimal to no human intervention has yet to be determined. This article illuminates how such technological advances could wreak havoc on the patent legal system as it currently stands. It then offers a proposal for a legal standard that is supported by the philosophical justifications for property rights. The structure of this proposal is derived from the human creativity framework used to analyze the copyrightability of computer-generated works –– paralleling the creativity standard to an intervention standard in the inventive process. Finally, this article provides a potential legislative and judicial framework for determining the amount of human intervention required to ensure protection against computer-assisted or computer-generated inventions. 

03/02/20

Patenting an Invention as a Free Black Man in the Nineteenth Century

Kathleen Wills

During the nineteenth century, the view of property rights in patents generally fell into two camps: an inventor’s inherent natural right to protect their property versus a limited-term monopoly that the government grants inventors. In the period before the Civil War, known as the antebellum period, lawmakers either viewed patents in the first camp as securing rights which coincided with the natural rights philosophy, or the second camp believing patents were government grants of limited monopolies. Lawmakers found textual support for the concept that patents involve regulation of economic development within the Constitution, including the Contract Clause, Patent Clause, and Commerce Clause. The foundational principles of patent law were often mentioned in early Supreme Court opinions that ensconced property rights, often written by Justice Taney, and those opinions are still cited by courts to this day.

As the debates ensued over which camp of fundamental perspective of patent law should govern, free black men faced many challenges in their fight to patent their inventions. One challenge came from the 1790 Patent Oath, where applicants had to swear to be both the “original” inventors of the claimed invention and citizens of the United States. While black inventors could fulfill the first requirement of the Oath and swear to be an original inventor, black inventors could not fulfill the second requirement because, in the years between 1857 and the 14th Amendment, black people were not seen as citizens of the U.S. This issue of citizenship which challenged free black men in their pursuit to procure patent rights was decided by the Supreme Court in 1857 with Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford (“Dred Scott”). Justice Taney held that neither slaves nor their descendants were citizens entitled to Constitutional rights. With the 1857 Dred Scott decision, free black men’s status and citizenship changed, altering their natural rights and privileges to property as guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court’s decision posed an immediate challenge to black inventors’ patent rights because, as non-citizens, they could not sign the Patent Oath. 

02/10/20

The Inherency Doctrine: A Performance Review

Ryan Pool

The doctrine of inherency is relatively straight forward and there is very little subjectivity in the proper analysis. Nevertheless, both Patent Examiners at the USPTO and many Applicants struggle to conduct a proper analysis under this doctrine.

The USPTO takes the position that “the claiming of a new use, new function or unknown property which is inherently present in the prior art does not necessarily make the claim patentable.” Whether a property is inherent or not is a question of fact, the fact in question being, does the claimed property inherently occur in the prior art. With regard to defining inherency in the context of patent law, the Federal Circuit held in In re Robertson that, “It is well-settled that inherency cannot be established by mere probabilities or possibilities.” As recent as 2016, the Federal Circuit citing Robertson offered the further definition that, “Inevitability is at the heart of inherency; ’that a certain thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.’” 

01/21/20

Everyone at the Journal would like to introduce the new Editor-in-Chief Johnathan Lindsey!

01/13/20

PTAB Practice Tips: Comparing Appealable and Petitionable Matters

James A. Worth

Practitioners considering an appeal to the Board should differentiate petitionable matters from appealable matters as early as possible to ensure that their arguments go to the right decision maker, and because petitionable matters have their own time clock for limitations. In an appeal, the Board is only permitted to consider the merits of an Examiner’s rejection. The Board is not permitted to review an Examiner’s other, procedural actions because the process of examination is within the exclusive purview of the Director, and is delegated by the Director to the Examiner. Thus, an applicant’s petition is reviewed by the Director, rather than the Board.

This article addresses the history of the distinction between appealable and petitionable matters, explains the modern codification of the law, and discusses examples of petitionable matters and other petitions.

12/23/19
12/10/19

Volume 101 Issue 2 is now available!

 

12/09/19

Here’s a sneak peak into Volume 101 Issue 2

  - PTAB Practice Tips: Comparing Appealable and Petitionable Matters 

The Honorable James A. Worth

             The Inherency Doctrine: A Performance Review 

Ryan Pool

            Patenting an Invention as a Free Black Man in the Nineteenth Century 

Kathleen Wills

               - Computer-Generated Inventions 

       Michael McLaughlin

- Vanda v. West-Ward: Swinging Back the Pendulum for Patenting Natural Phenomena 

Kevin A. Sforza

- I Wrote This, I Swear!: Protecting the "Copyright" of Fanfiction Writers from the Thievery of Other Fanfiction Writers 

Narisa Bandal

- Preambles: Form over Substance 

Roy Y. Yi

12/02/19

Warren D. Woessner and Robin A. Chadwick, Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.

Section 101 of the Patent Act (the Act) states that the following categories of invention are eligible for patent protection, so long as the other standards of patentability are met: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter, as well as improvements thereof. In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that a man-made microorganism was also eligible for patent protection under Section 101, reaffirming at the same time that no patents should be granted on laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract ideas. Instead, the Court emphasized that patent-eligible inventions must be generated by human ingenuity. Apart from its decision in 2001 that plants were also eligible for patenting, the Supreme Court had not again addressed whether living organisms, or their natural components, were patent eligible until 2012.

Although the courts have grappled for years with the “abstractness” of software claims, after about 2010 the courts turned their attention to life sciences patents, finding that many diagnostic claims were patent-ineligible as abstract ideas, while others were patent-ineligible for patenting as embracing natural phenomena. Shortly after the Bilski decision held that claims to a method of hedging commodity risk were patent-ineligible under Section 101 as an attempt to patent an abstract idea, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the Classen case involving an appeal of claims to immunization schedules, and then decided two biotech/pharma cases, the Mayo case in 2012 and the Myriad case in 2013. The application of the Supreme Court’s Mayo decision by the Federal Circuit to the prenatal testing claims in the PerkinElmer case and in the Ariosa case, as well as the Federal Circuit’s own rejection of the Myriad diagnostic claims suggests that claims directed to the use of biomarkers in personalized medicine have increasingly become vulnerable to attack by litigants as not constituting patent-eligible inventions. The recent Athena case further confirms the court’s stance against the patent eligibility of diagnostic claims. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has also issued a series of their own Memoranda outlining the patent eligibility of natural products, natural phenomena, and laws of nature. 

11/25/19

The Rumble About the Jungle: The Fight Over Dot Brand gTLDs and Geographic Names

J. Spencer Sanders II

In January 2012, The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”), the non-profit responsible for the maintenance and operations of the Internet, created a program designed to increase the number of generic top-level domains (“gTLDs”). The program’s purpose was to address the demand problem associated with gTLDs, increase competition, customer choice, and innovation. The first expansion closed in April 2012 and brought in over 1,900 applications for new gTLDs. The program came with its fair share of problems, with some applicants running into issues when applying for brand specific gTLDs. Specifically, the e-commerce giant Amazon’s application came under fire by countries in the Amazon rainforest region. The clothing company Patagonia and the hotel chain Shangri-La had similar problems with their gTLD applications for Patagonia and Shangri-La. After official opposition from representative members from each of the countries on ICANN’s Governmental Advisory Committee, the applications were put on hold and official processes started to decide whether the gTLD applications would be allowed to proceed. Issues over geographic name gTLDs and property rights in trademarks arose and the parties are still battling it out. The ICANN board needs to make changes in the promised second round of expansion to avoid these problems happening again. 

11/12/19
Volume 101 Issue 2 is coming soon! 
10/28/19

Who Owns A Fox? Possession is the root of title in patent law

Christine Johnson

What is it to possess? This appears a very simple question- there is none more difficult of resolution, and it is in vain that its solution is sought for in books of law: the difficulty has not even been perceived.”

The most valuable public resource in America today may lie in the public common of human ingenuity and ideas. Like ferae naturae ideas in the public common are not subject to individual ownership in their wild state. In English law private ownership of ferae naturae is acquired by taking possession of them. The state of possession raises prima facie title. The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to secure to inventors exclusive rights to their inventions. A patent is a deed that conveys title to an invention as private property. The title is granted in a quid pro quo exchange involving public rights. When the PTO issues a patent, it “take[s] from the public rights of immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee.” At the end of the patent’s term the invention described in the patent’s written description is conveyed to the public. Describing that invention in writing is an inventor’s burden in the quid pro quo exchange. The public benefits from the exchange to no more extent than the inventor meets this burden. To describe one’s invention one must have invented. Patents describing ideas for effects and results in the abstract of any completely conceived invention cause grave public harm. 

10/21/19

LOOKING FOR A NEEDLE IN A HAYSTACK: LIMITATIONS OF SEARCHING FOREIGN TRADEMARK ON TESS

Yan Song

Every element of a design mark in a US federal trademark application is assigned a design search code, a numerical classification index that codifies design figurative elements into categories, divisions and sections. There are 29 categories with hundreds of sub divisions and sections per category. Design search codes act as the equivalent of a filing system by which all possible design elements can be searched. However, symbol-based foreign languages are classified in one of only five categories. Since all syllable-based logographies (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) are assigned only five design search codes, an Examiner’s ability to search the mark as a design is extremely limited. To avoid approval of similar marks, an Examiner would have to compare the foreign mark to every other existing mark in the same category–an impracticality given that there are tens of thousands of logographic marks that exist. As such, an Examiner can search only the literal translation and phonetic translation of a foreign mark, so confusingly similar marks may be very well approved by the USPTO. This paper draws attention to the problem and investigates the abilities of other foreign trademark offices to perform comparable searches for foreign words. This paper begins by discussing how lingual communication functions in trademark and the difference between trademark in alphabetic language and logographic language. Next, it introduces functionality and limitation of USPTO for searching for foreign trademarks. By showing an example of foreign trademark search, it visualizes the problem of the TESS (Trademark Electronic Search System) database, from which reason of failure from linguistic perspective is also discussed. Ultimately, it suggests that technology of search system should be exchanged for the improvement on the reliability of TESS which would reduce the possibility of similar foreign marks being approved. 

09/09/19

THE NEW HIGHWAYMAN: ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. PATENTS ON CANNABIS PRODUCTS

William J. McNichol, Jr.

Patents play an important role in American business. Their stated purpose is to incentivize innovation and there is a large body of scholarship concerning how they perform this function. Scholars have noted the patent system’s “natural connection to innovation.” Patents long played an important role in in the related function of capital formation. This is no less true in the industries now emerging around sales of Cannabis products.5 However, under a long line of authorities going back to The Highwayman’s Case in 1725, the illegality of the use, possession, and distribution of these products probably creates an insurmountable barrier to the enforcement of most patents that claim Cannabis products or their use. This means that, with respect to the Cannabis industry, the U.S. patent system is unlikely to play its customary roles of incentivizing innovation and encouraging investment. 

08/26/19

PTAB Practice Tips: Comparing a Motion to Strike and a Motion to Exclude

James A. Worth

Upon instituting an AIA trial proceeding, a panel of the Board issues a scheduling order that provides a timeline for discovery, for the filing of briefs, and for the date of an oral hearing. Parties may contact the Board to request an initial conference call if there is a need to propose changes to the scheduling order or propose motions that have not been provided for by the scheduling order or by the PTAB Rules. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,765–66 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“TPG”); Trial Practice Guide Update (“Update”) at 24. Otherwise, parties may proceed with discovery and briefing without consulting the Board. Occasionally, parties will have a dispute about the scope of discovery or briefing that they cannot resolve on their own, and will ask the panel to resolve the issue, usually in the run up to the hearing. Disputes over the scope of argument and evidence may result in a motion to strike or a motion to exclude. 

08/19/19

The Current State of Innovation within the U.S. Legal System – Views on Evolving Protection for Intellectual Property Rights in the United States from the USPTO and the Courts

Andrei Iancu

Good afternoon everyone! Thank you, Pete Thurlow, for that generous introduction. It’s a great honor to open today’s panel discussion on the current state of innovation within the U.S. legal system, and I appreciate NYIPLA’s gracious invitation to be part of this outstanding annual event.

This very day 59 years ago, on March 22, 1960, the United States Patent Office issued patent number 2,929,922 to New York native Arthur Schawlow of Bell Labs and Charles Townes, a Columbia University professor and consultant to Bell Labs, for coinventing the optical maser—now called a laser. While doing postdoctoral research at Columbia University, Schawlow met Townes, and together they sought ways to extend the maser principle of amplifying electromagnetic waves into the shorter wavelengths of infrared and visible light.

In 1958, the two scientists published a proposal for the invention in an issue of Physical Review, prompting an international competition to build a working laser. Today, of course, lasers have countless applications and make it possible to play CDs, correct eyesight, scan labels in a grocery store, enable autonomous vehicles, measure time precisely, survey planets and galaxies, and even witness the birth of stars. 

08/12/19

PTOS Annual Meeting Keynote Address Will You Be My Valentine: Celebrating the USPTO Examiner Through History

Laura A. Peter

Today it is my honor to address so many patent and trademark examiners, and to celebrate you. You are the reason why our U.S. intellectual property system is so incredible. You are all highly educated experts in your fields. Every day, you work diligently to ensure that the patents and trademarks that this agency issues are strong and reliable. So today, I want to thank you and show you how much our agency has evolved over the last two centuries.

On this Valentine’s Day, let us start with taking a closer look at some of the jewelry, flowers, and candy associated with today through the lens of intellectual property.

When you get home tonight and your valentine gives you a special blue jewelry box, you will instantly know it’s from Tiffany & Co. Tiffany received a registered trademark for that particular blue color over 20 years ago. And the original Tiffany & Co. trademark dates back to 1893. Tiffany also holds 36 design patents and even a utility patent for a clip-on earring force tester.

The bouquet of red roses you sent to your sweetheart may even be patented. In 1931, the first plant patent issued for a climbing rose. In fact, 4% of all plant patents are for varieties of roses. 

08/05/19

Rossman Memorial Award 2019

Joshua Schwartz

The Rossman Committee was privileged to present the 2019 Joseph Rossman Memorial Award to Judge Hung Bui during the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.

The award was established in 1972 by the Society and the family of Dr. Joseph Rossman. Joseph Rossman started his career as a patent examiner and was Editor-in-Chief of The Journal back in the 1930s. He had degrees in chemical engineering and law, as well as a doctorate in psychology. In addition, Dr. Joseph Rossman was an author with a life-long interest in creativity, engineering and law. Dr. Joseph Rossman was the author of many articles in the Journal from the 1930s through the 1960s. Because the Journal was such a big part of Dr. Rossman’s life, his family approached the Society with the idea of establishing the Rossman Award in 1972. The Society enthusiastically embraced the idea and the rest is history. The Rossman Award is given to the author of the article in the Journal that, in the opinion of the judges, makes the greatest contribution to the fields of Patents, Trademarks or Copyrights. Factors that are taken into consideration include originality, timeliness of the subject, depth of research, accuracy, readability, and the potential for impact on the existing system. 

07/29/19

Federico Memorial Award 2019

Joshua Schwartz

The Federico Committee was privileged to present the 2019 Pasquale J. Federico Memorial Award to The Honorable (Ret.) Randall Rader during the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.

In 1993, the SOCIETY established the Pasquale J. Federico Memorial Award. The Federico Award is intended to recognize outstanding contributions to the Patent and Trademark Systems of the United States of America. It may be given to an individual, a group of individuals, a corporation or an institution. Awards to individuals may be made posthumously. No more than one award may be given in each year. Anyone may make a nomination.

Judge Randall Rader is a graduate of Brigham Young University and the George Washington University Law School. Judge Rader served as Counsel, to the House of Representatives, Interior and Ways and Means Committees from 1975-1980. Then served as Chief Counsel, to the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittees from 1980-1988. President Ronald Reagan appointed Rader to the United States Court of Federal Claims in 1988, to succeed Robert M. M. Seto. The United States Senate confirmed the nomination by unanimous consent on August 11, 1988. He served there for approximately two years. On June 12, 1990, Rader was nominated by President George H. W. Bush to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated by Judge Jean Galloway Bissell. Rader was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 1990, and received his commission on August 9, 1990. In 2010, Rader became Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit succeeding Chief Judge Paul Redmond Michel upon his retirement. He served in that capacity through May of 2014. Since leaving the bench in 2014, Judge Rader has founded the Rader Group, initially focusing on arbitration, mediation, and legal consulting and legal education services. 

07/22/19

JPTOS Editor-in-Chief Personal Notes: Two-Prongs within Step 2A

Alexander Sofocleous

Pondering subject matter eligibility, while browsing the aisles of my favorite hardware store, the following fleeting thought entertained my wandering mind: Anticipation and obviousness rejections involve the difference between a claim and prior art. Does subject matter eligibility involve a difference between the claim and a claimed judicial exception? Should it be more challenging to differentiate a claim (as a whole) from elements in the claim than to differentiate the same claim from applied prior art?

While studying USPTO’s notice of examination guidance and request for comments, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), I found it helpful to diagram Step 2A side-by-side the former flow-chart, from 2014 Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74618, 74621 (Dec. 16, 2014). 

07/15/19

Predicting Institution Decisions in Inter Partes Review Proceedings

Yuh-Harn Yang, Pu-Jen Cheng, and Feng-Chi Chen

Inter partes review (IPR) was introduced in Year 2012 as an adversarial, post-grant patent review process. The principle of claim construction (broadest reasonable interpretation), standard of proving unpatentability (preponderance of evidence), and shortened time to final decision (18-24 months) have made IPR a popular venue for patent challengers. Institution of an IPR mounts substantial pressures on the patentee because the challenged claims are highly likely to be invalidated in the final decision. Therefore, a reliable model to predict institution decisions is critical for patent and business management. In this study, we construct three support vector machine (SVM) models separately based on the contexts of IPR proceedings and features of the disputed patents. The ensemble model that incorporated the three SVMs can predict institution decisions with 79% accuracy and 0.85 Area under the ROC Curve. Separately, the IPR context-based models perform better than the patent feature-based model. Interestingly, most of the features traditionally regarded important for patent values are not significantly associated with institution decisions. Furthermore, models trained on earlier IPR documents can accurately predict the institution decisions in later proceedings. The prediction accuracy increases with the accumulation of training data. In addition, our approach can identify IPR context features that may influence institution decisions. Our results can provide an empirical basis for IPR policy making and business strategic planning. 

07/08/19

The Good Faith, the Bad Faith and the Ugly

Katherine Hunziker

If a person1 has a federally registered trademark, that person enjoys all the rights and protections provided by the Lanham Act across the country, excluding areas in which another person was using the mark prior to federal application. A federal registration confers constructive notice of priority throughout the country beginning at the time of application. Thus, an owner of a registered trademark can enjoin any subsequent user from using that mark. An unregistered trademark owner, however, has common law rights to their mark, but only in the areas in which it is being used in commerce and known by the relevant public. As a result, the first to use the unregistered mark (the senior user) cannot claim priority over a subsequent remote use of the mark by another person (the junior user) who adopted the mark in good faith.

The issue addressed here arises when one or both of the users of the same or similar unregistered mark expand into one another’s territory. Of course, the senior user can not enjoin the junior user without first proving that he has a protectable mark and that the junior user’s use of the same or similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion. Thus, once the junior and senior user expand, and their respective uses of the marks are likely to cause consumer confusion, the junior user can raise the affirmative defense provided by the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine. Once the junior user has established that she adopted the mark in good faith, the senior user may not oust the geographically remote junior user, regardless of the fact that the senior user was the first to adopt the mark. 

06/26/19

Preclusive Effect of the International Trade Commission’s Patent Decisions: Can District Courts Ignore Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.?

Emre Yuzak

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, gives complainants a powerful remedy against unfair practices in import trade. It permits the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) to exclude certain items from importation, directing Customs and Border Patrol to deny their entry. Section 337, with its liberal grants of exclusion orders, attracts mainly intellectual property disputes, including several high-profile smartphone cases.

Litigants in section 337 cases may also bring their disputes to state or federal court, raising the question of what preclusive effect the ITC’s decision has. In Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., the Federal Circuit ruled that parties cannot rely on the ITC’s decision in patent cases to apply claim preclusion or issue preclusion in other cases. 

06/18/19

Taking Patent Rights: Sovereign Immunity & the Fourteenth Amendment in Patent Validity & Inventorship Challenges

Connor J. Hansen

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property without due process of law” and has been interpreted to incorporate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Collectively, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Takings Clause, prohibit a state from depriving property owners of all economically beneficial use of their property without providing compensation for that deprivation.

A patent “confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more that it can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to a private purchaser.” Patent rights “fall squarely within both classical and judicial definitions of protectable property” that may be taken. This is largely because the right to exclude others concomitant with patent rights is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” When a sovereign owns an invalid patent or a patent to which it is not entitled, it has the right to exclude all others, even those who are the rightful owner of the patent or those who developed the prior art that would render the patent invalid, from practicing the claimed innovation. Other parties are also precluded from obtaining patent rights for the subject matter encompassed in the sovereign patent. The state has effectively appropriated from those parties the entire bundle of exclusionary rights conferred by a patent. 

05/28/19

The Likelihood of Exclusion: Economic Disparity in the United States Trademark System

Michael J. Choi

Trademarks are integral in the marketplace, serving as identifiers of the source of a business’s goods or services. Consumers rely on trademarks not only as source identifiers, but also as “quality guarantor[s] and consumer status symbol[s].” Entrepreneurs use trademarks to develop a brand and pursue opportunities for economic mobility. Although trademarks originally sprouted to protect consumers from fraud and counterfeit, the actual effects of modern trademark law severely overshadow these traditional purposes. Patterns in legislation and interpretations reveal a system of favoring the haves over the havenots, depriving have-nots of both offensive and defensive protections otherwise provided by trademark law.

The value of a trademark in modern day is the mark itself, rather than the brand it represents. Companies take just as much pride in their logos and brands as their actual products and services. As a personal property right, a trademark creates the duty to diligently manage and oversee these rights. However, overzealous trademark policing creates a hostile climate for the freedom of expression, the entrepreneurial spirit, and ultimately, a competitive and free-flowing marketplace. As a result, small businesses and other marginalized groups, often lacking the resources of large companies, are effectively excluded from the trademark system. 

05/20/19

Warning! Patent Agent Privilege Ends Abruptly

Matthew M. Welch

Say I have lost all faith in patents, judges, and everything related to patents. –Thomas Edison

Thomas Edison and many of the innovators following in his footsteps have been disgruntled and discouraged by United States patent law. However, patentintensive industries promote innovation, increase the GDP, and create millions of jobs. Patent law is vital to the continued prominence of America as a world power, and, to continue that prominence, patent law must adapt to current times. As a start, it must begin providing solutions to a number of problems plaguing the patent realm. One of the most outstanding problems currently running course through patent law is the dynamic between the attorney-client privilege and patent agents. The problem is two-fold. First, some courts have extended the privilege to patent agents, but the way they are treating this privilege is insufficient. Second, other courts are not recognizing the privilege whatsoever.

Attorney-client privilege is a pillar of the legal system that is entrenched throughout the United States. This privilege was instituted to allow full and frank discussions between clients and their attorneys. The purpose behind this was to allow attorneys to fully represent their clients based on all available facts. However, attorneys are not the only players in the field of patent law. In fact, one fourth of all patent practitioners are non-attorneys. These individuals are patent agents. 

05/15/19

BRUCE A. LEHMAN 1993-1998

Bruce A. Lehman was born in Beloit, Wisconsin, on September 19, 1945. He received history and law degrees from the University of Wisconsin – Madison and served as legal counsel to the Wisconsin state legislature before entering military service during the Vietnam War. He was a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army.  

Afterward he worked at the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. He joined the staff of the House Judiciary Committee when it was considering a recommendation to impeach President Richard Nixon. In 1978 he was appointed chief counsel of the Judiciary subcommittee with jurisdiction over intellectual property issues. He then spent 10 years in private law practice in Washington, where he was active in civic affairs.

President Bill Clinton appointed Lehman assistant secretary of commerce and commissioner of patents and trademarks, and he entered service on August 11, 1993. He was the first openly gay man to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate. 

05/13/19

PTAB Practice Tips on Oral Arguments

James A. Worth

PTAB oral arguments provide an opportunity for parties to highlight select points from their written briefs and to answer questions from the panel hearing the case. Failing to answer questions from the panel is one of the quickest ways to lose credibility with the panel. This article sets forth certain considerations and practice tips for counsel appearing for arguments before the PTAB.

In particular, this article suggests that counsel refrain from relying on evidence not already of record or new theories of a case, that counsel prepare for a wide range of questions based on the record, and with respect to AIA hearings, that counsel may wish to take a flexible approach towards the use of slide presentations and exhibits. This article will address each suggestion in turn, and review some of the animating considerations. 

05/07/19

Here’s a sneak peak into Volume 101 Issue 1

  • Federico and Rossman Awards 2019
Joshua Schwartz
  • PTAB Annual Meeting Keynote Address – Will You Be My Valentine: Celebrating the USPTO Examiner Through History
The Honorable Laura A. Peter
  • The Current State of Innovation within the U.S. Legal System – Views on Evolving Protection for Intellectual Property Rights in the United States
The Honorable Andrei Iancu
  • PTAB Practice Tips: Comparing a Motion to Strike and a Motion to Exclude
The Honorable James A. Worth
  • The New Highwayman: Enforcement of U.S. Patents on Cannabis Products
William J. McNichol, Jr.
  • Looking for a Needle in a Haystack: Limitations of Searching Foreign Trademark on TESS
Yan Song
  • Who Owns Fox? Possession is the Root of Title in Patent Law
Christine Johnson
  • The Rumble About the Jungle: The Fight Over Dot Brand gTLDs and Geographic Names
J. Spencer Sanders, II
  • Section 101: What’s Left to Patenting in the Life Sciences after Myriad, Mayo, and Alice?
Warren D. Woessner & Robin A. Chadwick

05/01/19

 

HARRY F. MANBECK JR. 1990-1992

Harry F. Manbeck Jr., was born in Honesdale, Pennsylvania on June 26, 1926. He received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Lehigh University and was hired as an engineer by General Electric Co. in 1949. A few years later he received a law degree from the University of Louisville and became a GE patent attorney.

He rose through the ranks at GE, a company with a large patent department, to become the chief patent counsel, a position he would hold for 20 years. During that period he was a prolific, well-known speaker on intellectual property rights.

President George H.W. Bush appointed Manbeck assistant secretary of commerce and commissioner of patents and trademarks, and he took the oath of office on March 12, 1990.


 

04/24/19

DONALD J. QUIGG 1985-1989

Donald J. Quigg was born April 28, 1916, in Kansas City, Missouri. He received a bachelor’s degree in business administration from the University of Oklahoma and a law degree from the University of Missouri. After a brief period with a law firm he entered the U.S. Army during World War II and received the Silver Star Medal for valor in combat.

In 1946 he joined Phillips Petroleum Co. in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, as a staff patent attorney and studied chemistry at night. In an era when employees often stayed with a company for an entire career, Quigg was a Phillips patent attorney for 35 years and was named an inventor in 10 Phillips patents.

He was chief patent counsel for his last 10 years at Phillips. Although Quigg worked at Phillips headquarters in Oklahoma, he was responsible for an office the company maintained in Washington, D.C., to train patent attorneys. The office monitored patent legislation and regulations for Phillips, giving Quigg familiarity with patent policy issues in Washington.

In 1981 he retired and took the post of deputy commissioner of patents and trademarks. After four years as deputy President Ronald Reagan appointed him assistant secretary of commerce and commissioner of patents and trademarks. He took office on October 13, 1985, at age 69. 

04/17/19

GERALD J. MOSSINGHOFF 1981-1985

Gerald J. Mossinghoff was born in St. Louis on September 30, 1935. He received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from St. Louis University and a law degree from George Washington University.

He worked four years as an examiner at the Patent Office, starting in 1957, before leaving to join a law firm. He returned to government service for a series of jobs including the post of director of legislative planning at the USPTO. Later, at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, he rose to the position of deputy general counsel. 

President Ronald Reagan appointed Mossinghoff commissioner of patents and trademarks, and he took the oath of office on July 8, 1981. The next year Congress changed the title to Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and Mossinghoff reported directly to the secretary of commerce. 

04/02/19

SIDNEY A. DIAMOND 1979-1981

Sidney A. Diamond was born October 17, 1914, in New York City. He received a bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth College and a law degree from Harvard University.

He practiced law in New York City and Washington, D.C. From 1943-46 he worked for the Justice Department as special attorney and special assistant to the attorney general. From 1971-78 he lived in Tucson, Arizona.

In the spring of 1978 President Jimmy Carter appointed Diamond assistant commissioner of trademarks, a post that at the time required presidential appointment with Senate confirmation. Later that year President Carter elevated him to commissioner of patents and trademarks. Diamond took the oath of office on November 29, 1979. 

03/26/19

DONALD W. BANNER 1978-1979

Donald W. Banner was born in Chicago on February 24, 1924. He was a P-47 fighter pilot during World War II and was shot down in Europe and held as a prisoner of war until 1945. After the war he received an electrical engineering degree from Purdue University and law degrees from the University of Detroit and The John Marshall Law School. 

He was a patent attorney for Borg-Warner Corp. for 25 years, working on projects that included development of automatic transmissions for automobiles. He was chief patent counsel for his last 12 years with the company. Three of his five children also were intellectual property attorneys.

He was first nominated to be commissioner of patents and trademarks by President Richard Nixon but decided not to accept the appointment. In 1978 he was nominated again, by President Jimmy Carter, and took the oath of office on June 5, 1978. 

03/20/19

C. MARSHALL DANN 1974-1977

C. Marshall Dann was born in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, on March 27, 1915. His father was an engineer with Westinghouse Electric Corp. He received a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, a master’s degree in chemistry from the University of Delaware, and a law degree from Georgetown University.

He spent 36 years with E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., at the time the world’s largest chemical company. He started as a research chemist in Wilmington, Delaware, and was named as the inventor in a U.S. patent. He decided to take advantage of a DuPont program in Washington, D.C., that allowed employees to work in the company’s Washington office as patent apprentices while attending law school. Many large companies ran apprentice programs during that era. After law school he returned to Wilmington and rose to the position of chief patent counsel of the company, managing more than 100 patent lawyers. 

03/18/19

The Effects of AI Technology on Personal Injury Litigation

 

By: Rae Steinbach

 

The history of artificial intelligence dates back to the 1950s, but it has been taking on a larger role in our personal and business lives in more recent years. Machine learning and other AI technologies have taken 450% more jobs since just 2013, and that trend is only going to continue.

 

While many people anticipated the gradual introduction of artificial intelligence into lower-skilled jobs, fewer expected the technology to apply to more complex settings such as the law. Personal injury lawyers and their area of practice have already been profoundly affected by the rise of AI, substantially increasing client access to legal resources.

 

Streamlining Claims with Artificial Intelligence

 

Compared to the current timeline involved in processing insurance claims, artificial intelligence promises a significant upgrade. Using AI software, claim processing time could be reduced to as little as five seconds. Efficiency is further aided by chatbots which can respond to simple customer inquiries.

 

The Limits of AI

 

While insurance companies obviously see significant potential in the integration of artificial intelligence, there may also be some cases in which the human element is needed. Personal injury lawyers will need to take on challenges made by plaintiffs who believe artificial intelligence made the incorrect decision.

 

It’s also difficult to determine whether an algorithm will be able to capture everything relevant to the outcome of a claim. Much of the responsibility will rest with lawyers, as they will need to learn which types of cases are likely to be missed by prevailing AI technology.

03/13/19

ROBERT GOTTSCHALK 1972-1973

Robert Gottschalk was born on January 10, 1911, in New York City. He received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from McGill University and a law degree from St. Lawrence University. Gottschalk practiced with law firms and was a patent counsel with companies including Corn Products Inc. and GAF Corp. He spoke and wrote frequently about patent law.

In May 1970 Gottschalk moved to Washington, D.C., to become deputy commissioner of patents. The position he took had for many years been called First Assistant Commissioner in the statute, but in 1969 the Patent Office expanded the duties for the position and adopted the deputy title by executive action. The statute was later amended to use the deputy title as well.

After his predecessor resigned, Gottschalk served as acting commissioner for several months, after which President Richard Nixon appointed him commissioner of patents. He took the oath of office on January 7, 1972.

03/06/19

WILLIAM E. SCHUYLER JR. 1969-1971

William E. Schuyler Jr. was born on February 3, 1914, in Washington, D.C., and resided in the Washington area for his entire career. His mother operated a patent information business. He received a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from Catholic University and a law degree from Georgetown University. 

He was a law firm partner and litigator who represented clients in district court patent infringement trials throughout the United States. He argued many appeals in regional Courts of Appeals in the era before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established. He taught a law school course in patent litigation for more than 20 years.

President Richard Nixon appointed Schuyler commissioner of patents, and he took the oath of office on May 7, 1969.

03/04/19

Unitary Patents & Unified Patent Court: The Start of a new Epoch in the European Patent System?

Markus Nolff

Since signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957, creating the European Economic Community, a community patent was thought to be necessary to further the goal of forming and furthering a single, common market. After various failed attempts within the last fifty years, the so-called “unitary patent” is on the brink of becoming reality. The unitary patent will be of a unitary character, granted and administered centrally at the European Patent Office, with unitary effect throughout almost the entire European Union. Start of availability of the unitary patent is linked to the establishment of a Unified Patent Court which will have exclusive judicial competence regarding any action, including infringement and revocation, concerning the unitary patent. The unitary patent in combination with the Unified Patent Court is expected to considerable ease the effort and cost for acquisition, maintenance, and enforcement of patent protection, thereby further incentivizing research and development. However, enactment has been held up by a pending constitutional complaint before the German Federal Constitutional Court and is now also complicated by the upcoming Brexit. It is currently unclear whether and when the relevant treaty might enter into force.

02/27/19

EDWARD J. BRENNER 1964-1969

Edward J. Brenner was born in Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin, on June 26, 1923. He received bachelor’s and master’s degrees in chemical engineering and a law degree from the University of Wisconsin. 

He served in the U.S. Army and was a member of the radiological safety team for the Bikini Atoll nuclear bomb tests. He was an engineer and patent attorney with Standard Oil of New Jersey’s Esso Research and Engineering Co., where he became assistant director of the legal division.

President Lyndon Johnson appointed Brenner commissioner of patents, and he took the oath of office on March 11, 1964.

02/25/19

Why Patent Ownership Disputes Can Make or Break Consumer Product Launches

By Bradley J. Van Pelt

In the race to produce the latest and greatest consumer products, companies working with outside consultants and manufacturers must establish clear lines indicating who are the actual patent owners and inventors of the products’ designs and concepts. If those lines of patent ownership and invention are vague or your ideas get exposed publicly before patent filings, the product launch could become mired in litigation, possibly causing the product to fail completely. Also, as companies move manufacturing out of China due to the tariff situation, they should consider how their IP will be protected as they evaluate other manufacturing sites around the globe.

1) What are the biggest risks for companies working with outside consultants and manufacturers during the development of a consumer product?

When developing or finalizing product design with an outside consultant or manufacturer (vendor) who may help in the development of the commercial product, it may become unclear who invented each aspect of the design. It is very important to file for patent protection before the company developing the product enters into any discussions with vendors.

If an application has not been filed before vendor involvement and if a vendor contributes to the invention, it may partially belong to the vendor unless there is an agreement that requires the vendor to assign the rights back your company. Without such an agreement and/or prior patent protection, the vendor may claim that the product concept is theirs and try to sell it to other customers.

Also, when vendors are helping other competitors solve similar problems or manufacture a similar product, your ideas may leak intentionally or inadvertently into your competitors’ products. For example, while visiting the vendor, a competitor may happen to see your product sample that you are developing with the vendor’s help. That competitor may then launch a product very similar to yours before you get the chance to publicize, officially launch, or file for patent protection for your product.

02/20/19

DAVID L. LADD 1961-1963

David L. Ladd was born in Portsmouth, Ohio, on September 18, 1926. He attended Kenyon College for a year before serving in the U.S. Army. He received a bachelor’s degree from the University of Chicago, attended Illinois Institute of Technology, and returned to the University of Chicago to earn his law degree. After graduation he practiced patent, trademark, and copyright law in Chicago for about eight years.

President John Kennedy appointed Ladd commissioner of patents, and he took office on April 17, 1961. At 34, he was the second youngest person to hold the position. The youngest was William Bishop, who was appointed at age 31 in 1859.

02/13/19

Robert C. Watson was born in Washington, D.C., on November 21, 1890. His father was a patent attorney. 

Watson received a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from Lehigh University, where he was an intercollegiate heavy-weight wrestling champion. His first job was in Baltimore with the Pennsylvania Railroad. He earned a law degree from Georgetown University in 1917.

He served in the U.S. Army in World War I. In 1922 he married Sarah Latimer, daughter of a U.S. senator from South Carolina. Watson practiced patent law in Washington for about 30 years until President Dwight Eisenhower appointed him commissioner of patents. He took the oath of office on February 18, 1953.

02/11/19

Inventing Venice: An Urban and Environmental Innovation Model from the Lagoon City

Richard L. Hindle

Innovation in physical urban infrastructure is a vital component of city making in an era of sea level rise, climate change, and rapid urbanization. Venice pioneered an urban and environmental innovation model in the 14th and 15th century, successfully negotiating the cities complex geography and the sociotechnical processes that characterized Renaissance urbanism. A review of early inventor rights issued in the city suggests that the process of patent innovation facilitated urbanization of the Venetian lagoon through development of advanced drainage, dredge, irrigation, and reclamation infrastructure, essential to the city’s survival. In addition to granting patents for new inventions, the Venetian government established expert review for proposed inventions, supported prototyping and testing for untried technologies, and used patent rights to attract experts with novel inventions from across Italy and Europe. These processes, in addition to the extensive dossier of patents issued in Venice, substantiate the primacy of innovation in the process of urbanization and revel an urban innovation model. Patent law later spread along Venetian trade routes through Europe, where they were also employed in economic modernization, and the construction of urban and regional infrastructure. Interestingly, similar process can later be observed throughout Europe and the United States as patent rights were constitutionalized.

02/06/19

JOHN A. MARZALL 1949-1953

John A. Marzall was born on March 8, 1896, in Chicago and practiced law there after living in New York. President Harry Truman appointed him commissioner of patents, and he took the oath of office on December 2, 1949, the day after Commission Kingsland resigned.

A highlight of Marzall’s tenure was the 1952 Patent Act, generally considered at the time to be the most important patent statute since the examining system started in 1836. The House Judiciary Committee published a preliminary draft of the legislation in 1950 and requested comments from the public. The committee circulated another draft in 1951 and held hearings.

02/04/19

Rebutting §102-rejections under Net MoneyIN v. VeriSign, as illustrated by opinions from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)

Tom Brody

Net MoneyIN (Fed. Cir. 2008) is one of the few Federal Circuit cases available that relate to anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102). Fortunately, opinions from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) provide a family of fact-patterns, where these opinions demonstrate that Net MoneyIN can be applied to a variety of situations that are much greater than the facts of the Federal Circuit case. Net MoneyIN has been successfully applied in cases before the Board, to compel the Board to reverse in the following situations. These situations include: (1) The prior art reference identifies two or more of the claim elements in two or more distinct locations, e.g., in Example One and Example Two, in Figure 1 and Figure 2, or in Example One and in the background information of the prior art reference; (2) Anticipation rejection based on “picking and choosing” a claim element from a disclosure in the prior art reference, where the disclosure takes the form of a long list of chemicals or other substances; (3) Where the arrangement of parts (structures) in the prior art device is different from the arrangement of corresponding parts that is required by the claim; (4) Where the examiner, in imposing a §102 rejection, had invoked a doctrine that belongs not to the anticipation inquiry, but instead to the obviousness inquiry. This article is a manual that provides the practitioner with tools for rebutting §102-rejections that go far beyond those provided by Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California (Fed. Cir. 1987). Regarding the situation where the arrangement of parts are different, it is useful to remember that there exist at least three types of claim elements – structural elements, functional elements, and elements that describe arrangements of structures.

01/23/19

LAWRENCE C. KINGSLAND 1947-1949

Lawrence C. Kingsland was born in St. Louis on April 11, 1884. He attended Washington University in St. Louis and received a degree from Washington University School of Law in 1908. 

For the next 39 years he practiced patent law in St. Louis, including as the first-named senior partner in a law firm. At the request of the Department of Commerce he served as an adviser to the Philippines government on drafting that country’s patent and trademark laws.

President Harry Truman appointed Kingsland commissioner of patents, and he took the oath of office on September 10, 1947. Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman, a later governor of New York and twice-unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination for president, administered the oath.

01/22/19

The American Association of Patent Judges

The Honorable Hubert C. Lorin

We are pleased to announce the formation of The American Association of Patent Judges (AAPJ). Since March 2, 1861,1 when an appeal to three Examiners-In-Chief (EIC) in the Patent Office was first provided for, approximately 489 individuals have served as an EIC, or its descendant, an Administrative Patent Judge (APJ). In the fall of 2015, several members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office envisioned an educational and charitable organization to honor of all those EICs and APJs who have served and who continue to contribute to the stewardship of the patent provision in the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution. The AAPJ is the culmination of that vision.

01/16/19

CASPAR W. OOMS 1945-1947

Caspar W. Ooms was born on August 30, 1902, in Chicago. He attended Knox College and the University of Chicago School of Commerce and Administration. He received a law degree from the University of Chicago in 1927. 

Following graduation from law school he clerked for a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Afterward he practiced law with various Chicago law firms until he entered government service. He specialized in patent litigation in courts throughout the United States, representing both patent owners and defendants. He argued three cases before the Supreme Court.

President Harry Truman appointed Ooms commissioner of patents, and he entered service on July 29, 1945. 

01/09/19

CONWAY P. COE 1933-1945

Conway P. Coe was born in Calvert County, Maryland, on October 21, 1897, and moved to the Washington, D.C., area at an early age. After receiving a B.A. from Randolph-Macon College he was hired as assistant examiner at the Patent Office but left five months later to serve in the U.S. Army during World War I. 

After the war he worked for a rubber company and then returned to the Patent Office as an assistant examiner. While at the office he earned a law degree from George Washington University. In 1923 he joined a law firm in Akron, Ohio, and later returned to Washington to open his own office. 

12/26/18

THOMAS E. ROBERTSON 1921-1933

Following Mr. Coulston’s term of office, which was the shortest on record, comes Mr. Robertson's, which was the longest [Note: While Mr. Robertson had the longest term as commissioner, Dr. Thornton was the longest-serving head of the Patent Office]. Having been appointed by President Harding, he served under Presidents Coolidge and Hoover and remained nearly four months under President Roosevelt.

Mr. Robertson was born May 7, 1871, in Washington, D. C., and educated in the local public schools. He studied in the George Washington University and the National University Law School, and holds honorary degrees from National University and Bates College.

12/19/18

MELVIN H. COULSTON 1921

Mr. Coulston’s short term of office is evidence, not of his unfitness for the position, but of a peculiarity of our political system. He was confirmed by the Senate on the evening of March 3, 1921, in the dying hours of the 66th Congress, to serve until the upcoming administration should appoint a Commissioner of their own choice.

Mr. Coulston is another Commissioner who came up through the ranks, having been appointed 4th Assistant Examiner February 17, 1902, and risen through the grades to First Assistant Commissioner prior to his Commissionership. He had also been Chief Clerk of the Patent Office.

12/17/18

The Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society Welcomes Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

Alexander Sofocleous, Hung H. Bui, and Seahvosh Nikmanesh

Palatine was to Rome as our Journal is to intellectual property. Our Journal’s palatines followed a tradition of welcoming the incoming and farwelling the parting, thus apprising our guild. Our first Editor-in-Chief George Prescott Tucker, cleverly quoted: “Welcome the coming, speed the parting guest.”

We welcome the Honorable Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Formerly a Managing Partner for Irell & Manella LLP, Mr. Iancu was nominated by President Donald J. Trump on August 26, 2017, confirmed by the Senate on February 5, 2018 in a 94 Yea to 0 Nay vote, and began his first official day on February 8, 2018.5 On Febrary 23, 2018, Mr. Iancu was ceremonially sworn-in by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross in the Madison Building, 1st floor, of USPTO’s Alexandria, VA headquarters. We thank Joe Matal, who performed the functions and duties of the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO from June 7, 2017 to February 7, 2018 with grace and distinction, and we wish him the best as he continues his federal career.

12/12/18

ROBERT FREDERICK WHITEHEAD 1920-1921

The son of a successful farmer and lawyer, Mr. Whitehead was born February 28, 1869, near Lovingston, Virginia. He attended the public schools and the University of Virginia, having by the year 1893 acquired a number of degrees at the latter institution. He taught school for a time, and then specialized in mathematics for two years at Johns Hopkins University.

12/10/18

Time for a Midlife Makeover for the PCT
Will pending Trade Agreements give the necessary Push?

Markus Nolff

Will the patent provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (that are also incorporated into the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and which very likely will also part of any renegotiated NAFTA) which, inter alia, would further harmonize some areas of patent law and impose additional patentability & patent acquisition requirements, including cooperation and work sharing between patent offices, give the necessary push to expand the role and scope of PCT’s international phase, for example, by merging chapter I & II and introducing an International Certificate of Patentability.

12/03/18

Tribal Sovereign Immunity at the Patent and Trademark Office

Brandon Andersen

The America Invents Act was at least partially designed to weed out invalid patents through administrative proceedings. One such proceeding, inter partes review, is popular among challengers but criticized by patent holders for its high invalidation rate. Some disgruntled patent holders have discovered an old doctrine as a potential new tool to avoid inter partes review: tribal sovereign immunity.

As sovereigns, Indian tribes are immune from suit unless Congress abrogates their immunity or a tribe waives it. If that immunity extends to inter partes review, a non-sovereign can avoid review by assigning his patent to an Indian tribe willing to license the patent back to him (for a fee). While beneficial to patent owners, this use of tribal sovereign immunity undermines the purpose of the America Invents Act, and Congress may respond by restricting tribes’ immunity.

11/28/18

JAMES T. NEWTON 1917-1920

The chaotic condition of the rest of the world was reflected in the affairs of the Patent Office at the time when Mr. Newton became Commissioner. The personnel seemed to be leaving "en masse," some going directly into the military service, and others seeking transfers to the more remunerative positions in the war bureaus. Civil service registers were exhausted. For many months it became necessary to go into the highways and the byways to induce people to assume employment in the Patent Office at a salary less than the market price, so that the Office could somehow function, and in some way deliver service. This was the situation that confronted Commissioner Newton, a situation that arose from uncontrollable causes, external to the Office, and was precipitated without notice. It was his duty to make the best of this critical circumstance, and he did it with courage, unfailing purpose, and with exceptional poise and good nature.

11/26/18

Should You Appeal? A Look at Success Rates Before the PTAB on an Individual Rejection Basis

Ryan Pool

Imagine an applicant faced with a final Office Action containing rejections with which they do not agree. They consider appealing the rejections, but only want to proceed to appeal if they feel they have a better than average chance of winning. Their application faces a rejection under 35 USC § 112 for Enablement and for lacking Written Description. Their application is also rejected under 35 USC § 102 and 103. This should be relatively easy to imagine as it is commonplace. From October 2016-October 2017, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) reported an intake of 11,796 appeals.

Deciding whether to appeal is a rather consequential decision, both in time (pendency remains around 18-24 months on average before a decision is rendered) and in money (government fees alone are almost $3,000 for large entities). Although every case is different and favorable facts make for favorable decisions, it remains helpful and informative to have a correct statistical perspective regarding likely outcomes before the PTAB.

11/21/18

THOMAS EWING 1913-1917

The name Ewing has been connected with public life and governmental functions over a considerable period of years. Thomas Ewing, Commissioner Ewing's grandfather, was the first Secretary of the Interior Department, having been appointed by President Zachary Taylor in 1849 when the Department was formed. Secretary Ewing was an eminent lawyer and was twice in the Senate from Ohio, having been in that body at the time the Patent Act of 1836 was under consideration and when it was passed, and there is a family tradition that he was active in the preparation of the bill. Secretary Ewing was also Secretary of the Treasury during the administration of President William Henry Harrison.

11/19/18

Three New Metrics for Patent Examiner Activity: Office Actions per Grant Ratio (OGR), Office Actions per Disposal Ratio (ODR), and Grant to Examiner Ratio (GER)

Shine Sean Tu

The current metric for examiner prosecution activity is allowance rate, which is calculated by dividing the total number of allowances by the sum of the allowances and abandonments (allowance rate = total allowance / (total allowances + total abandonments)). Importantly, however, allowance rates do not consider an examiner’s pending docket. Specifically, allowance rates do not fully capture if the examiner is simply writing office actions thereby prolonging prosecution or allowing cases. This study rectifies this failure by creating and analyzing a dataset that captures every active examiner’s current docket. Calculating the Office Action per Grant Ratio (OGR = Total # of Office Actions / Total # of Grants), this study’s new metric for measuring patent examiner activity, captures not only pending cases, but also helps decipher which examiners are spending their time allowing cases or writing Office Actions. This new metric indirectly helps determine if specific examiners are prolonging prosecution compared with peers within their Art Unit, Workgroup and Technology Center. Using the OGR score, this study elucidates how examiners in certain art units and Workgroups behave- specifically, which examiners in certain art units are more likely to write office actions or allow cases. To calculate the OGR, this study captures 8,537,660 office actions, 2,812,177 granted patents and 1,255,552 abandonments from 9,535 examiners from January 1, 2001 to June 8, 2017.

11/15/18

EDWARD BRUCE MOORE 1907-1913

Edward Bruce Moore was born at North Anson, Maine, December 25, 1851. At the age of fourteen he came to Washington, serving as a page in the Senate. In 1876 he became interested in newspaper work, becoming editor of the Washington Daily News and the Washington Daily Telegraph. He was admitted to the bar in 1881, and in 1883 entered the Patent Office as an Assistant Examiner in Division 1.

11/13/18

PTAB Practice Tips Post-SAS

James A. Worth and David P. Ruschke

On April 24, 2018, the Supreme Court held that a decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) to institute an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding may not institute on less than all claims challenged in a petition for review. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018) (“SAS”). Institution of an inter partes review is authorized by statute when “the information presented in the petition filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 311 and any response filed under [35 U.S.C. §] 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Prior to SAS, most panels exercised the discretion to institute only on those claims or grounds presented in the petition for which the PTAB determined a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail, pursuant to then-existing procedures. See SAS, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (discussing the procedural history and 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)). Now, under current guidance, if the PTAB institutes a trial, the PTAB will institute on all challenges raised in the petition. Guidance on the impact of SAS on AIA trial proceedings (USPTO Apr. 26, 2018), available at https://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial.

10/31/18

FREDERICK INNES ALLEN 1901-1907

Born at Auburn, New York, January 19, 1859, Frederick Innes Allen came from a prominent family of that city. Graduating from Yale in 1879, he received a class prize in mineralogy. He studied law and was admitted to the bar in 1882, beginning the practice of law in Auburn, where he remained until appointed Commissioner of Patents by President McKinley in 1901.

10/29/18

A COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO IMPLEMENT THE SUPREME COURT’S ALICE TWO-STEP FRAMEWORK TO PROVIDE “CERTAINTY” AND “PREDICTABILITY”

Hung H. Bui

Concepts and ideas are not patent-eligible, but methods employing those concepts and ideas may well be. Like ideas themselves, “abstract ideas” are not patent-eligible, but suffer much worse fate — these “abstract ideas” suffer the same “existential crisis” as all of us and, worse, levitate in purgatory before our better angels cogitate (1) “what makes an idea abstract” and (2) “what constitutes an abstract idea.” But the truth is: “no one understands what makes an idea ‘abstract.’” That did not stop us from searching for a legal construct to address these questions and to explore methods employing an “abstract idea” for patent eligibility. Like the myth of Sisyphus, we do because we must — even if those constructs failed and failed again, year after year.

In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the Supreme Court set forth an analytical two-step framework to determine whether a claim is directed to a judicial exception, i.e., an “abstract idea.” Since Alice, however, the Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) have all struggled to implement the Supreme Court’s Alice two-step framework in a predictable and consistent manner. For example, the Federal Circuit has issued several precedential decisions for patent eligibility of computer-implemented (software-related) and business method inventions under 35 U.S.C. § 101, including: (1) DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014); (2) Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016); (3) Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016); (4) McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); (5) Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc. 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016); (6) Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017); and (7) Visual Memory LLC v. Nvidia Corp., 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, none of these precedential decisions provides sufficient guidance as to what aspect of a claimed invention suffices for the claim to transition from ineligible to eligible.

10/24/18

CHARLES HOLLAND DUELL 1898-1901

Charles Holland Duell, twenty-fifth Commissioner of Patents, was the illustrious son of Robert Holland Duell, the fifteenth Commissioner of Patents.

Charles was born in Cortland, New York, April 13, 1850. Being graduated in 1872 from the Law Department of Hamilton College, he was soon thereafter admitted to the bar, and began the practice of law in New York City. Here he continued until 1880, with the exception of a short term as examiner in the Patent Office in 1875-1876. In 1880 he removed to Syracuse and continued the practice of law there, making a specialty of patent law, until called to Washington in 1898 as Commissioner of Patents. He returned to New York in 1901 to resume private practice until 1904, when he again returned to Washington to accept an appointment at the hands of President Roosevelt as Associate Justice of the U. S. Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. He continued on the bench until 1906, returning again to New York as senior member of the firm of Duell, Warfield and Duell. His interest with this firm continued until his death on January 29, 1920.

10/22/18

Part of a Larger Whole: How Combination Patents Show That Patent Exhaustion is Part of Patent Misuse

David B. Orange

The Supreme Court recently explained that selling a patented product “marks the point where patent rights yield to the common law principle against restraints on alienation.” This paper considers the law governing when an owner has a patent on a combination of parts, and sells one of the parts to a consumer. Currently, when a patent owner sells part of a patented combination, we apply an analysis that is similar to indirect infringement, and if no infringement exists at the time of sale, we assign all rights to the patent owner because we have only considered the exhaustion doctrine as though it were a distinct area of law. However, the present approach ignores that the sale was authorized and unconditional, so even if the entire patented combination was not exhausted, the consumer should not be in the same position as if the sale were unauthorized. Consequently, the exhaustion of combination patents leads to the same result as in Impression Products. 

10/02/18

JOHN S. SEYMOUR 1893-1897

John Seymour was born on September 28, 1848, and came from Colonial stock, his earliest ancestors in this country being found among the first settlers of Hartford, Connecticut. The first years of his life were spent at Whitney's Point, New York, his schooling being in the common schools and the Whitney's Point Academy. After graduating from Yale College and then studying law at the same institution, he returned to the place of his ancestors in Connecticut and there took up the practice of law in Norwalk. He held a number of prominent positions in that state before he was appointed Commissioner of Patents by President Cleveland during the latter's second administration.

10/01/18

The Patent Provisions of TPP: An Endpoint or should be just a mere Starting Point for more and better Patent Protection in a revised NAFTA

Markus Nolff

In his 2018 State of the Union Address, President Trump stated that, “one of my greatest priorities is to reduce the price of prescription drugs.” Few sentences later, President Trump stated that he, “will fix bad trade deals and negotiate new ones,” and “will protect ... American intellectual property through strong enforcement of the trade rules.” One week after the State of the Union Address, the Council of Economic Advisers released a study containing the following recommendations: (i) address high domestic prices by fostering better market price competition domestically and, (ii) to incentivize development of new (inventive) pharmaceutical products by addressing the low overseas pricing of pharmaceuticals which takes little account of the cost of their research and development (hereinafter “R&D”).

09/27/18

WILLIAM EDGAR SIMMONDS 1891-1893

Descended through his father from Daniel Webster, and through his mother from Roger de Coigneries, who came to England with William the Conqueror, it might well be expected that William Edgar Simmonds would make his mark in the world. Also he was another "Connecticut Yankee," being born at Canton, Connecticut, November 24, 1842.

His father having died when he was three years old, the mother succeeded in giving the children an excellent education. At the age of 16 William worked and contributed to the support of the family, saving enough besides to finance a normal school training for himself. From 1860 to 1862 he taught school, and then entered the Union army as a volunteer.

09/24/18

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Sovereignty In Tackling Transnational Counterfeits: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?

Qingxiu Bu

Transnational counterfeiting has grown tremendously with the increasing interdependence of global economy. The process of illicit financial flow has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance, and the resultant deficiency produces regulation vacuum where the cross-border crime can thrive. It is very necessary to consider the effect of service process of foreign defendants getting evidence. As illustrated in Gucci’s case, the U.S. court face great challenges in addressing extraterritorial jurisdiction. In the context of extraterritorial discovery, it remains unresolved how to prioritize competing jurisdictional claims. Remediation is compromised due largely to sensitivities over national sovereignty. The broad interpretation of sovereignty makes the Bank of China (BoC) operate behind a firewall that keeps it immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, leaving the brand owners vulnerable. A deadlock arises between proper exercise of extraterritoriality and critical response to the current increasingly complex cross-border counterfeiting. At stake are fundamental questions of conflict of laws. A valid nexus is indispensable to justify a U.S. court in applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 45. Given the unviable course of action via the Hague Evidence Conventions, it is argued that greater legal protections for U.S. entities via subpoenas are a more feasible solution. In response to the global challenge, more multipronged approaches should be adopted to combat the transnational counterfeiting crime.

09/19/18

CHARLES ELLIOTT MITCHELL 1889-1891

Born May 11, 1837, at Bristol, Connecticut, Charles Elliott Mitchell was of ancestry prominent in the history of New England, being descended on his father's side from William Mitchell, a soldier of the Revolutionary War, and on his mother's side from the Rev. Thomas Hooker, founder of the Connecticut colony, which, according to the historian John Fiske, "marked the beginnings of American democracy."

09/17/18

Compensation for Non-pecuniary Damage of Trademark Infringement in Taiwan

Judge Jr-Da Fan

Trademark refers to the texts or signs that specific enterprises use to distinguish their products or services from those of other enterprises. For example, the name “Windows” indicates the computer operating systems developed by Microsoft, and “McDonald’s” refers to the hamburgers and other fast food produced by a specific restaurant brand. For a trademark to distinguish the products or services of one enterprise from those of others, the brand trademark established by that enterprise must not be imitated by others. For example, if other companies are allowed to sell fast food under the name McDonald’s, this damages the food-selling interests of the original company. Moreover, if the goods or services labeled under specific trademarks do not maintain their favorable quality, then consumers do not associate their past positive experiences with present purchase perceptions, thereby lowering their intention to purchase the goods or services of the original brands at higher prices. Therefore, when enterprises establish a valuable trademark and cultivate associations of goodwill with it, they must not lower the quality of their goods or services, to protect their investment in the trademark. Therefore, in trademark infringement litigation, if trademark infringement is proven or if the trademark used by the defendant has a likelihood of being confused with that of the plaintiff, irreparable damage to the goodwill associated with the plaintiff’s trademark can often be accounted, because trademark infringement is a type of continuous infringement with an irreparable nature.

09/12/18

BENTON J. HALL 1887-1889

As a young man, having received but a limited collegiate and academic training, Benton J. Hall was greatly stimulated and broadened by the potent influence of a class of men, newcomers into Iowa in the decade and a half preceding the Civil War, by whom he was soon to be accepted as an equal and afterwards recognized as a leader. The influence of this galaxy of luminaries colored Mr. Hall's whole life and included men destined to become Senators, Cabinet members, Federal judges, and Supreme Court Justices.

Benton J. Hall, another in the long list of the sons of Ohio who achieved promise, was born January 5, 1835, at Mt. Vernon in that state. The father took his family to Iowa in 1840 and became very prominent in governmental affairs of the state, being one of the first Justices of the Iowa Supreme Court. Young Hall followed in his father's footsteps, and the many eulogies bestowed upon the father were later merited and won in an equal or even greater degree by the son.

09/10/18

Krafting TC Heartland: A Legislative Response to Venue Shopping

Antonio DiNizo

In the world of patent litigation, the Eastern District of Texas reins king with nearly forty five percent of all patent infringement cases nationwide filed within the district in 2015. While being a small relatively obscure area of Texas, the Eastern District and its courthouse in Marshall, Texas have developed a reputation for attacking some of our country’s biggest corporations and well-respected patent litigators.

In recent years, the Eastern District of Texas has come under increased scrutiny for attracting a special kind of patent owner, Non-Practicing Entities (“NPEs”) or patent troll. While the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods significantly restricts the ability for NPEs to pursue litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, this Note explores how Congress could craft a legislative solution to prevent abusive NPE litigation.

09/04/18

The Wright Brothers: Would Their Patent Survive Today’s Patent Law Rigors? Doubtful

Charles Shifley

“The patentees, Orville and Wilbur Wright, were the first men to actually fly!” So begins an appellate brief in perhaps Orville and Wilbur Wright’s most famous patent infringement case, Wright Co. v. Herring-Curtiss Co., 211 F. 645 (2nd. Cir. 1914). Imagine getting to write a line “the first men to ... fly!” exclamation point included, as the first line of a brief for clients.

On the strength of the facts, and excellence of legal work, the court in the Wright case affirmed as valid the central U.S. patent of the Wrights, declared the Wrights to be pioneers in flight, and resolved that airplane wing ailerons and a tail rudder were part of their invention. Creative legal defenses, such as that a rudder of the Curtiss flying machine was not an infringement because it was only used sporadically, were put to rest memorably: e.g., “a machine that infringes part of the time is an infringement.”

08/29/18

M. V. B. MONTGOMERY 1885-1887

Martin Van Buren Montgomery—lawyer, legislator, jurist—was the 20th Commissioner of Patents.

He was born in the township of Eaton Rapids, Michigan, October 20, 1840. The early part of his life was spent on his father's farm, attendance at the district schools taking place only in the winter months, as was the case with other farm boys who later became Commissioners. He studied law, was admitted to the bar in 1865, and immediately began to practice. His talents were at once recognized, and he filled, successively, different public offices of increasing importance.

08/27/18

 

A Tribute to Judge Giles S. Rich

A Tribute to Judge Giles S. Rich

John F. Witherspoon

One summer night in 1926, while staying at the Willard Hotel, Giles Sutherland Rich made a decision that set in motion a chain of events that account for our being here tonight.

As a young man, he wanted to be a pilot, because, he said, he thought commercial aviation “might have a future.” But he failed his eye exam. And so he had to look for a different career.

His father was a patent lawyer in New York. When he was growing up, Giles often visited his father’s office and was intrigued by what he saw.

In the summer of 1926, he drove his father to Washington to interview some examiners. On the trip, he learned more about what his father did and why he liked it.

08/22/18

BENJAMIN BUTTERWORTH 1883-1885 and 1897-1898

The 19th Commissioner of Patents was born near Maineville, Ohio, October 22, 1837, of Quaker ancestry, one of his maternal ancestors, John Linton having emigrated to Pennsylvania with Wm. Penn. His father emigrated to the Miami Valley from Virginia in 1814.

The boy, Benjamin, was the youngest son and worked on his father's farm until the age of 18. He was educated in the common schools of Warren County, Ohio, and in the academy at Maineville, taking his college work at the Ohio University at Athens. After that he studied law and was admitted to the Ohio Bar in 1861 at the age of 24.

08/21/18

Rossman Award 2018

Joshua Schwartz

The Rossman Committee was privileged to present the annual Joseph Rossman Memorial Award during the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Patent and Trademark Office Society. The award was established in 1972 by the Society and the family of Dr. Joseph Rossman. Joseph Rossman started his career as a patent examiner and was Editor-in-Chief of The Journal back in the 1930s. He had degrees in chemical engineering and law, as well as a doctorate in psychology. In addition, Dr. Joseph Rossman was an author with a life-long interest in creativity, engineering and law. Dr. Joseph Rossman was the author of many articles in the Journal from the 1930s through the 1960s. Because the Journal was such a big part of Dr. Rossman’s life, his family approached the Society with the idea of establishing the Rossman Award in 1972. The Society enthusiastically embraced the idea and the rest is history. The Rossman Award is given to the author of the article in the Journal that, in the opinion of the judges, makes the greatest contribution to the fields of Patents, Trademarks or Copyrights. Factors that are taken into consideration include originality, timeliness of the subject, depth of research, accuracy, readability, and the potential for impact on the existing system.

08/15/18

EDGAR M. MARBLE 1880-1883

Rising from the ranks, Mr. Marble was appointed Commissioner of Patents on April 28, 1880, by President Hayes, and served until 1884.

It was a most interesting period. The reconstruction following the Civil War was just ending, and many of the great figures of the war were still on the stage. In the field of invention, electricity was just emerging. In the practice of patent law, routine was just established.

Edgar M. Marble's qualifications for the position of Commissioner of Patents were found in the record he had already established in the Interior Department, in the position he had occupied up to that time, for executive capacity, clearness and correctness of decision and a thorough grounding in general law.

08/13/18

Federico Award 2018

Joshua Schwartz

The Federico Committee was privileged to present the 2018 Pasquale J. Federico Memorial Award to Teresa Stanek Rea during the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.

In 1993, the SOCIETY established the Pasquale J. Federico Memorial Award. The Federico Award is intended to recognize outstanding contributions to the Patent and Trademark Systems of the United States of America. It may be given to an individual, a group of individuals, a corporation or an institution. Awards to individuals may be made posthumously. No more than one award may be given in each year. Anyone may make a nomination. The award is named in honor of Pasquale J. (Pat) Federico who was an institution within the Patent and Trademark Office. Pat entered then Patent Office in 1923 as a junior examiner in Division 43. By 1935, he was the Assistant Chief of his division and he became the Division Chief in 1940. He was appointed to the Board of Appeals in 1947 and remained there until his retirement from the Office in 1977. Pat Federico was a prolific author of articles dealing with intellectual property. Perhaps his greatest achievement was writing the first draft of the 1952 Patent Act. He was also, according to Giles Rich, the man most responsible for getting the 1952 Patent Act through Congress and enacted into law. The first Federico Award was presented to the late Giles S. Rich, who had served on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals for over four decades. Honorees from other years include Nick Godici, Paul Michel, Donald Banner, Charles E. Van Horn, Pauline Newman, C. Marshall Dann, Herbert Wamsley, Helen Wilson Nies, Mike Kirk, Tom Arnold, Howard T. Markey, Rene D. Tegtmeyer, Isaac Fleischmann, John Whealan, Anne Chasser, Raymond Chen, Bernie Knight, and Mark Lemley.

08/08/18

General Paine was another Civil War hero to become Commissioner of Patents. Born at Chardon, Ohio, February 4, 1826, he was the seventh in line of descent from Stephen Paine, who emigrated from Hingham, England, to Hingham, Massachusetts, in 1638. He graduated from Western Reserve College at the age of 19, at the head of his class, taught school in Mississippi, and then took up the study and practice of law in Cleveland, Ohio. He married in 1850. 

08/01/18

ELLIS SPEAR 1877-1878

One of the many who, after the Civil War, were anxiously looking about for civilian employment and means of making a livelihood for themselves and their families was a young officer but lately retired from the Army of the Potomac where he had achieved a reputation for courage and ability. At the age of 31 a Brevet Brigadier General, and having received from Congress on two occasions the supreme recognition of merit and valor on the field of battle, General Spear left the military service and entered upon his new duties in the Patent Office with enthusiasm and devotion.

07/30/18

Applying the de minimus Exception to Sound Recordings: Digital Samplers Are Neither Thieves Nor Infringers

Kayla Mullen

When a new song plays on the radio, listeners may experience a feeling of nostalgia due to the use of familiar chords that exist in the public domain. Music artists are now able to create this feeling and a resulting hit by taking sound bites from older songs and mashing them with new material, which is known as “sampling” in the music industry. “Sampling” is defined as “the actual physical copying of sounds from an existing recording for use in a new recording, even if accomplished with slight modifications such as changes to pitch or tempo.” This method of appropriation involves physically taking from a prior work, which sets sound recordings apart from other copyrightable works. Sometimes the prior work is unrecognizable, but fragments are still there. Sounds that may be undetectable to the average ear, in some cases less than a second in length, are seamlessly incorporated by the technological advances that have made digital sampling commonplace in the music industry today. While copyrighted sound recordings have been protected for over forty years by the Copyright Act of 1976, whether digital sampling constitutes copyright infringement may now depend on where in the country a copyright infringement case is litigated.

For over ten years, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films was the only federal court of appeals decision to address whether the de minimis exception applied to copyrighted sound recordings. In that case, the Sixth Circuit established a bright-line rule that any copying of a sound recording, even a trivial sample, constituted prima facie copyright infringement. On June 2, 2016, the Ninth Circuit held in VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone that the de minimis exception, which excludes copying that is trivial or insignificant from actionable infringement, applies to all copyrighted works, including sound recordings. The court found that Madonna’s hit song Vogue digitally sampled .23 seconds from the song Ooh I Love It (Love Break), but the court did not find that this sampling constituted copyright infringement. Now, the question is whether a de minimis exception applies, and whether it should apply, in cases of copyrighted sound recordings.

07/25/18

ROBERT HOLLAND DUELL 1875-1876

Robert Holland Duell was a native of the State of New York, born in Warren, on December 20, 1824. He studied in Syracuse Academy and took up the profession of law, being admitted to the bar in 1845. Three years later he removed to Cortland and established himself in law there, continuing to make this his home for the greater part of his later life, to the time of his death on February 11, 1891.

Mr. Duell early became interested in politics and became District Attorney of Cortland County in 1850, which office he held until 1855, when he became District Judge. After serving four years in this capacity he was elected as Republican representative to Congress. In all, he spent eight years in Congress, 1859-1863, and 1871-1875.

07/23/18

Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in Antitrust

Kelly L. Moulla

In the United States, as well as in the European Union, reverse payment patent settlements, or so-called “pay-for-delay agreements,” are neither addressed by domestic competition laws, nor mentioned in international competition agreements. As those agreements seem to be out of the reach of competition laws, patent holder pharmaceuticals frequently enter into such contracts with their potential competitors, generic manufacturers, in order to benefit from their monopoly for the longest time possible, by delaying their competitors’ product entry in the market. In fact, as a patent confers its owner market exclusivity rights for a long, though limited, period of time, conciliating competition law and such intellectual property right can be challenging. Due to the lack of adequate legislation, domestic courts in both the U.S. and the E.U toiled to obtain any resolution on related matters, rendering conflicting and confusing judgments. In international intellectual property law, the governing TRIPS agreement briefly mentions competition law in the licensing of intellectual property, but does not go as far as creating a regime for pay-for-delay agreements in regard to competition rules. On one hand, the harm among consumers and healthcare providers, who have to bear the high cost of patented drugs, when they could potentially benefit from the generic drug’s reduced price, is calculated in millions of dollars each year. On another hand, those blurred lines can also harm pharmaceutical companies, as they may, or may not, be subjected to extremely burdening fines at the outcome of expensive trials. In a globalized economy, the lack of clear regulations on one hand, and international harmonization on the other hand, can cause tremendous damages to pharmaceutical companies, and can therefore affect the health market internationally.

07/18/18

JOHN MARSHALL THACHER 1874-1875

This Commissioner stands in a unique position in that he entered the Patent Office as a clerk and rose through the ranks to the top. He is an excellent representative of the average citizen who performs conscientiously and well the duties which come to him, and leaves upon the sands of time, footprints which are both few and faint. There is no evidence that Mr. Thacher took any active part in politics, and he seems to have received his appointment for merit.

He was born at Barre, Vermont, July 1, 1836, a son of the Rev. Joseph and Nancy A. Thacher. After graduating from the University of Vermont in 1859 he taught school, and in the Civil War served as a captain in the Vermont Volunteers.

07/17/18

No Credit Where Credit Is Due: Exploitation in Copyright

Gia Velasquez

Alan Lomax, a folklorist and twentieth-century field collector of music, has been credited as “unlock[ing] the secrets of this kind of music” by Bob Dylan, “the man who is more responsible than any other person for the twentieth century folk song revival” by Pete Seeger, and “a man who stood for the equity of people’s culture.” He has not, however, been described as a copyist or plagiarist. Some may baffle at this suggestion: surely his contributions to music, evidenced by his posthumous Grammy Trustees Award in 2003 and National Medal of Arts from President Ronald Reagan in 1986, free him from the purview of such negative connotations.

The purpose of this paper is not to discredit Lomax, nor to criticize his methodology. Without his research, music of groups such as cowboys, convicts, slaves, workers on American railways, and creoles would have likely been lost. Rather, this paper is meant to highlight some of the many occasions where original artists have not received credit for their works. These stories are known due to technological developments that increase the accessibility of art, such as Lomax’s, but some have inevitably been lost.

07/11/18

MORTIMER D. LEGGETT 1871-1874

General Mortimer D. Leggett, the thirteenth Commissioner of Patents, while demonstrating unusual ability in several fields of activity, came into his greatest prominence in his military career, and it is as a soldier that he is most widely known.

He was a warm friend of Gen. U. S. Grant and it is said when Grant became president Gen. Leggett was offered several desirable positions, but stated that there was but one particular office which he would like to hold and if it became vacant he would be glad to be considered for it, and that was the office of Commissioner of Patents. When this office became vacant by the resignation of Mr. Fisher, Gen. Leggett was appointed, his term extending from January 16, 1871, until his resignation November 1, 1874.

07/09/18

Two’s Company: The Rise in Chinese PCT Participation and What it Means for Japan

Kevin Eugene Thomas Cunningham Jr.

Japan leads the rest of Asia and much of the world when it comes to participation in the Patent Cooperation Treaty in both total applications as well as national phase entries. However, China is swiftly making strides in its own patent regime, and has overtaken Japanese participation in the PCT in many key industries. This paper explores possible reasons why the Chinese have been able to overtake the Japanese in particular fields through looking at both historical and modern understandings of intellectual property rights. Additionally, this paper will explore whether or not Japanese PCT hegemony in Asia is waning in favor of China through statistical analysis of Japanese and Chinese filing trends in various PCT fields. Finally, this paper will examine whether Japan needs to take any affirmative steps to protect its PCT superiority, and if so, it will suggest potential actions to further that goal.

07/03/18

SAMUEL SPARKS FISHER 1869-1870

The occasion needed the man, and when it was announced that Col. Fisher was persuaded to take the Commissionership, satisfaction among the friends of the patent system was universal and heartfelt. His administration of the Patent Office marked a turning point in its history. He was instrumental in obtaining remedial legislation and instituting reforms in the processes and conduct of the Office that were not only essential to correct manifest abuses that had been gradually acquired, but which placed it upon a higher plane of usefulness and efficiency than it had ever attained before.

07/02/18

2 + 2 = 5: The Canadian Patent Agent Examination Board and the Doctrine of Essential Elements

Wissam Aoun

Tremendous confusion has revolved around the theory and application of the doctrine of essential elements in Canadian patent law ever since the Supreme Court of Canada first introduced the doctrine in Free World Trust c. Électro Santé Inc. In recent years, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office’s (CIPO) interpretation and application of the doctrine in its patent application examination guidelines has been the subject of considerable criticism from the Canadian patent profession. However, CIPO’s misapplication of the doctrine in recent years’ Patent Agent Qualifying Examination has received relatively little attention. This paper examines the application of the doctrine of essential elements in recent years’ Canadian Patent Agent Qualifying Examination. The analysis begins with a thorough and comprehensive review of the doctrine of essential elements under Canadian patent law. The analysis reviews the last ten years’ Canadian Patent Agent Examination, with a focus on recent years’ emphasis on the doctrine of essentiality. Despite the fact that the doctrine itself is still unsettled under Canadian law, the approach taken on recent years’ Patent Agent Exams is at best an ambiguous, and at worst an inaccurate application of the doctrine. This paper concludes by demonstrating that the concerns surrounding the doctrine of essentiality may be significant contributing factor to invalidity issues surrounding recent years’ Patent Agent Exams.

06/26/18

ELISHA FOOTE 1868-1869

Elisha Foote, the eleventh Commissioner of Patents, may be regarded as being the last Commissioner of the "old regime", prior to the revised laws of 1870. His term of office covered the period from July 25, 1868, to April 25, 1869, the interval between his term and that of his predecessor, Commissioner Theaker, being supplied by the Chief Clerk of Theaker's administration, who held the office of Acting Commissioner from January 20 to July 24, 1868.

06/25/18

Lexmark, The Overruling of Mallinckrodt and The Future of Restraints on Alienation For Patented Goods

James B. Kobak, Jr.

The Supreme Court in its recent Lexmark decision ruled unanimously (with Justice Gorsuch not participating) that a patent owner could not enforce contractual restrictions on resale of patented products in domestic transactions through patent infringement suits because all patent rights were exhausted by the first sale. This decision, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, rejected the theory, articulated by the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt v. Medipart, Inc. more than twenty five years ago: that a patent owner could circumvent exhaustion by conditioning a grant of its patent rights in a sales agreement as a legitimate means of obtaining compensation for the value of its invention. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the logic and the treatment of earlier precedent used in the Mallinckrodt opinion along lines that I had criticized at the time and others have criticized since to little avail, until now, over a quarter century later.

06/20/18

THOMAS C. THEAKER 1865-1868

The Civil War having given an impetus to creative genius as applied to the useful arts, entirely without precedent, it was to the problems of this period that the tenth Commissioner of Patents turned his attention, his term of office being recognized as one of the most important, in one aspect, in the history of the Patent Office.

06/18/18

Patent Holder’s Equitable Remedies in Patent Infringement Actions Before Federal Courts and the International Trade Commission

Richard L. Stroup, Susan Tull, Mindy Ehrenfried

A United States patent grants the patent holder the right to exclude others from practicing the claimed inventions within the territorial limits of the United States. When its patent is infringed, the patent holder can seek remedies in the form of monetary recoveries or equitable relief. This article addresses the equitable relief the federal courts or the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) can grant. That relief can be in the form of injunctions, orders, or even monetary awards, granted in equity.

The patent statute provides that an issued patent "shall contain … a grant to the patentee of the right to exclude others." It provides that the federal courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity.” And for actions before the ITC, the statute provides that that Commission “shall” enter an exclusion order, after a trial finding a violation, and “may” enter a preliminary order, before trial–if in both instances the patent holder can prove it has a domestic industry in the United States and the public interests or the President’s review do not preclude entry of such injunctive relief.

06/13/18

DAVID P. HOLLOWAY 1861-1865

The war-time commissioner was David P. Holloway, the ninth incumbent of that office.

Holloway was born in Waynesville, Ohio, on December 6, 1809. With his parents he moved in 1813 to Cincinnati where he attended the common schools. He learned the printer's trade at Richmond, Indiana, and for four years worked on the Cincinnati "Gazette". In 1832 he established the Richmond "Palladium" and was its editor for several years.

President Lincoln appointed him Commissioner of Patents on March 28, 1861, which position he held until August 17, 1865. During his term a number of procedural changes occurred in the patent laws, due, no doubt, largely to the efforts of others who preceded him. The act of March 2, 1861, establishing a permanent board of Examiners-in-Chief, was passed just before his administration began. (It may be noted that the permanent board first appointed by Commissioner Holt and established by the act of 1861 was found satisfactory in many respects though Commissioner Holloway criticized it on the ground that it had increased the work of the Commissioner instead of decreasing it, and recommended that its decision should be made merely advisory, the Commissioner to adopt them or not as he should see fit, whereby there would be but two appeals, i.e., from the primary examiner to the Commissioner, and from him to the Court.) This permanent Board of Examiners-in-Chief found great favor with applicants and attorneys.

06/11/18

Karen J. Dean Earns 2017 Leadership In Action Award from the Partnership for Public Service and the Leadership Alumni Board for Spearheading USPTO's Office of the Ombudsman 

Alexander Sofocleous

In May of 2016, the United States Patent & Trademark Office launched a pilot program for the USPTOs Office of the Ombudsman. The programs success was huge and, as a result, the Office was made permanent as of January 2017. The purpose behind the Office of the Ombudsman is to provide a neutral/impartial, independent, confidential, and informal resource to USPTO staff (e.g., employees, supervisors, senior executives, political appointees) for discussing any individual workplace concern or systemic issue. By providing a medium, like no other at USPTO, the Office of the Ombudsman helps, inter alia, provide Agency leadership with unfiltered information regarding persistent or systemic issues and provide expert conflict resolution services through facilitated discussions. The Office served more than 350 employees and provided the medium to raise issues about conflicts with between co-workers, disputes and poor communication between employees and their managers, concerns about performance appraisals, lack of respect and bullying.

06/06/18

PHILIP FRANCIS THOMAS 1860

Less than one year out of the long and colorful political career of Philip Francis Thomas was spent in the service of the Patent Office.

A native of the Eastern Shore of Maryland, he was born in Easton on September 12, 1810. Leaving the beaten political track of his Whig ancestors, he became a Democrat and was for half a century more or less active in Maryland politics. The son of a doctor, he studied law at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was admitted to the bar in 1831, and at the age of 24 plunged into Maryland politics, finally getting himself elected to the legislature.

06/04/18

Global Patent Litigation: How and Where to Win, 2nd Edition

Asha Puttaiah

How does one decide where to sue if litigations can be contemplated in multiple countries? Consider a corporation with a national patent in a designated economic regional forum whose international competitor own a legal (but later) patent in their own country - what is the end goal of the corporation? Market entry or ownership? What are the chances of success? For that matter, what is considered success? Invalidation? Infringement? Licensing potential? The answers are ‘I don’t know,’ ‘Kind of, ‘No,’ and ‘Maybe’ – in any order you wish, There is no simple answer.

05/29/18

Waymo vs. Uber My Be the next Edison vs. Westinghouse

Chloé Margulis and Charles Goulding

During the late 1800’s, significant debate resulted from the development of new electric power supply systems. Whereas Thomas Edison supported growth of DC, direct current, supply, competitor George Westinghouse worked to make AC, alternating current, more widespread in both rural and urban settings. This War of Currents is mimicked in the current clash between Google and Uber over LiDAR technology in self-driving vehicles. The study discusses implications concerning Google vs. Uber and a comparison of this case to Edison vs. Westinghouse, its predecessor. A comparison is made between the similar decisions and actions of Nikola Tesla and Anthony Levandowski, both of whom left one company to work on personal technological ventures before being bought out by another company. An analysis is conducted concerning patents owned by Google, potential patent infringements, and the impact this case will have on our future, the growth of technology and autonomous vehicles, and intellectual property law.

05/23/18

WILLIAM DARIUS BISHOP 1859-1860

The seventh Commissioner of Patents, William Darius Bishop, was descended from old New England stock, his original ancestor, Rev. John Bishop, having emigrated from England about 1640. Alfred Bishop, his father, was a native of Connecticut, where he followed his duties as an extensive canal and railroad contractor. Commissioner Bishop was born at Bloomfield, New Jersey, September 14, 1827, while his parents were temporary residents of that state; but he returned to Bridgeport, Connecticut, which became his permanent residence.

05/21/18

Digital Resurrections Necessitate Federal Post-Mortem Publicity Rights

Meaghan Fontein

In the 1966 horror film Island of Terror, actor Peter Cushing’s character faced a predicament of dealing with computer-borne life forms resembling virtual humans. Fast-forward: 22 years after his death and 50 years after Island of Terror, Peter Cushing himself is resurrected as a virtual human to reprise his Grand Moff Tarkin character in Star Wars: Rogue One. While Cushing’s digital resurrection was seen as brilliant innovation by some, the performance upset many others-including his heir-who felt emotionally damaged from seeing a deceased person’s image repurposed for profit. Moral dilemmas, however, are merely secondary to the true threat of harm posed by digital resurrections: misappropriation for commercial gain. By definition, to misappropriate means to put to the wrong use.” Reaching beyond the deceased artist’s control to digitally resurrect their exact likeness for profit plainly fits the definition. Digital resurrections also risk the ancillary harm of causing reputational damage if a likeness is revived in an upsetting manner or bad taste. This science-fiction worthy scenario has created a need to uniformly recognize post-mortem publicity rights in one’s persona.

05/17/18

JOSEPH HOLT 1857-1859

It is said that the incumbency of the office of Commissioner of Patents by Joseph Holt was a minor incident in a notable career. And it might well be added that the selection of Judge Holt was a chance of party politics, as a number of such selections have been in the history of the Patent Office. The events leading up to his appointment are controversial and steeped in politics.

05/14/18

“What’s in a name? A parody by any other name would smell as sweet:” a dueling case study and comment

Kyle Serilla

We live in a post-post-modern culture where even an “it’s all been done before” attitude has been... well... done before. Our references are referencing other references. To say it another way, references in modern communication have been so stripped from their original context that they live in their own separate context. Nowhere is this as evident as the internet.

When a simple text will not do to express one’s indifference about where to have lunch, a savvy smartphone user may open a “gif” database app, type in their current feeling, and ultimately send an image of Judy Garland happily mouthing the text below “I don’t care! Or to express ones shock regarding the tale of a friend’s paper cut: Jimmy Stewart dramatically fainting. It is safe to assume to that the target youth audience for such apps have little awareness of the classic films where these scenes originated (In the Old Good Old Summer Time and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, respectively). And that’s the point. The distance and randomness makes it absurdist fun. The reference lives on its own in a new context. The same can be said of memes (the stagnant brother to the gif) as well as the more widespread sound-bites and video-bites that dominate our political discourse.

Legos, the iconic children’s building blocks from Denmark, were once limited to living in plastic pins under bunk beds, but now live on computer, television, and movie screens as reincarnations of pop-cultures most famous characters. The Lego Group turned its slumping sales of the 1990s around in-part by embracing relationships with other kid-friendly brands. Today that merchandise itself is the star. Just look to LEGO Harry Potter videogames, LEGO Star Wars the television series, and The LEGO Batman Movie, itself a spin-off of The LEGO Movie. The LEGO entertainment brand shares a similar absurdist playfulness as the meme culture by again and again making the viewer aware that the world they are watching is not the original source but a wonderfully silly version where the content is as hallow as the blocks creating it.

05/09/18

CHARLES MASON 1853-1857

Born at Pompey, New York, October 24, 1804, the Honorable Charles Mason was the son of Chauncey and Esther Mason, grandson of Jonathan Mason and a descendant of Capt. John Mason, 1635. He graduated first in his class in the U. S. Military Academy, having as a classmate Robert E. Lee. He was appointed Second Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers, July 1, 1829, and served as Assistant Professor of Engineering at the Military Academy from 1829 to 1831. In 1831 he resigned from the army to study law in New York City, being admitted to the bar in 1832. He practiced law at Newbury, N. Y., from 1832 to 1834 and in New York City from 1834 to 1836. In 1835 and 1836 he was acting editor of the New York Evening Post.

05/07/18

The Future of the Compulsory License: Tick Tock and It’s Time to Eliminate it

Debbie Chu

On a quiet evening, a girl sits on her bedroom floor while tears trickle down her cheeks. She wipes them away as she listens to a song that reminds her of what she and her former boyfriend used to be. Meanwhile, in another part of town, strobe lights, streamers, and disco balls adorn a middle school gymnasium while students dance to a song with a thundering bass and a pounding rhythm. The difference between the two scenarios is obvious; the former is sad and the latter is happy. Both songs have the same lyrics, so what exactly is it that the first one triggers sadness and the second one evokes happiness? The answer lies in the rhythm of the song. The first one is composed of “keyboardsynth chords, bright, jangly guitars, effects loop, pitch shift, clock-ticking percussion, and elastic bassline” and has a “touching and bittersweet” tempo. The second one has a modern feel to it with a pop and punk style.

The song in the first scenario comes from Cyndi Lauper’s Time After Time, her first number-one hit in the U.S. Billboard Hot 100 chart in June 1984. This song received many accolades, among which are Rolling Stone & MTV’s “100 Greatest Pop Songs,” VH1’s “100 Best Songs of the Past 25 Years,” and “100 Greatest Songs of the 80s.” Music critics commended the song for its “masterpiece” and for being “the best and most significant song [Lauper] ever wrote or recorded.” The song in the second scenario comes from Quietdrive, an alternative rock band. Quietdrive released their cover of Lauper’s Time After Time in 2006. This version of the song ranked number 25 on the American Top 40 countdown show, and it was the soundtrack of a 2006 film, John Tucker Must Die as well as music for the trailer of a 2008 remake of the movie, Prom Night.

05/02/18

SILAS HENRY HODGES 1852-1853

Though he was commissioner for the brief space of only one year, Mr. Hodges was, for a considerable part of his life, actively connected with the Patent Office.

Silas Henry Hodges, lawyer, was born January 12, 1804, at Clarendon, Vermont. From 1845 to 1850 he was Auditor of Accounts of Vermont. He was appointed Commissioner of Patents in 1852 by President Fillmore. From 1861 to 1875 he was an Examiner-in-Chief in the Patent Office. He died in Washington, D. C., April 21, 1875.

04/30/18

Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 2), Governance, Self-Regulation and Canada’s Patent Professional Identity Crisis

Wissam Aoun

Only registered Canadian patent agents may represent others before the Canadian Patent Office. To qualify as a registered Canadian patent agent, candidates must complete an apprenticeship followed by successfully passing the Canadian patent agent examination. This article analyzes the current regulatory framework for Canadian patent agents. Based on a theoretical, historical and international comparative analysis, this article demonstrates that the current Canadian regulatory model has lost sight of its purpose and is symptomatic of a greater crisis of legitimacy plaguing the Canadian patent agent profession. The article highlights the need for greater reform of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework in order to better serve the intellectual property needs of the Canadian public. This article concludes with a series of comprehensive recommendations for reform of the current Canadian regulatory framework.

04/25/18

Thomas Ewbank 1849-1852

Thomas Ewbank, third Commissioner of Patents, was born of humble parentage in Durham, England, March 11, 1792. He was apprenticed in boyhood to the trade of sheet metal working; and from 1812 to 1817 was employed as a tin-smith in London. There he developed the belief that monarchical institutions limited ones capabilities, and so he emigrated to the United States in 1819 and settled in New York. He then engaged in the manufacture of copper, lead and tin tubing for sixteen years and obtained patents thereon. Having attained a modest competency from the business of tube making, he devoted his entire attention in the next few years to travel, science, literature, the history of invention, and its future development. In 1845-48, he visited South America, not merely as a pleasure seeking traveler, but with a mind alert to the lessons to be learned from a wider experience of natural phenomena and the industrial arts of remote races. He returned with a collection of objects from Brazil that became widely known as the "Ewbank Collection." The lessons of this voyage were subsequently published in a volume entitled "Life in Brazil: A Journal of a Visit to the Land of the Cocoa and the Palm."

04/23/18

Does Patent law allow plaintiffs too many bites at the apple?

Jason D. Reinecke

The Federal Circuit’s current rule on claim preclusion doesn’t bar a plaintiff from bringing a second patent infringement lawsuit against the same defendant and accused conduct if the plaintiff alleges infringement of a different patent in the second suit. This Article argues that the Federal Circuit’s rule is inconsistent with the widely adopted transactional approach to claim preclusion as described in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and adopted by most courts. This Article discusses three rules -the current rule, a rule that properly implements the transactional approach, and a middle-ground rule -along with their policy implications. In short, if the Federal Circuit adopted a rule consistent with the transactional approach, the goals of claim preclusion may be better served. A transactional rule would, among other things, provide parties with increased finality and reliance, often provide increased judicial and private litigation efficiency, and minimize the chance of multiple recovery and excessive recovery of damages. Because a transactional rule offers such advantages, the Federal Circuit’s current rule on claim preclusion warrants reconsideration by the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.

04/18/18

EDMUND BURKE 1845-1849

The second Commissioner of Patents was born at Westminster, Vermont, Jan. 23, 1809. He studied law, was admitted to the bar in 1829, practiced at Newport, New Hampshire, established the New Hampshire "Argus," and edited it for several years. From 1839 to 1845 he was a member of Congress. Appointed Commissioner of Patents, May 5, 1845 by President Polk, he served ably and faithfully in this office until May 9, 1849, after which he became for a brief period official editor for the "Union" in Washington, D. C., and later resumed the practice of law at Newport, New Hampshire, and Boston, Massachusetts.

04/16/18

Determining The “Article of Manufacture” Under 35 U.S.C. § 289

Perry Saidman, Elizabeth Ferrill, Damon, Neagle, and Tracy Durkin

For the first time in more than 100 years, on December 6, 2016, the Supreme Court decided a case involving a design patent. The case, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016), involved the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 289, which says that an infringer is liable to the design patent owner to the extent of his total profit for sales of any article of manufacture to which the patented design has been applied. The Supreme Court decided that an article of manufacture under Section 289 may be the end product as sold by the infringer, or it may be a component of the end product. This decision left open the question of how to decide what the article of manufacture is in any given case, including the one at bar. Our article, being a collaborative effort among a small group of design patent specialists, proposes a test for determining the relevant article of manufacture in any given case, and also proposes considerations for determining the total profit once the relevant article of manufacture has been identified.

04/11/18

HENRY L. ELLSWORTH 1835-1845

When the Act of 1836 created the new office of Commissioner of Patents, the appointment of the then Superintendent of Patents, Henry L. Ellsworth, to the Commissionership proved both logical and wise. As Superintendent of Patents since his appointment in 1835, he had proved his ability by substituting order for chaos in the administration of a department which had never previously been conducted in a scientific and business-like manner. It is generally thought that the responsibility of initiating the policy under the new law, and new organization, was well placed.

04/09/18

Note: The Application of Big Data Analytics to Patent Litigation

Chloé Margulis 

This article defines the current gap between big data analytics and patent litigation. It discovers how big data analytics can be applied to the patent industry to create more effective risk analysis, an early warning system, and preventative strategies for inside and outside of the courtroom. Big data has the potential to modify current practices in the patent industry, namely those geared towards aiding patent examiners, attorneys, inventors, jurors, and judges. It also offers a solution to the threat that patent monetizers pose on smaller companies and inventors, who often lose time and money in these sometimes unavoidable lawsuits. This research examines the application of big data in the healthcare industry for real-time results and preventative measures. These actions set a good precedent for further diffusion into other industries, such as patent law. Features for future implementation and project development are presented as a roadmap to create a universal big data analytics system for the patent industry.

04/04/18

JAMES C. PICKETT 1835

James Chamberlayne Pickett was born in Fauquier County, Virginia, on February 6, 1793. His family moved to Kentucky when he was a young boy. He attended the best schools, including the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, New York. He served in the army during the War of 1812. 

Pickett practiced law in Kentucky and was editor of a newspaper. He married Ellen Desha, daughter of Kentucky’s governor. He was elected to the Kentucky legislature, after which he spent four years in South America as a U.S. diplomat. He was fluent in several languages and a prolific writer on scientific subjects and diplomatic history.

04/02/18

Fine China? A Look Into Chinese Intellectual Property Infringement, Treaty Obligations, And International Responses

Kevin Eugene Thomas Cunningham Jr.

China has garnered the reputation of being the world’s largest exporter of infringing good, as well as being a place where property rights are notoriously difficult to enforce. The international community has a vested interest in curbing infringing activity, however, it has proven difficult to get China to both create new domestic law allowing for increased protections, as well as enforcing those laws whenever they are eventually implemented. This paper conducts a brief survey of the Chinese historical underpinnings surrounding their current intellectual property law regime. It then goes on the examine many of the treaties to which China is a signatory, as well as the unique issues that China faces when attempting to enforce its domestic law and meet international obligations. Finally, I will analyze international responses to China’s lack of enforcement, followed by an analysis of what worked, what didn’t, and what can be done in the future to achieve the desired result of increased protection for intellectual property.

03/28/18

JOHN D. CRAIG 1829-1835

John D. Craig was born in Ireland in 1766. He was a teacher at the Baltimore Union School and the master at an academy in Baltimore. In 1828 he led the founding of the Ohio Mechanics Institute of Cincinnati, which became the College of Engineering and Applied Science of the University of Cincinnati.

After Secretary of State Martin Van Buren transferred Patent Office Superintendent Thomas Jones to another position in the State Department, he appointed Craig superintendent the next day, June 11, 1829.

03/26/18

Patent Eligibility of Online Application Software – Another View

Scott Anderson

In a recent article, Ping-Hsun Chen presented “Patent Eligibility of Online Application Software After Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.” in which he reached the following conclusion: “Internet Patents indicates that on-line application software may no longer be patent eligible.” This very gloomy conclusion overstates the facts somewhat, and a more accurate statement of the current state of affairs is in order.

03/21/18

THOMAS P. JONES 1828-1829

Thomas P. Jones was born in Herefordshire, England, in 1774. He immigrated to the United States after being trained as a physician and lived in Philadelphia as early as 1796.

He was a professor of natural philosophy and chemistry at the College of William and Mary and held other academic positions. He returned to Philadelphia in 1825 to become a professor at the Franklin Institute and the editor of its journal.

03/19/18

The Unintended Consequences of the Injunction Law after eBay v. MercExchange - An Empirical Study of the Effects on Injunctions in Patent Law

Christopher J. Clugston and Wonjoon Kim

Good intentions often have unintended consequences. This applies to recent changes in the injunction law in patent cases. Although these changes were intended to alleviate some of the problems caused by patent owners that do not practice their invention, the changes have also unintentionally made it more difficult for patent owners in certain industries to obtain injunctions.

An injunction in patent litigation is generally an order prohibiting the manufacture, use, sale, or importation of any device that embodies the patented technology. As authorized by the Patent Act, courts “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity.” Outside patent law, the “principles of equity” traditionally means that an injunction can be granted only if the plaintiff can show that the following four factors, in the aggregate, favored an injunction: (1) irreparable injury, (2) an inadequate remedy at law, (3) a balance of hardships between the parties, and (4) the public interest. However, different standards developed for injunctions in patent cases. In 1982, Congress created the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the Federal Circuit), giving it jurisdiction over all patent law appeals. From its inception, this court has instead interpreted the phrase “principles of equity” to mean that injunctions should routinely be granted after a patent was found to be valid and infringed. A denial was appropriate only in “exceptional circumstances.” Indeed, one study found that, prior to 2006, injunctions were granted in over 95 percent of cases. The rationale for this nearly automatic grant of injunctions was that the right to exclude is “the essence” of a patent, and, without an injunction, the value of that right would be significantly diminished. However, because of the increasing number of patent plaintiffs that do not, themselves, practice their invention, many began to question the soundness of this general rule.

03/12/18

WILLIAM THORNTON 1802-1828

William Thornton, the first and longest serving head of the office, was born on May 20, 1759, in the British Virgin Islands. He was sent to England at the age of five for education. His many interests included architecture, painting, botany, and mechanics. He received a medical degree from the University of Aberdeen and practiced briefly as a physician. 

He travelled widely in Europe and met Benjamin Franklin in Paris. In 1785 he returned to the family sugar plantation on the island of Tortola. The next year he moved to Philadelphia, which was an early seat of the U.S. government, and became a U.S. citizen.

03/12/18

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03/12/18

Rebutting Obviousness Rejections by way of Anti-Obviousness Case Law

Tom Brody

The most common strategies for rebutting obviousness rejections are to argue that the prior art fails to disclose all the claim elements and to argue that the examiner did not assert the proper rationale for combining references. An alternate strategy, or a strategy to use in addition, is to demonstrate that one or more relations exist between the primary reference and the secondary reference. These relations are: (1) Non-analogous art; (2) Rendering the prior art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose; (3) Proposed modification cannot change the principle of operation of a reference; (4) Redundant advantage; (5) Advantage provided by the secondary reference not needed by and not relevant to the primary reference; (6) Disparate references; (7) Context differs between cited references, and (8) Teaching away. This article names these relationships the anti-obviousness inquiry, because these relationships are applied only in rebuttal arguments and not in the examiner’s rejections. Rebuttal arguments making use of only the anti-obviousness inquiry (without any other type of argument) are sufficient to overcome obviousness rejections. The analysis herein only includes opinions from PTAB where the examiner’s asserted rationale was not weakened by being merely conclusory, and not weakened by the prior art not disclosing all the claim elements. An issue-spotting guide is provided for detecting conclusory rationales. The obviousness inquiry takes many, many forms with little in the way of a common property, and for this reason the author provides a unified concept of the obviousness inquiry using the family of resemblances concept of Wittgenstein.

03/06/18

Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 1) (In)Validity Issues Surrounding the Canadian Patent Agent Exam

Wissam Aoun

Only registered Canadian patent agents may represent others before the Canadian Patent Office. To qualify as a registered Canadian patent agent, candidates must complete an apprenticeship followed by successfully passing the Canadian patent agent examination. This article analyzes the validity of the current Canadian patent agent exam. The analysis includes a comprehensive review of the development of the current exam, as well as a review of candidate solution papers from the most recent exams. Furthermore, the analysis includes a comprehensive review of patent office licensing exams from comparable jurisdictions. The analysis concludes that the current Canadian patent agent exam is an invalid indicator of entry-level competence. Subsequent work will show that the validity issues surrounding the Canadian patent agent exam are symptomatic of a greater crisis of legitimacy plaguing the Canadian patent agent profession, highlighting the need for greater reform of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework.

02/20/18

Two Stepping with Alice in Justice Stevens' Shadow

L. Rex Sears, Ph.D., J.D. 

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International articulated a two-step procedure for determining patent eligibility: “[f]irst, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts”; if so then at “step two, we . . . examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to transform the [concept] Into a patent-eligible application.” Lower-court opinions issued after Alice are structured around and focused on that two-step analysis. But academic commentary has focused on Alice’s assumptions about and implications for “the boundary between an unpatentable principle and a patent-eligible invention,” almost to the exclusion of the two-step inquiry that preoccupies the courts. 

02/13/18

How to Write a Law Review Article

Sean Burke

It is traditional for outgoing Editors-in-Chief at the Journal to write a short note to our readers. While there is no overarching theme to these notes, my predecessors have often discussed their good times at the Journal and the friends they made along the way. This is not one of those essays. 

02/05/18

Patent Eligibility of Online Application Software After Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc.

Ping-Hsun Chen

This article analyzes a Federal Circuit decision from 2015, Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015), holding that the claims for a method, computer system, or computer-readable storage medium, for providing an intelligent user interface to an online application were patent-ineligible. Internet Patents may indicate that the possibility of patenting online application software or programming is closed. Reciting a computer or software mechanism in a claim may not be helpful because the computer or mechanism elements may merely implement general functions of a computer, which cannot add any inventive concept into the claim.

01/24/18

Express Employee Patent Assignments: Staying True to Intellectual Property's Credo of Rewarding Innovation

Paul Spiel

Employees often assign away rights without knowing they are doing so, introducing what some have called ”cube-wrap” contracts. In ProCD, the 7th Circuit concluded that shrink-wrap agreements were valid, but the reasoning the court used is not well suited for employment-related patent assignments. Express employee patent assignments impermissibly overreach into an inventor’s past and future and could be deemed unconscionable. Rewarding innovation is ingrained in the U.S. Constitution and is a major justification for patent law itself, but express assignments remove this incentive. Public policy in tandem with unconscionability justifies a reworking of the ways in which employees expressly assign patentable inventions.

01/16/18

Errors, Incorporation by Reference, and the Abhorrent Doctrine of Disappearing Anticipation

Mark R. Buscher

The standard for anticipation of a patent claim is seemingly straight forward – a single prior art reference recites each and every element and limitation of the claim. “There must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention.” Yet some interesting wrinkles can occur.

01/08/18

Ethical Considerations in Intellectual Property Law

Leonard Raykinsteen

The U.S. legal system affords certain rights and provides protections for owners of property that result from “the fruits of mental labor,” or so-called “creations of the mind.”1 This kind of property is called intellectual property (IP). IP law, in turn, deals with the rights and protections for owners of IP. These rights and protections are based on federal patent, trademark and copyright laws and state trade secret laws. In general, patents protect inventions of tangible things; copyrights protect various forms of written and artistic expression; and trademarks protect a name or symbol that identifies the source of goods or services.

01/02/18

The Interplay Between User Innovation, the Patent System and Product Liability Laws: Policy Implications

Stijepko Tokic, J.D., LL.M.

Innovation is a heavily used buzzword in the United States of America, and the fixation with innovation has deep roots in American society. It was even suggested that “America is innovation.” The “innovate or die” mindset, famously articulated by Bill Gates in his Congressional testimony in 1998, has been mentioned in at least ten books going back to 1958. Over time, the popularity of the slogan “Innovate or Die” made the slogan itself a business, as it is now commercially sold as a poster.

One of the primary issues in innovation debates is the role of the patent system in promoting innovation. Recognizing the importance of stimulating innovation, the Framers of the Constitution authorized the United States Congress (Congress) “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Patent Act of 1790 was the first act enacted by Congress, and the law gave inventors rights to their creations for the first time in American history. While the notion that intellectual property rights are designed to create incentives to innovate, and ultimately to promote innovation, has been repeatedly acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court), many scholars continue to question that notion and argue that the patent system currently does the exact opposite: stifles innovation.

12/27/17

 

How an Old Non-Statutory Doctrine Got Worked into the § 101 Test for Patent Eligibility

Peter Hecker 

The 35 U.S.C. § 101 test for patentable subject matter laid out by the Supreme Court in Alice has been the subject of complaint by judges and patent practitioners because of its redundancy with the § 103 nonobviousness requirement. This redundancy seems to have come from a common root shared by Alice’s inventiveness requirement and § 103 obviousness. Particularly, § 103 obviousness descended from a mid-nineteenth century doctrine known as the skillful mechanic test, while Alice’s inventiveness requirement appears to have evolved from another old doctrine known as aggregation. Both the aggregation doctrine and the skillful mechanic test assessed whether a patent claim was inventive. In the mid twentieth-century, the Supreme Court clearly stated that the Patent Act of 1952 codified the skillful mechanic test in § 103 obviousness. It is less clear that Alice’s inventiveness requirement descends from the aggregation doctrine. However, the similarity between the two rules, their legal contexts, their purposes, and complaints about them, all suggest that Alice’s inventiveness requirement descended from the aggregation doctrine. If this is true, then the overlap between Alice’s inventiveness requirement and § 103 obviousness likely stems from the common root of inventiveness shared by the old skillful mechanic and aggregation doctrines. 

12/11/17

An Overview and Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Patent Litigation, Part II

Kyle Pietari

The forces of globalization and nations’ investments in their patent systems are making the enforcement of patent rights an increasingly international practice. Though the patent systems of Japan and the United States differ in many fundamental ways, both are key jurisdictions. The aim of this two-part article is to provide a thorough overview and comparison of the major aspects of patent litigation in the U.S. and Japan. It is written from a litigator’s perspective, to demystify the system of each nation for someone familiar with that of the other nation.

12/01/17

Bifurcation of Validity and Infringement Determinations

Janice Kwon and Mark Vallone

A large majority of jurisdictions have adopted a “unified” (or “combined”) patent litigation system, wherein the same court adjudicates the validity and infringement of a patent. For example, prior to the implementation of the America Invents Act (“AIA”), in the United States, the same court would adjudicate both an infringement claim and an invalidity defense thereto. However, a handful of other jurisdictions, such as Germany and China, have adopted a bifurcated system wherein one court supported by technical experts adjudicates patent validity and a separate court or agency adjudicates patent infringement. Infringement proceedings are quickly completed under the assumption that the patent is valid, and the judgment can be enforced before the validity of the patent is determined. Other countries, such as Belgium, Japan, and now the United States, are de facto or “optional” bifurcated systems—while the patent litigation system on its face is a “unified” system, wherein the same court adjudicating infringement can also review validity issues, patent infringement proceedings may be suspended until parallel validity proceedings in the Patent Office are completed.

11/15/17

Reconceptualizing Copyright Registration

Omri Alter

This Article considers the issue of copyright registration through the paradigm of behavioral economics. By considering the issue through a paradigm that has not been considered before, it results in a conclusion that stands face to face with copyright scholarship of recent years. This Article critiques the trend in the literature that advocates for strengthening the role of registration in copyright law. The Article does so by examining what is termed here as “registration dilemma,” which relates to the decision making done by authors to come to a conclusion regarding whether to register their work. The social benefits ascribed to the implementation of copyright registration by the conventional literature dealing with this issue are based on rational decision making of authors. Yet, this conventional model portrays only a limited picture. It does not account for a wide array of decisions that authors may take with regard to the registration dilemma, such as decisions that arise while considering behavioral models of decision making. Because the benefits of copyright registration rely on authors making rational decisions, the existence of decisions that are not based on these kinds of considerations imply that the intended goals will not be achieved. Hence, this Article proposes to downplay the role of registration and search for other means to achieve the same policy goals, without relying on authors’ decision making.

11/01/17

Holmes on Patents: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Patent Law 

Amelia Smith Rinehart

The writings and opinions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., have inspired generations of legal scholars to explain topics like pragmatic skepticism, legal positivism, legal realism, legal moralism, and other “legal-isms.” Justice Holmes—celebrated and contemptible, beloved and beleaguered, emphatically entrenched in the common law—stumbled into federal patent cases on the Supreme Court, yet there is little scholarship stemming from his few opinions in this area. As the twenty-first century ushers in a new gilded age, replete with important battles over patent law and policy as a mechanism for promoting innovation, Holmes’ unique outlook on public and private law (and patents) at the turn of the twentieth century may offer a new perspective within contemporary debates about patent law and its limitations.

10/26/17

Uber & Alice: Could One Patent Really Take Down This Ridesharing Giant?

Douglas B. Wentzel

General Motors’ recent acquisition of ridesharing company Sidecar, licensing of its intellectual property, and half a billion dollar investment in Lyft each suggest that Uber’s likelihood of being sued for patent infringement is on the rise. General Motors now has the rights to assert U.S. Patent 6,356,838—“System and method for determining an efficient transportation route.” Uber’s infringement liability ultimately depends on the validity of this patent, which includes claims to computer-implemented methods and systems for procuring on-demand automobile-based transportation services. U.S. Patent 6,356,838 includes at least one means-plus function claim, and its claims as a whole implicate the Mayo/Alice twostep framework due to their computer implementation, making it an interesting specimen for analysis. This Article finds that Claims 12 and 18 of U.S. Patent 6,356,838 are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that Uber infringes each of these claims. The analysis performed and discussed herein evidences a patent-eligibility framework that generates uncertainty for patentees, creates instability in the relevant computer-implemented technology markets, and reduces the value of United States intellectual property. Ultimately, something must be done to address uncertainty and instability inherent in the Mayo/Alice framework if the United States intellectual property is to retain its status as the most valuable global currency.

10/20/17

Technology Unions: How Technology Employees Can Advocate For Internet Freedom, Privacy, Intellectual Property Reform, and the Greater Good

Martin Skladany

The acute demand for programming, engineering, and scientific talent has put highly skilled and talented workers at Internet and technology behemoths-e.g., the Apples, Facebooks, and Googles of the world-in a unique position to promote change within their companies that would improve society. Such employees should band together to form technology unions in order to advocate for more responsible and enlightened policies by their employers on issues such as privacy, Internet freedom, and the commons and to encourage their employers to challenge competitors and governments that violate such policies. Given that external actors such as civil society and government have been ineffective in pressuring technology giants towards reform, it is time to generate pressure internally.

08/29/17

Are Means-Plus-Function Claims Reasonably Certain to Require Tables of Support?

David Orange

The most likely victims of the Supreme Court’s Nautilus v. Biosig decision appear unaware of their fate. When the Court explained that patent claims must be more than merely “amenable to construction,” but rather must provide “reasonable certainty” in order to meet the requirements of the second section of 35 U.S.C. §112, it is actually claims invoking the sixth section of this statute, better known as means-plus-function claims, that could be invalidated first. Means-plus-function claims are at risk for exactly the reasons that attorneys include them: there is flexibility in matching the claim element to examples from the patent. The flexibility of means-plus-function claims is now on a collision course with the new reasonable certainty standard. Patent drafters seeking the protection of old means-plus-function standards may be creating the very “zone of uncertainty” that Nautilus prohibits. Without new case law, practitioners may not understand how to draft valid means-plus-function claims going forward. This paper considers both legal and practical considerations to forecast how the Patent Trial and Appeal Board will guide applicants.

08/23/17

Patentee's Monetary Recovery From An Infringer - A Revisit

Richard L. Stroup, Cecilia Sanabria, Kelly C. Lu, & Daniel G. Chung

In 1977, the original article was published in this Journal, authored by a younger version of one of the authors, at the start of his legal career. Since then, much has changed. The Federal Circuit was created and given exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. The Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the U.S. Claims Court have published additional precedent, refining the law and its application. Congress has made a few changes to the law, although the majority of controlling statutes and types of available awards remain much the same. Yet, since 1977 the interpretation and application of the law has shifted in many ways.

08/15/17

Claims With Ranges, the Result-Effective Variable, and In re Applied Materials

Tom Brody

Claims can be drafted to require a parameter associated with a value (number), range, or algorithm. Where a claim includes a parameter associated with a value, range, or algorithm, enhanced resistance to obviousness rejections can result because of case law requiring that the prior art disclose overlap and case law requiring the prior art disclose a goal-to-be-achieved in optimizing the value of the parameter. Case law requiring overlap is In re Peterson and In re Geisler, while case law requiring that the prior art disclose a goal-to-be-achieved in optimizing the parameter is In re Antonie and In re Boesch. In re Applied Materials describes both requirements. Rebuttal strategies include arguing that the prior art fails to disclose the same parameter as that required by the claim. Another strategy is to argue that the prior art fails to disclose one or both of overlap and the goal. Yet another type of rebuttal is to demonstrate that the prior art’s disclosed goal is associated with a parameter, but that it is not the same type of parameter as that is recited in the claim. Application of the above cases by the Board and examiners is unpredictable, because the Board and examiners sometimes base the rejection solely on In re Aller or only In re Gal (”design choice”). In re Aller and In re Gal case law are of low-stringency, and these bodies of case law work to the disadvantage of the inventor. 

08/14/17

Gilead Sciences

“This is a new role created within the Intellectual Property team here at Gilead Sciences, reporting into the Vice president of Intellectual Property and will support an international department of about 20 Attorneys. This is an opportunity to develop and manage a high performing team to review best practices and implement processes to improve operational excellence to support significant volume and highly impactful work. This team is made up of high caliber, reputable and extremely hard working IP professionals and they are integral to the companies’ ability to continue providing therapies to medical areas of unmet needs worldwide.”

08/05/17

''Adapted to'' After Aspex

Sean Burke

A recent trio of Federal Circuit cases has exposed uncertainty about the meaning of the linking phrase “adapted to.” Under the new intrinsic evidence standard, “adapted to” is initially presumed to mean “configured to,” but may be broadened to mean “capable of” if there exists support in the claims and specification.

The intrinsic evidence test has caused three problems for patent practitioners. First, the presumption of the narrower “configured to” meaning violates the broadest reasonable interpretation standard at the Patent & Trademark Office. Second, the use of intrinsic evidence unavoidably imports limitations from the specification into the claims. Finally, litigators have exploited, and likely will continue to exploit, the two definitions of “adapted to” by advocating either the broad definition or the narrow definition, depending upon whether the party owns the patent in question.

07/25/17

Trading on the Outcomes of Patent Challenges Short-Selling Petitioners and Possible Modifications to the Inter Partes Review Process

Feng Ye

Imagine investing in a pharmaceutical company A that sells drug B. Before investing, you researched company A and saw its high profit margin and its monopoly over drug B were protected by a patent. Naturally, you were excited about your research results, so you purchase company A’s stock. After purchasing, someone tells you that the patent covering drug B is invalid and he shorted – basically, bet against – the stock of company A. You are confident about your research on company A, so you ignore him. Later, while attending an investment conference, you overhear a hedge fund manager brag about successfully short-selling stock. You eavesdrop closer, as the manager whispers about driving a company’s stock price down by challenging its patents. Later, you find out that the hedge fund manager publically expressed interest in aggressively challenging low quality patents through inter partes review. While researching inter partes review, you find that Company A’s patent covering drug B was just targeted in a petition for inter partes review.

07/12/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 6,360,968 B1

Wildfire Protection System

Inventors: Timothy Orrange and Gary J. Sweeton

Description: I was supposed to go camping this upcoming weekend in the Santa Barbara California area, but earlier this week there was a wildfire in the area that canceled the plans for myself and others planning on doing the same. So, in light of the weather being hot and dry in many places across the country, keep this invention in mind.

06/20/17

An Overview and Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Patent Litigation

Kyle Pietari

In recent decades, patent systems have taken a lead role in shaping the global economy. This trend has been particularly clear in the U.S. and Japan, two of the world’s largest economies that are home to two of the most utilized patent systems. Many people are familiar with how patents are enforced in one of these nations, but not the other. With globalization, patent litigation is becoming an increasingly international practice, and understanding the fundamentals of patent litigation in multiple key jurisdictions can be of crucial importance for a party to a patent dispute. 

06/09/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 6,481,784 B2

Pickup Truck Tent Camping System

Inventors: Lee B. Cargill

Assignee: Enel Company

05/31/17

When All You Have is a Hammer, Everything Looks Like a Nail
In re Tam and the Federal Circuit's Conflation of Federal Trademark Registration and the First Amendment

Drew Jurgensen

In December 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) issued an en banc decision in the In Re Tam case. The decision of the Federal Circuit reversed settled case law that has stood for the past seventy years. The court held that the “disparaging provision” of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional on its face because it fails the strictest form of judicial scrutiny in violating the First Amendment rights of a trademark owner without offering a narrowly tailored regulation that directly advances a compelling government interest. The disparaging provision, which allows the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to deny federal trademark registration to marks that “disparage . . . or bring [a substantial composite of a referenced group] into contempt, or disrepute,” has now been effectively removed from the USPTO’s toolkit by way of the federal circuit court that has direct appellate review power over the Office.
05/24/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
     Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 3,375,836A

Folding and Automobile-Transportable Camping Tent

Inventors: Lara Domeneghetti

05/15/17

The Patent Attorney in Popular Culture 

Robert M. Jarvis

Popular culture is filled with lawyers. Prosecutors and defenders are the most commonly seen, with civil litigators following closely behind. Patent attorneys, on the other hand, almost never appear. Still, with enough digging, such characters can be located. Discussed below are the ones I have been able to find. (See article for footnotes).

04/17/17

Evolution of Music Players

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

With Coachella Valley Music and Arts Festival currently taking place, I thought it would be interesting to look into our past and see what portable music devices were used. Here is a brief history of our portable music devices.

First, starting with the Transistor Radios, U.S. Pat. No. 2,892,931, Richard Koch designed a miniature sized transistor radio that could fit inside an ordinary shirt pocket. To make this device commercially acceptable, he had to come up with an acceptable battery life, meaning create circuitry to consume minimal voltage so as to power the device for longer period of time.

Second, the Portable Lightweight Record Player, U.S. Pat. No. 3,218,081, Augusto Gentilini designed a portable record player that would fit inside of a small suitcase. The reason for a reduction in size was because of the altered motor arrangement. This arrangement also limited the vibration caused by the motor due to the connection with a suspended rubber plate and offsetting the weight of the motor by adding an adjustable weight. 

04/03/17

Patents in Outer Space: An Approach to the Legal Framework of Future Inventions

Juan Felipe Jiménez

Space is a challenge for patent law. From the first Apollo moon mission, to the astronauts on board today’s International Space Station, man has used technology in outer space. But what happens if the technology used on these missions is patented on Earth? Because patent rights are territorial, use of patented technology in outer space is presumptively non-infringing, and accordingly requires no license. As increasingly frequently private commercial actors are exploring space, this lack of patent enforcement has the capacity to distort incentives to invent technology that is primarily designed for use outside the Earth’s boundaries. While some countries have tried to solve this problem by applying their domestic patent law extra-territorially, an international solution is required.

03/14/17

From Camera Obscura To Camera Futura - How Patents Shaped Two Centuries of Photographic Innovation and Competition

Elliot Brown, Ben Hattenbach, and Ian Washburn

The development of photographic technology has been one of the defining achievements of the last several centuries. About a thousand years ago, the state of the art approach to recording imagery involved what was called a ”camera obscura.” This device was a large box or even a full room with a hole in one side, which was used to project an upside-down image of its surroundings on a screen, enabling one to trace the image onto paper. Less than two hundred years ago, the cutting-edge technology for imaging was the daguerreotype, an expensive and unwieldy process through which a delicate image could be etched onto silver-coated copper plates that had been sensitized in iodine vapor. Today, in contrast, the Internet provides ready access to gigapixel imagery captured by space telescopes of galaxies billions of light years away. Even run of-the-mill consumer equipment offers image-stabilized autofocus lenses and image sensors whose tens of millions of pixels can capture details in near darkness.

02/21/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
              Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 4,166,462 A

Self-propelled Shark-proof Cage

Inventors: James M. Ellis

02/13/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 1,809,593 A

Folding Ornament of Expansible Tissue

Inventors: Henry E. Luhrs

Assignee: Beistle Company

02/08/17

The Failure to Preserve CRISPR-Cas9’s Patentability post Myriad and Alice

Benjamin C. Tuttle

The CRISPR-Cas9 system is a highly versatile genome-editing technology that is derived from bacteria. Heralded as one of the most influential biotechnology discoveries in history, CRISPR-Cas9 is unlike any previous geneediting technology because it utilizes a simple RNA template and a relatively small universal enzyme to accurately, efficiently, and cheaply make genetic modifications in any organism. Developed independently by two leading research groups out of the University of California, Berkeley (“Berkeley”) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), the ownership of CRISPR-Cas9 technology has lead to a patent dispute, culminating in the recent allowance of an “interference proceeding” by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). The USPTO’s pending decision on this interference proceeding leaves uncertain the propriety of a technology projected to be worth billions. 

01/23/17

Curiouser and Curiouser! Why the Federal Circuit Can’t Make Sense of Alice
Austin Steelman

In 2010, the Supreme Court broke nearly its nearly three-decade silence on patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101 in Bilski v. Kappos. The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test but declined to “define further what constitutes a patentable ‘process”’. Without a new test, the Federal Circuit’s post-Bilski decisions presented inconsistent interpretations of §101, especially for software patents. So in June 2014, the Supreme Court once again sought to bring clarity to the questions surrounding the abstract idea exception in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.

01/18/17

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 6,568,120 B2

Ice Fishing Trap

Inventors: Kasmir Smolinski 

01/10/17

Two Years After Alice v. CLS Bank 

Jasper L. Tran

As of June 19, 2016, courts have examined 568 challenged patents brought under § 101 motions citing Alice, resulting in 190 valid patents and 378 patents invalidated with an average invalidation rate of 66.5%. Specifically, the Federal Circuit upheld 3 patents and invalidated 34 patents—an average invalidation rate of 91.9%. Also, courts have decided a total of 500 motions brought under § 101 citing Alice, resulting in 109 validation holdings and 391 invalidation holdings with an average invalidation rate of 78.2%. Specifically, the Federal Circuit has decided 26 motions, resulting in 2 validation holdings and 24 invalidation holdings with an average invalidation rate of 92.3%. The district courts have decided 251 motions, resulting in 84 validation holdings and 167 invalidation holdings with an average invalidation rate of 66.5%. The PTAB has decided 209 motions, resulting in 23 validation holdings and 186 invalidation holdings with an average invalidation rate of 89.7%.

12/14/16

The Bedeviling Mess of ePlus, Contempt, and Article III

Wayne A. Kalkwarf and Matthew D. Tanner

ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.1 concerns the cancellation of patent claims. Although a judicial decision cancelling a patent claim would not necessarily warrant significant scrutiny, ePlus addresses an issue beyond the scope of routine patent jurisprudence. The decision involves a basic constitutional power of the judicial branch.

11/23/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
              Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 8,375,847 B1

Winch for Turkey Deep Fryers

Inventors: William P. Anganes

11/21/16

Review: The Criminal Law Of Intellectual Property and Information: Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition

Asha Puttaiah

The Criminal Law of Intellectual Property and Information: Cases and Materials, 2nd Edition by Geraldine Moohr, Jacqueline Lipton, and Irina Manta (2015, West Academic.)

A law enforcement officer buys original copyrighted movies for his video rental shop. In order to prevent damage to his newly acquired video property, he produces one copy of each original movie and rents the copy while keeping the originals in a safe place. Has he violated the copyright owner’s federally recognized property right with his self-created ‘insurance’ program? Is it a criminal violation? Is a civil infringement? Does his distribution business implicate the Commerce Clause because it entails interstate commerce? If yes, does this invoke a federal criminal statute? Or is it merely a localized property right infringement? Is it merely bad or good business practice? Does property right infringement constitute theft? Does the law enforcement officer’s role as a business owner affect what he is authorized to do with the copyrighted video in comparison to what he is authorized to do as a private citizen? As a law enforcement officer, should he have known better? One last question – Is your head spinning yet?

11/17/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 8,549,699 B1

Illuminated Leaf Blower

Inventors: Francisco A. Domingo

11/15/16

Michael B. Pierorazio

In re: Lawrence Everatt Anderson,

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/16-1156.Opinion.10-11-2016.1.PDF

The Federal Circuit holds that “the speed being displayed on the display for use by a motorist in determining a route of travel” is a non-limiting statement of intended use because the “‘for use’ language does not add a structural limitation to the claimed system or method.”
11/09/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. US 4,189,904 A

Leaf Mulcher Attachment for Lawn Mowers

Inventors: Alexander D. Parker

11/08/16

In Support of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rulemaking: Replacing the Two-Month Time Period With A Sixty-Three Day Time Period

Alexander Sofocleous

When an appellant is dissatisfied with a decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), the appellant may seek judicial review. Generally, in ex parte patent prosecution or prosecution of an application to register a mark, a dissatisfied appellant may request reopening of prosecution or seek judicial review of a PTAB or TTAB decision affirming or affirming-in-part an examiner’s action. Such PTAB or TTAB decisions occur frequently. Properly calculating the time period for seeking judicial review is critical because being late has consequences.

11/02/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 5,058,370 A

Yard Rake with Pick-Up Head

Inventors: Elise M. K. Russell

10/24/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. 7,878,878 B2

Life Size Halloween Novelty Item

Inventors: Darren S. Massaro 

10/11/16

Written By: Roland Casillas

        Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 6,311,631 B1

Jet-Propelled Water Board

Inventors: Ronald L. Beecher

Assignee: Ronald L. Beecher

10/04/16

Intellectual Property Registries in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip

Chagai Vinizky

Intellectual property laws are essentially territorial. Because the State of Israel did not impose its sovereignty on Judea and Samaria,1 in principle Israeli laws did and do not apply to the region. Thus, the registration of intellectual property rights with the five intellectual property registries in Israel (patents, design patents, trademarks, appellations of origin, and plant varieties) in principle provide protection only within the territory of the State of Israel and not in Judea and Samaria. A historical perspective of intellectual property registries in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip requires the review of four periods: Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian/Egyptian, and the period of the Israeli military government. The latter is divided into two sub-periods: from 1967 to the Interim Agreement in 1995,2 and from 1995 to the present. The discussion of trademarks began during the Ottoman period and it is still relevant today, because the lifespan of a trademark is not limited in time as long as it is renewed. The discussion of patents and design patents (henceforth, designs), from the Ottoman period to the Interim Agreement does not concern patents and designs that are valid today, because patents and designs expire at the end of their period, but the substantive law applicable to the registration of patents and designs, and the process that takes place in relation to the registration in intellectual property registers when there is a change of government or a transfer of territory. The discussion is important for the solutions that we present in this article. This article describes the development of intellectual property rights registration in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, stressing the existing flaws in the current law, and proposes solutions to remedy these flaws.

09/07/16

Garcia v. Google, Inc. and the Limited Rights of Motion Picture Actors Under American Copyright Law

Jessica Watkins

The 9th Circuit’s Garcia v. Google decision accomplished little more than maintaining the status quo, further entrenching the notion that motion picture actors cannot claim copyright ownership in their individual performances. However, the virulent way in which Cindy Garcia’s performance in Innocence of Muslims was twisted and broadcast to the world begs the question of whether this aspect of copyright law should be revisited. The moral rights laws in other countries take into account the intimately personal nature of artistic expression, and recognize that creative expression is an extension of personhood. Furthermore, there are many aspects of modern technology that necessitate a fresh look at copyright ownership, characteristics that could not have even been fathomed when the Copyright Act was signed into law. Where Garcia has been less than helpful in its particular facts, it is useful as a starting point for refreshed attitudes about the potential for actors’ ownership of copyright in their performances. This article offers guidance for the next generation of copyright reform, pointing to foreign copyright regimes, privacy laws, and necessary alterations to the Copyright Act as a comprehensive starting point from which discussion and new legislation can evolve. What will hopefully follow is more predictability and security for motion picture actors whose performances are deserving of copyright protection.

08/22/16

Trade Dress: An Unsuitable Fit for Product Design in the Fashion Industry

Shayna Ann Giles

Fashion design is an uneasy fit for intellectual property law. Because trade dress is not clearly defined in the Lanham Act, the courts were able to expand this area of intellectual property to protect product design in the fashion industry. Congress does not concur with this expansion, as demonstrated by the lack of legislative action in the face of multiple opportunities to grant protection to fashion design. Despite Congressional intent, the courts attempted to fit fashion design into various types of intellectual property law, beginning with copyright and patent. After realizing that neither of those were an appropriate fit for fashion design, the courts settled on trademark law and more specifically trade dress.

08/10/16

The Problem of Mop Heads in the Era of Apps: Toward More Rigorous Standards of Value Apportionment in Contemporary Patent Law

David Franklyn & Adam Kuhn

In 1884, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a damage claim on a patented mop head improvement for failure to apportion profits attributable to the patented feature against the entire mop. 130 years later, jurists deal with the same core challenge of damage apportionment except with much more complicated products. Given the fact that as many as 250,000 patents impact the average consumer smart phone, can anyone say confidently that any single one of these patents drives consumer demand for the whole product or even for any particular feature of the product? And if not, how much worth does any one patent have in relation to the value of the entire product? For example, what portion of the sales price of an iPhone is attributable to a particular individual feature of that phone, such as the ability to use FaceTime?

07/20/16

Joinder of Unrelated Infringers as Defendants in Patent Litigation Under the Jurisprudence of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas - A Critical Review

Ping-Hsun Chen

In 2011, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) was enacted. 35 U.S.C. § 299 was created to limit district court’s power to permit joinder of unrelated infringers as defendants in a single lawsuit. Before that, district courts apply Rule 20 of the Federal Civil Procedure. The Eastern District of Texas had permitted joinder only because the same patent was infringed.

07/13/16

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Stays Pending Inter Parties Review: Not in the Eastern District of Texas

Douglas B. Wentzel

Grant rates for stays of patent litigation pending the outcome of IPRs are now falling despite initially being very high. Use of IPRs is increasing, as is the likelihood that defendants will seek to stay litigation pending the resolution of these proceedings. Defendants should recognize that obtaining a stay pending IPR outcome is particularly challenging in the most popular patent litigation venue, the Eastern District of Texas.

Recent scholarship analyzes the general success rates of motions to stay pending IPR, but has yet to consider in depth the differential treatment of motions to stay pending IPR nationwide versus solely in the Eastern District of Texas, or treatment of these motions to stay in NPE-filed patent litigation. Treatment of stays pending IPR in exclusively NPE-filed cases in the Eastern District of Texas is significant because NPE-filed cases constitute more than two-thirds of all infringement cases filed in 2015 and NPEs filed almost half of all 2015 patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas.

06/28/16

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Indacon sued Facebook for infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,834,276 (hereinafter the “’276 patent”), directed to “searching, indexing, perusing, and manipulating files in a database … through the insertion of automatically generated hyperlinks.”  Indacon at *2.  Appealing a finding of noninfringement by the district court, Indacon disputed the construction of the claim terms “alias,” “custom link,” “custom linking relationship,” and “link term.”  As no extrinsic evidence was introduced, the Federal Circuit reviewed, de novo, the specification and the prosecution history to determine the correct construction.

06/21/16
Retired Patent Attorney, 30 years experience, accepting overflow work in electrical and mechanical fields. robertplattbell@gmail.com Ph. (703) 544-5281
06/14/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 5,527,039 A

Golf Swing Training Aid

Inventors: Claude A. Levesque

06/07/16

Written By: David Youngkin

In In Re: Gregory E. Urbanski, Kevin W. Lang the Federal Circuit upheld the decision of the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Board) finding the claims of the application obvious.  Urbanski’s application at issue was U.S. 11/170,614, entitled “Protein and Fiber Hydrolysates”, and was directed to a method of enzymatic hydrolysis of soy fiber.  Relevant to the appeal was claim 43 which required “that the soy fiber and enzyme be mixed in water for 60 to 120 minutes”.

05/26/16

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Redline instituted an inter partes review (IPR) to show that claims 9 and 10 of U.S. Patent No. 6,526,808 (the ’808 patent), owned by Star, would have been obvious.  Redline did not include expert testimony to support its grounds in its IPR petition.  Upon institution of the IPR on two of the twelve grounds proposed in Redline’s petition, Redline submitted a motion for supplemental disclosure including expert testimony pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 42.123(a), which allows for supplemental information “relevant to a claim for which the trial has been instituted” to be submitted “with-in one month of the date the trial is instituted.”  The USPTO PTAB denied Redline’s motion finding that the supplemental information could have been submitted with Redline’s petition and did not comply with the PTAB’s “statutory mandate for economy, integrity, efficient administration, and timely consideration of IPRs.”  Redline at *14.  The PTAB then rejected the grounds, noting that Redline “did not rely on an expert declaration in support of its position.” Id. at *12.  While Redline admitted that it intentionally delayed filing the expert information because submitting information for two grounds is less of a burden than submitting information for twelve grounds, Redline, on appeal, argued that the PTAB must allow the motion as long as the timeliness and relevance requirements of §42.123(a) are met.

05/02/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
              Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 5,742,942 A

Golf Glove having Club-Gripping Strap

Inventors: Philip K. Sykes

04/19/16

 

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 3,532,344 A

Golf club and glove including coacting non-slip elements and grip positioning means

Inventors: Benjamin Masstab

04/11/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 2,258,999 A

Golf Player’s Glove

Inventors: Edward S Nunn
04/06/16

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Wi-LAN sued Apple alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. RE37,802 (the ’802 patent) concerning a wireless data communication technique.  The jury found no infringement and that the infringing claims were invalid as anticipated by prior art that disclosed a randomizer using real multipliers.  The district court denied Wi-LAN’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial regarding infringement, but overruled the jury’s verdict regarding invalidity by ruling that the ’802 patent required complex multipliers.  Wi-LAN appealed the denial of JMOL and its motion for a new trial.  Apple appealed the district court’s ruling of validity.

03/22/16

Written By: David Youngkin

In Rosebud LMS Inc. V. Adobe Systems Incorporated the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgement finding that Adobe Systems was not liable for pre-issuance damages because it had no actual notice of the application which issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,578,280.

03/09/16

Written By: Roland Casillas
      Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 8,046,937 B2

Automatic Lacing System

Inventors: Tiffany A. Beers, Michael R. Friton, Tinker L. Hatfield

Assignee: Nike, Inc.
03/08/16

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Appellant Ethicon asserts that the America Invents Act (AIA) and due process preclude the same panel of the Patent Trial and Appeals Board that instituted inter partes review of patented claims from making a final decision regarding the validity of the patented claims.  In addition, Ethicon argues that the disputed claims are valid because the commercial success of Appellee’s allegedly infringing invention is a “strong secondary indication of non-obviousness.”  Ethicon Endo-Surgery at *19.  The Court (DYK, Taranto) holds that “that neither the statute nor the Constitution precludes the same panel of the Board that made the decision to institute inter partes review from making the final determination” and finds no error in the Board’s obviousness determination.   Id. at *2-3.  The Dissent (Newman) argues that the AIA requires bifurcation of the process because the AIA requires the Director to make the institution decision and the Board to issue the final decision.

02/23/16

Written By: Justin Blaufeld

 

The Federal Circuit holds that a restriction requirement that fails to classify a few dependent claims is nevertheless sufficient to stop the clock under the Patent Term Guarantee Act.

 

A patent has a term of 20 years from its effective filing date.  Since undue delays at the PTO can often burn through a patent’s term, the Patent Term Guarantee Act (35 U.S.C. § 154(b)) provides for the restoration of patent term when the PTO misses certain deadlines.  Applicants may petition the Director to restore any days in excess of these deadlines after a patent application is deemed allowable.

02/16/16

In honor of one of the great United State Supreme Court Justices passing over the weekend, Justice Scalia said this in a past interview with Piers Morgan.

Justice Scalia: “My hardest [decision ever made]?  It's the dullest case imaginable. They -- there is -- there is no necessary correlation between the difficulty of a decision and its importance. Some of the most insignificant cases have been the hardest. It would probably be a patent caseYou want me to describe it really?
Piers Morgan: No, I don't. (LAUGHTER)
Justice Scalia: No. Of course. (LAUGHTER)
02/09/16

Written By: David Youngkin

Recently the Federal Circuit in Lumen View Technology LLC v. Findthebest.com, Inc. upheld the district courts finding of exceptionality.  However, the Federal Circuit found it was improper to double the awarded attorney fees. 

Lumen View is the exclusive license of U.S. Patent 8,069,073 (“the ‘073 patent”), which is directed to methods of facilitating bilateral and multilateral decision making.  Findthebest.com (“FTB”) operated a website that provided personalized product and service recommendations based on user inputted information.  Lumen View filed suit alleging that FTB infringed the claims of the ‘073 patent.
01/12/16

Written by: Justin Blaufeld

Belden and Berk-Tek compete in making and selling telecommunications cable and cabling systems. In 2012, Berk-Tek's predecessor (Nexans, Inc.) petitioned for inter partes review of Belden's U.S. Patent No. 6,074,503, which claims a method for making a communications cable.    
01/08/16

Written By: Roland Casillas, Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 9,126,487 B2 

Hoverboard which Generates Magnetic lift to Carry a Person

Inventors: D. Gregory Henderson, Shauna Moran, Mitchell Dougherty, Victor Espinoza, Robert William Melvin, James Janicki, David P Olynick

Assignee: Arx Pax, LLC 

01/06/16

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Appellant Inphi asserts that U.S. Patent No. 7,532,537 (’537 patent) is invalid because the negative claim limitation “and the chip selects of the first and second number of chip selects are DDR chip selects that are not CAS, RAS, or bank address signals” does not meet the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1.  Specifically, Inphi argues that specification fails to provide a reason to exclude the negative limitation.  Santorus, Inc. v. Par Pham., Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  The Court (O’MALLEY, Reyna, Chen) found substantial evidence to affirm the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (the Board) determination that the negative claim limitation is supported under §112, paragraph 1.     

12/14/15

Written by: Roland Casillas, Web and Blog Editor

Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., No. 14-1789 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Appellant, Jack Wolfskin applied to the Patent and Trademark Office for a design mark consisting of an angled paw print for the use with its products, clothing, footwear, and accessories. Appellee, New Millennium Sports filed a response to oppose the application as it would likely create confusion with its own registered mark. In response, Jack Wolfskin filed a counterclaim for cancellation of New Millennium’s mark since they have abandoned said mark. The Patent Trial and Appeals Board found for New Millennium Sports, stating there was no abandonment of the mark. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals agrees with the Board and New Millennium in finding no abandonment has taken place.                            

12/03/15
Meticulous German-to-English translations since 1989. Patents, briefs and expert opinions, court decisions. Competitive rates. G. Leonard, 630-235-9810, gleonard@allwordsgerman.com.
11/17/15

Written By: John Kirkpatrick

Appellant Achates argues that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board erred when the Board instituted an inter partes review (IPR) of Achates’ patents because Appellee Apple’s petitions for the review were time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).  The Federal Circuit (Prost, Lourie, and LINN) concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Achates’ appeal because “the Board’s determinations to institute IPRs are final and non-appealable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d).”

11/13/15

Written By: Roland Casillas, Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 9,170,707 B1

Method and System for Generating a Smart Time-Lapse Video Clip

Inventors: Jason N. Laska, San Francisco, CA (US); Greg R. Nelson, San Bruno, CA (US); Greg Duffy, San Francisco, CA (US); Hiro Mitsuji, San Francisco, CA (US); Lawrence W. Neal, Oakland, CA (US); and Cameron Hill, San Francisco, CA (US)

Assignee: Google Inc.

11/10/15

Written By: David Youngkin

Spectrum appealed the district court’s holding that U.S. Patent 6,500,829 (“the ‘829 patent’”) was invalid as obvious and that claims were not infringed by Sandoz’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that a substantially pure compound would have been obvious over both the 50/50 mixture and pure isomer.  Additionally the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that held Spectrum could not rely on the doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estopple.
10/30/15

Written By: Roland Casillas, Web and Blog Editor

Patent No. U.S. 9,170,645 B2

Publication No. U.S. 2012/0293406 A1

Method and Apparatus for Processing Input in Mobile Terminal

Inventors: Hyung-Kil Park, Gyeonggi-do (KR); and Min-Hwan Seo, Gyeonggi-do (KR)

Assignee: Samsung Electronics, Co., Ltd.
10/26/15

Written By: David Youngkin

The phone wars between Apple and Samsung continue, with Apple seeking a permanent injunction barring Samsung from implementing selected features on Samsung products.   Recently, Apple appealed the district court’s denial of its request for a permanent injunction. In Apple Inc., v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., a divided panel for the Federal Circuit (Judge Moore, concurring Judge Reyna, and dissenting Chief Judge Prost) found that the lower court erred in its denial, vacated the decision, and remanded the case back to the lower court.
10/09/15
Penn State Law is seeking an experienced legal professional to plan, oversee and implement all functions and activities of its new Intellectual Property (IP) Law Clinic. The clinic is designed to provide Penn State Law students with significant IP law experience and to provide the Penn State and local community support in protecting its intellectual property. The clinic is offered in direct support of the University’s Invent Penn State initiative (http://www.psu.edu/invent-penn-state) and Penn State President Eric Barron’s commitment to “promoting patents, licensing and start-ups” as part of Penn State’s effort to expand its already significant role in Pennsylvania’s economic development and create career opportunities for Penn State graduates (http://news.psu.edu/story/326830/2014/09/19/administration/president-emphasizes-economic-development-and-student-career).
10/06/15

IP Alert: Federal Circuit Upholds Expert Apportionment Methodology to Prove Reasonable Royalty Damages for Individual Features of Complex Technology

--Written by Fitch Even attorneys Steven C. Schroer and Christian C. Damon

On September 21, 2015, in Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit added a new chapter to rapidly developing jurisprudence addressing the kinds of evidence admissible to prove the reasonable royalty value of patents drawn to individual features of a multi-element technology. Explaining its holding by reference to long-established Georgia-Pacific principles, the court upheld a jury verdict awarding a royalty based on opinions of a damages expert whose methodology rested on the premise that a “feature’s use is proportional to its value” and allocating infringing versus non-infringing use of the multi-element technology. The court affirmed the admission into evidence of the expert’s opinions based on usage surveys conducted by the infringer in the ordinary course of its business. In doing so, the Federal Circuit liberalized the admission of expert testimony that relies “on a methodology not previously used or published in peer-reviewed journals.” The court held that such opinions do not per se run afoul of guidelines established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that based on the particular facts present and the manner the issue was presented at trial, a jury’s lump-sum damages award could compensate the patent owner for past and future damages and that a going-forward royalty was unnecessary.
10/01/15

Coming soon. If anyone has come across an interesting or innovative issued patent, new or old, and would like the IP community to know about it, please contact the Web and Blog Editor.

09/30/15

Written by: Justin Blaufeld

The Federal Circuit holds that in order to rely on the provisional filing date of a prior art patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), one must prove that the prior art patent is actually entitled to the benefit of priority, in addition to showing that the provisional application anticipates the patent being challenged.

09/29/15

Written By: David Youngkin

Staub Design, LLC, v. David John Carnivale (Fed. Cir. 2015)

Mr. Carnivale owned the registered trademark “THE AFFORDABLE HOUSE” and registered domain name www.affordablehouse.com in 1998.  Mr. Staub, in 2004, registered the domain name “www.theaffordablehouse.com”.  The question for the court was not of trademark infringement, but of validity. Also, questions of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion were included in further proceedings by the courts.
09/22/15

Category: Claim Construction 

Written By: Michael B. Pierorazio

Rotatable Technologies LLC owns Patent No. 6,326,978 for a selectively rotating window on a computer display having a frame and display portion. The issue before the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board was whether some limitations recited in the claims, “computer display window”, “display portion”, “toggling the window between two preselected orientations”, were properly defined within the Specification. The question now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is whether or not to stand behind the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board’s decision.

09/17/15

Category: Licensing 

Written By: Justin Blaufeld

In  Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention after its patent term has expired.  Over time, some have come to criticize this rule as an undue restraint on the right to contract.  For example, a patent holder may want to cover a portfolio of patents with one contract, or structure a royalty deal to provide for larger payments in the future in exchange for smaller payments today. The Supreme Court revisits Brulotte to decide whether or not the rulings of the past still hold true today.

04/15/15
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleKennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., No. 2014-1350 (Fed. Cir. March 25, 2015).
Issues
[Anticipation] Because all the limitations of Kennametal’s claim are specifically disclosed in Grab, the question for the purposes of anticipation is “whether the number of categories and components” disclosed in Grab is so large that the combination of ruthenium and PVD coatings “would not be immediately apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.” Wrigley, 683 F.3d at 1361.
Kennametal, Inc., at *10.
[Obviousness] Kennametal claims that the Board failed to establish a prima facie case of obviousness. Because of the problems relating to cobalt capping, Kennametal contends, it would not have been obvious to combine ruthenium binders with PVD coating.
Id. at *13.
Holdings
[Anticipation] Grab’s express “contemplat[ion]” of PVD coatings is sufficient evidence that a reasonable mind could find that a person of skill in the art, reading Grab’s claim 5, would immediately envisage applying a PVD coating. Grab col.4 l.59. Thus, substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Grab effectively teaches 15 combinations, of which one anticipates pending claim 1.
Id. at *11.
[Obviousness] [B]ecause a person of skill in the art reading Grab would readily envisage the combination of ruthenium binders and PVD coatings, it would have been obvious to that person that these two could be combined with a reasonable expectation of success. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that this express teaching was not significantly undermined by the problem of cobalt capping, especially in view of the similar teaching of Leverenz.
Id. at *15.
 
 
04/11/15
Category: Administrative Law 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleExela Pharama Sciences, LLC v. Lee, No. 2013-1206 (Fed. Cir. 26, 2015).
IssueThis appeal presents the question of whether a third party has the right to challenge, by way of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a ruling of the Patent and Trademark Office reviving a patent application that had become abandoned by failure to meet a filing schedule established by the Patent Cooperation Treaty and its implementing statute.
Exela Pharama Sciences, LLC, at *2.
HoldingWe affirm the dismissal, on the ground that PTO revival rulings are not subject to third party collateral challenge, thereby precluding review regardless of whether Exela’s claims were time-barred.
Id. at *3.
 
04/07/15

Category: Infringement 

  

By: Abby Lin, Contributor  

TitleAqua Shield v. Inter Pool Cover Team, No. 2014-1263 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).
Issues
[1] We deal here only with a challenge to the soundness of the district court’s particular use of IPC’s profits in its rationale.
Aqua, at *10.
[2] Aqua Shield appeals … the finding of no willfulness that led to the denial of enhanced damages and attorney's fees.
Id. at *2.
Holding
[1] Contrary to Aqua Shield’s broader contention, therefore, the district court did not err in considering IPC’s profits. But it did err in treating the profits IPC actually earned during the period of infringement as a royalty cap. That treatment incorrectly replaces the hypothetical inquiry into what the parties would have anticipated, looking forward when negotiating, with a backwardlooking inquiry into what turned out to have happened. See Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1385 (expectations govern, not actual results).
Id. at *10.
[2] [The district court improperly applied Seagate's two part terms for willfulness analysis by relying on EDNY's denial of Aqua Shield's motion for preliminary injunction based on personal jurisdiction and incomplete analysis on if IPC's design around was implemented. ] We therefore vacate the court’s decision that IPC did not willfully infringe and remand for an analysis that conforms to Seagate’s standard. 497 F.3d at 1371. We do not reach an ultimate conclusion ourselves. We observe, however, that Seagate’s first requirement focuses on whether the infringer’s defenses, as ultimately presented to the court, were reasonable. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1008. [...] we note that the objective baselessness of an infringer’s defenses, assessed on the litigation record, may have a strong bearing on whether the “objectively defined risk” of infringement “was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 [...]
Id. at *14-15 (text added).

 

 

 

04/03/15
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleVersata Soft., Inc. v. Callidus Soft., No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 27, 2015).
Issue[The Fed. Cir. issued opinion on appeal, but joint petition to dismiss case submitted to the district court was not presented to CAFC until after opinion on underlying appeal issued] Due to the unique timing and sequence of events, we stayed issuance of the mandate and directed the parties to respond whether the circumstances require that we vacate our prior opinion.
Versata Soft., Inc., at *2 (text added).
HoldingBecause the parties’ voluntary and unconditional dismissal mooted the appeal before the release of our prior opinion, we vacate the opinion and dismiss the appeal.
Id. at *2.
 
 
Editor Note
This case vacates a previous CAFC precedential opinion issued on the merits of the case, and prior to the controversy being settled. Previous opinion available here.
 
 
 
 
 
03/25/15
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor
 
TitleABB Turbo Systems AG v. TurboUSA (Fed. Circ., Dec. 17, 2014).
Issue[…] the only issue we need to address is whether the district court erred in dismissing the trade-secret claim against TurboUSA and Willem Franken.
ABB Turbo, at * 6 (text added).
HoldingWe reverse [the district court’s ruling dismissing the trade-secret claim against the defendants], concluding that the district court relied on judgments about the merits that go beyond what is authorized at the complaint stage. We remand for further proceedings.
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
 
03/21/15
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor
 
TitlePresident & Fellows of Harvard v. Lee, No. 2013-1628 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2014) (Non-Precedential).
Issue[Is there] evidence that [Harvard] had [not actually] paid the requisite terminal disclaimer fee [for U.S. Patent No. 5,087,571 (the '571 patent)] and that, as a result, the terminal disclaimer was not legally entered into the prosecution history for the ’571 patent and was therefore invalid.
President & Fellows of Harvard, at *4.
HoldingWe conclude that the evidence as a whole provides a rational basis for the PTO’s conclusion that the terminal disclaimer fee was paid. As such, we find that the district court properly concluded that the PTO’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Id. at *9.
 
 
 
03/12/15
Category: 103 
 
 
 
 By: Michael Pierorazio, Contributor
 
TitleI/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., No. 2013-1307, -1313 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues
[The Obviousness Determination] The Google Defendants argue that I/P Engine’s claimed invention is obvious as a matter of law because it simply combines content-based and collaborative filtering, two information filtering methods that were well-known in the art.
I/P Engine, Inc., at *8.
[The Jury’s Findings] I/P Engine points to the fact that the jury found that there were differences between the prior art and the claimed invention[…], and argues that on appeal “the only question is whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings.”[…].
Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).
[Secondary Conditions] […] I/P Engine’s argument that the commercial success of Google’s accused advertising systems provides objective evidence of non-obviousness.
Id. at *18.
Holdings
[The Obviousness Determination] [T]he prior art contained explicit statements describing the advantages of combining these two filtering techniques, and […] it would have been obvious to include a user’s query in the filtering process[…]. We […] hold that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
I/P Engine, Inc., at *8 (internal citations omitted).
[The Jury’s Findings] [W]hile the jury made underlying determinations as to the differences between the asserted claims and the prior art, it did not address the ultimate legal conclusion as to obviousness. Thus, while the jury found that the prior art did not disclose all of the elements of the asserted claims[…], it never determined whether it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to bridge any differences between the prior art and the claimed invention[…].
Id. at *17 (internal citations omitted).
[Secondary Conditions] We find no merit in I/P Engine’s argument that the commercial success of Google’s accused advertising systems provides objective evidence of non-obviousness. Evidence of commercial success, or other secondary considerations, is only significant if there is a nexus between the claimed invention and the commercial success. […]. Id. at *18 (footnote omitted)(internal citations omitted) )(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, secondary considerations cannot overcome the strong prima facie case of obviousness[…]. Id. at *19 (footnote omitted)(internal citations omitted).
 
 
03/08/15
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleFenner Inv., Ltd. v. Cellco Partnership, No. 2013-1640 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2015).
IssueThe district court’s definition of “personal identification number” is the issue on this appeal. Fenner argues that the district court erred by construing “personal identification number” as a number that is associated with the individual user and not with the device. Fenner argues that the plain meaning of “personal identification number” does not contain or require this limited definition,
Fenner Inv., Ltd., at *4.
HoldingWe affirm the judgment [since the written description and prosecution history describe the “personal identification number” to be associated with individual users, and the doctrine of claim differentiation may not expand construction beyond that which is taught by the specification].
Id. at *2(text added).
 
 
 
03/05/15
A Triumph of Genius,By: Ronald K. Fierstein

Review by Roland Casillas

With the amount of interesting facts that were packed into this book, it is hard to create a chronological summary of what developed throughout Edwin Land’s life and occupation. But, each chapter sheds new light into one of the largest legal battles of the century. The story develops a picture perfect company, Kodak, assisting a newly formed company, Polaroid, to create an innovative product that will change the face of photography.

03/04/15
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitlePacing Tech., LLC v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., No. 2014-1396 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2015).
IssueOn appeal, the parties dispute whether the asserted claims require the claimed devices to play back the pace information using a tempo, such as the beat of a song or flashes of light. This dispute turns on whether the preamble to claim 25 is limiting and on the construction of a “repetitive motion pacing system” as recited in the preamble.
Pacing Tech., LLC, at *4.
HoldingWe hold that the preamble to claim 25, which reads “[a] repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user...,” is limiting [because the preamble terms “user” and “repetitive motion pacing system” limit the claims, and the embodiments discussed in the specification disavow an interpretation beyond that which is disclosed].
Id. at *5 (text added).
 
 
 
02/28/15
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleMemorylink v. Motorola Solutions, No. 2014-1186 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014 ).
IssueMemorylink Corp. (“Memorylink”) appeals from the decisions of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (i) granting summary judgment in favor of Motorola Solutions, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc. (collectively, “Motorola”) on the contract [] claims, [...] and (ii) dismissing various tort claims as barred by the statute of limitations [...].
Memorylink at *2.
HoldingBecause we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment or in dismissing the tort claims, we affirm.
Id.
 
02/24/15
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleAntares Pharma. v. Medac Pharma. Inc., No. 2014-1648 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 2014).
Issue[Are] the asserted reissue claims of [RE44,846 ("the '846 patent)] invalid for [...] failing the original patent requirement of [35 U.S.C. § 251, requiring] that the original specification expressly disclose the particular invention claimed on reissue[?]
Antares Pharma, at *4 (text added).
HoldingU.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 315 U.S. 668 (1942) made clear that, for § 251, “it is not enough that an invention might have been claimed in the original patent because it was suggested or indicated in the specification.” [...] Rather, the specification must clearly and unequivocally disclose the newly claimed invention as a separate invention.
Id. at *15 (text added, internal citation removed).
 
 
 
02/20/15
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleNeurorepair, Inc. v. The Nath Law Group, No. 2013-1073 (Fed Cir. Jan. 15, 2015).
IssueThe question before this court is whether a California state court malpractice case involving patent law representation was properly removed to a federal court.
Neurorepair, Inc., at *2.
HoldingBased on Gunn v. Minton, this court vacates and remands the district court’s judgments with instructions to remand the case to California state court [because: A. NeuroRepair’s suit would not “necessarily raise” issues of patent law; B. At least one patent law issue is actually disputed; C. The patent issue in NeuroRepair’s suit is not “substantial”; and D. if cases such as NeuroRepair’s were heard in federal court, it would disrupt the federal-state balance].
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
 
02/16/15
Category: 102  
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
CaseTyco Healthcare Group, LP v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., No. 2013-1324, -1381 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2014).
Issues
1) "Tyco argues on cross-appeal that because Ethicon made changes to design features of the prototype, such as replacing the single cam with a dual cam mechanism, Ethicon did not establish prior conception. Tyco further asserts that Ethicon failed to show diligence through the date of constructive reduction to practice in October 1997, arguing that there was a gap in weekly records from September 1996 to February 1997."
Tyco, at *9.
2) "Relying on Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984), Tyco asserts that the Ethicon Prototype cannot serve as prior art under § 102(g) because there was no reduction to practice before Tyco’s priority date. Tyco contends that the absence of prior reduction to practice is dispositive of the issue, but also argues that based on In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1039- 40 (CCPA 1980), § 102(g) prior art cannot be prior art under § 103 if it was “unknown to both the applicant and the art at the time the applicant makes his invention,” because doing so would “establish a standard for patentability in which an applicant’s contribution would be measured against secret prior art.”"
Id. at *11.
Holdings
1) "Having established prior conception and diligent reduction to practice, the district court correctly found that the Ethicon Prototype anticipates those twenty-six claims under § 102(g)."
Tyco, at *10-11.
2) "The district court erred when it inconsistently applied § 102(g) to the Ethicon Prototype by not requiring prior reduction to practice for anticipation purposes but requiring it for the obviousness analysis. The clear language of § 102(g) does not require prior reduction to practice so long as the inventor can prove that he or she conceived of the invention first and was diligent in later reducing it to practice.....We therefore hold that neither § 102(g) nor § 103 make prior reduction to practice the only avenue through which § 102(g) prior art can constitute prior art under § 103. "
Id. at *11.
 
 
 
 
02/12/15
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Imes, No. 2014-1206 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 29, 2015).
Issues
[I: “wirelessly”] The central dispute is whether Schuetzle discloses a second wireless communication module. […] The examiner thus construed “wireless” as including communication along the metal contacts of the removable memory card and the computer system when the memory card is inserted into the computer. According to the examiner, the metal contacts are not a wire.
In re Imes, at *2-3.
[II: “streaming”] The examiner found that Knowles discloses the recited communications module operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a destination.
Id. at *5.
Holdings
[I: “wirelessly”] We hold that the Board erred in concluding that Schuetzle’s removable memory card 35 discloses the claimed second wireless communication module. […] The metal contacts of a removable memory card do not carry a signal through atmospheric space using electromagnetic or acoustic waves, and thus removable memory card 35 is not a wireless communication module under the broadest reasonable interpretation of that term in view of the specification.
Id. at *4.
[II: “streaming”] Sending a series of e-mails with attached still images is not the same as streaming video. Such a construction is unreasonable as it comports with neither the plain meaning of the term nor the specification. Streaming video is the continuous transmission of video.
Id. at *6.
 
 
 
02/03/15
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleFleming v. Escort Inc., 2014-1331, -1371 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 24, 2014).
Issues
1. Fleming’s first contention on appeal [...] is that Escort’s evidence in support of invalidity was insufficiently specific to support the verdict.
Fleming, at *6.
2. Fleming also challenges the proof of Orr’s prior invention by invoking the principle that “oral testimony by an alleged inventor asserting priority over a patentee’s rights ... must be supported by some type of corroborating evidence.”
Id. at *8.
3. Fleming’s final challenge is that, even if Orr had priority of invention by virtue of his activities through 1996, he lost priority under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2)’s disqualification of prior inventions that have been “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed.”
Id. at *10.
Holdings
1. We conclude that there was sufficiently specific factual support for the invalidity determinations [and because broad claims do not require extensive testimony and expert’s testimony on radar communication was adequate in view of the scope of the claims].
Id. at *6 (text added).
2. Fleming is correct that none of the corroborating evidence constitutes definitive proof of Orr’s account or discloses each claim limitation as written. But the corroboration requirement has never been so demanding. [...] It is a flexible, rule-of- reason demand for independent evidence that, as a whole, makes credible the testimony of the purported prior inventor with regard to conception and reduction to practice of the invention as claimed. [...]
Id. at *10 (internal citations omitted).
3. In this case, there is no evidence of any active efforts to suppress or conceal (because during the entire period between conception and filing, the inventor was either actively improving the invention, or engaged in another project after bankruptcy of his firm.).
Id. at *11 (text added).


01/27/15
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
 By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TitleJapanese Found. for Cancer Research v. Lee, No. 2013-1678, 2014-1014 (Fed. Circ. December 9, 2014).
Issue[Whether the district court was correct in ruling that] the PTO acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and abused its discretion, when it refused to withdraw the terminal disclaimer on U.S. Patent No, 6, 194,187 (“187 patent”).
Japanese Found., at *2 (Text Added).
Holding[…] we find that the PTO did not act arbitrarily, act capriciously, or abuse its discretion in declining to use any inherent authority that it might have in withdrawing the terminal disclaimer on the ‘187 patent that the Foundation’s attorney of record duly filed in accordance with the PTO’s regulations.
Id. at *17.
 
 
01/23/15
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
 
TitleTeva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13-854 (Jan. 20, 2015).
IssueToday’s case involves claim construction with “eviden­tiary underpinnings.” See Part III, infra. And, it requires us to determine what standard the Court of Appeals should use when it reviews a trial judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute. Should the Court of Appeals review the district court’s factfinding de novo as it would review a question of law? Or, should it review that fact-finding as it would review a trial judge’s factfinding in other cases, namely by taking them as correct “unless clearly erroneous?”
Teva Pharma. USA, Inc., at *1.
HoldingWe hold that the appellate court must apply a “clear error,” not a de novo, standard of review [when reviewing underlying factual disputes of claim construction, but may apply de novo review when reviewing claim construction generally].
Id. at *1-2 (text added).
 
 
01/20/15
Category: Infringement
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
Case:Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., No. 2013-1472, -1656 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2014).
Issues
1. “Halo argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of no direct infringement with respect to products that Pulse delivered abroad. Halo contends that those products were sold and offered for sale within the United States because negotiations and contracting activities occurred within the United States, which resulted in binding contracts that set specific terms for price and quantity. Halo argues that the location of the sale or offer for sale should not be limited to the location of delivery. Halo also argues that it suffered economic harm in the United States as a result of Pulse’s sales.”
Halo Electronics, at *8-9.
2. “Halo challenges [the district court’s holding that Pulse did not willfully infringement due to relying on its obviousness defense] mainly by arguing that Pulse did not actually rely on any invalidity defense pre-suit when selling the accused products because Pulse’s obviousness defense was developed after the lawsuit was filed in 2007. Halo also contends that after Pulse received Halo’s notice letters in 2002, the Pulse engineer only performed a cursory review of the Halo patents and Pulse did not rely on that analysis to assess whether it was infringing a valid patent. Halo asserts that the court erred in holding that the objective prong was not met simply because Pulse raised a non-frivolous obviousness defense.”
Id. at *17 (text added).
3. “Pulse cross-appeals from the judgment that the asserted claims of the Halo patents were not invalid for obviousness[based on the jury’s findings]”.
Id. at *19 (text added).
Holdings
1. “We agree with Pulse that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment of no direct infringement with respect to those products that Pulse manufactured, shipped, and delivered outside the United States because those products were neither sold nor offered for sale by Pulse within the United States. [Because the products were not sold/offered for sale within the U.S., Halo also did not suffer economic harm.]”
Id. at *9(text added).
2. “We agree with Pulse that the district court did not err in holding that the objective prong of the willfulness inquiry was not satisfied. “Seagate’s first prong is objective, and ‘[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.’” DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371). The court properly considered the totality of the record evidence, including the obviousness defense that Pulse developed during the litigation, to determine whether there was an objectively-defined risk of infringement of a valid patent.”
Id. at *18.
3. “Pulse did not file a motion during trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) on the issue of obviousness before that issue was submitted to the jury and thus waived its right to challenge the jury’s implicit factual findings underlying the nonobviousness general verdict. The district court thus correctly presumed that the jury resolved all factual disputes relating to the scope and content of the prior art and secondary considerations in Halo’s favor. Based upon those presumed factual findings, the court did not err in reaching the ultimate legal conclusion that the asserted claims were not invalid for obviousness.”
Id. at *19-20.
 
 
 
01/15/15
Category: 102 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleDelano Farms Co. v. The California Grape Commission, No. 2014-1030 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 9, 2015).
IssueThe question in a case such as this one is thus whether the actions taken by [a third party that stole the contents of the invention] create a reasonable belief as to the invention’s public availability.
Delano Farms Co., at *7.
HoldingThere is no public use when a third party steals secretive information without authority and endeavors to keep said information secret from the public and a sole disclosure limited to a friend/colleague is not a public use.
See, generally, id. at 11.
 
 
 
01/10/15
Category: 101   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleContext Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013-1588, -1589, 2014-1112, -1687 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014).
Issues
[1: Abstract Idea] Are claims directed to 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory, an abstract idea?
See, generally, Context Extraction and Transmission LLC at *6-7.
[2: Additional Limitations] Does the use of a scanner in a claim limitation - either individually or as an ordered combination— transform the claims into a patent-eligible application?
See, generally, id. at 9.
Holdings
[1: Abstract Idea] [T]he claims of the asserted patents are drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory.
Id. at *7.
[2: Additional Limitations] CET’s claims merely recite the use of this existing scanning and processing technology to recognize and store data from specific data fields such as amounts, addresses, and dates. See id. There is no “inventive concept” in CET’s use of a generic scanner and computer to perform well-understood, routine, and conventional activities commonly used in industry.
Id. at *9.
 
 
 
01/06/15
The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.
  • Rebutting Obviousness Rejections by Disclosing Impermissible Hindsight Tom Brody Patent PR Eric L. Lane
  • The Google Art Project: An Analysis From a Legal and Social Perspective on Copyright Implications Katrina Wu
  • Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law Jurisprudence And IP Federalism Shubha Ghosh
  • Note: Trademarking Social Change: An Ironic Commodification Roger Stronach
  • Note: A Comparative Analysis of the Evolution of Trademark Law in Cuba and the Dominican Republic Ana Cristina Carrera
  • Note: Controlling the Patent Trolls: A Proposed Approach for Curbing Abusive Section 337 Claims in the ITC Matthew Duescher
  • 2014 Author Index
01/03/15
Category: Infringement
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TitleSSL Services, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc. (Fed. Circ. October 14, 2014).
IssueSSL appeals the district court’s denial of a new trial on non-infringement of claim 27 of [U.S. Pat. 6,061,796], arguing that the district court erred in its claim construction of the terms “intercepting” and “destination address,” and in imposing a set step order requirement for the claim. SSL also appeals the district court’s finding that it was not the prevailing party in the litigation overall. Citrix cross-appeals the district court’s denial of JMOL [“judgment as a matter of law”] of no willful infringement and invalidity of claims 2, 4, and 7 of [U.S. Pat. 6,158,011]. Citrix further contends the district court’s award of prejudgment interest and asserts that certain of its evidentiary rulings justify a new trial on willful infringement and damages.
SSL Services, at *2-3 (text added).
HoldingsBased on the “destination address” limitation, we affirm the denial of a new trial on non-infringement of claim 27 of the ‘796 Patent. Furthermore, we affirm the district court’s denial of JMOL requesting a finding of no willful infringement and invalidity of the asserted claims of the ‘011 Patent. We also affirm the denial of a new trial based on the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and affirm the award of prejudgment interest. Finally, we vacate the district court’s denial of prevailing party status to SSL because we find that SSL is the prevailing party, and remand for an assessment of costs and fees.
Id. at *3.
 
 
12/30/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor  
 
TitleAzure Networks v. CSR, No. 2013-1459 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 2014).
Issue
[Standing] [Did the District court properly grant] the Appellees' motion to dismiss Tri-County for lack of standing, finding that Tri-County had effectively assigned Azure the '129 patent.
Azure Networks at *3 (text added).
[Claim Construction] [Did the district court properly construe] the term "MAC address" in the '129 patent as "a device identifier gerenated by the hub device".
Id. (text added).
Holding
[Standing] We agree that the agreement between Tri-County and Azure constituted an effective assignement for purposes of standing, we affirm the dismissal of Tri-County.
Id.
[Claim Construction] The district court improperly construed the term ["MAC address"], we vacate the judgmenet of noninfringement and remand.
Id.
 
 
 
12/27/14
Category: 101  
 
 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleIn re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Lit., No. 2014-1361, -1366 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 2014).
Issues
[I: Composition of Matter Claims] The four composition of matter claims now on appeal are directed to primers, which are “short, synthetic, single-stranded DNA molecule[s] that bind[] specifically to . . . intended target nucleotide sequence[s].” J.A. 13. The court held these were likely patent ineligible because they claim so-called products of nature—that is, they claim the same nucleotide sequence as naturally occurring DNA.
In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Lit., at *5.
[II: Method Claims] Ambry argues that Mayo is directly on point because the method claims here, as there, simply identify a law of nature (the precise sequence of the BRCA genes, and comparisons of the wild-type BRCA sequences with certain mutations of those gene sequences found in the test subject) and apply conventional techniques.
Id. at *13.
Holdings
[I: Composition of Matter Claims] We do not read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Myriad as conferring patent eligibility on composition of matter claims directed to naturally occurring DNA strands under such circumstances. A DNA structure with a function similar to that found in nature can only be patent eligible as a composition of matter if it has a unique structure, different from anything found in nature. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–17 (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10). Primers do not have such a different structure and are patent ineligible.
Id. at *9.
[II: Method Claims] We need not decide if Mayo is directly on point here because the method claims before us suffer from a separate infirmity: they recite abstract ideas. […] [Furthermore, under the Alice analysis,] [t]he non-patent-ineligible elements of claims 7 and 8 do not add “enough” to make the claims as a whole patent-eligible [because the language only identifies the technique used to compare two gene sequences].
Id. at *13 and *17 (text added).
 
 
 
 
12/24/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleStryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc. No. 2013-1668 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2014).
Issue[Whether] [t]he district court failed to undertake an objective assessment of Zimmer’s specific defenses to Stryker’s claims [in determining willful infringement].
Stryker Corp. at *18 (text added).
Holding[Because Zimmer’s arguments were founded on reasonable interpretations of claim language that Stryker needed to directly rebut before the jury], we find that Zimmer’s defenses to the infringement of each patent claim that Stryker asserted were not objectively unreasonable, and, therefore, it did not act recklessly.
Id. at *19 (text added).
 
 
 
 
12/17/14
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleAnticancer, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 2013-1056 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2014).
Issues[The district court's action, in requiring Anticancer to pay defendants' attorney fees, in order for AntiCancer to supplement its Preliminary Infringement Contentions,] was [an unwarranted] sanction, [...] and that the summary judgment based on the [fee-shifting] was improper.
Anticancer, Inc., at *6 (text added).
HoldingWhen a complaint meets the standards of the Federal Rules, and there has been no reasonable opportunity for discovery and evidentiary development of the issues, it is rarely appropriate to summarily decide the merits against the complainant. We need not intrude upon the district court’s authority to require supplementation of the Preliminary Infringement Contentions when such supplementation may assist the procedures of trial. However, exercise of a court’s inherent authority to levy a sanction as a condition of supplementing the Contentions requires conduct that “constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.”
Id. at *27.

 
12/14/14
Category: 101 
 
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
CasePlanet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS, No. 2013-1663 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues
1. Planet Bingo argues that “in real world use, literally thousands, if not millions of preselected Bingo numbers are handled by the claimed computer program,” making it impossible for the invention to be carried out manually [and thus impossible to be done mentally, making it patent eligible].
Planet Bingo, at *4 (text added).
2. Planet Bingo argues that the patents recite “significantly more” than an abstract idea because the invention includes “complex computer code with three distinct subparts.”
Id. at *5.
Holdings
1. But the claimed inventions do not require [thousands of preselected Bingo numbers]… although the ’646 and ’045 patents are not drawn to the same subject matter at issue in Bilski and Alice, these claims are directed to the abstract idea of “solv[ing a] tampering problem and also minimiz[ing] other security risks” during bingo ticket purchases. This is similar to the abstract ideas of “risk hedging” during “consumer transactions,” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, and “mitigating settlement risk” in “financial transactions,” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356–57, that the Supreme Court found ineligible. Thus, we hold that the subject matter claimed in the ’646 and ’045 patents is directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at *4(text added, internal citations omitted).
2. [T]he claims recite a program that is used for the generic functions of storing, retrieving, and verifying a chosen set of bingo numbers against a winning set of bingo numbers. And, as was the case in Alice, “the function performed by the computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). Accordingly, we hold that the claims at issue do not have an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed subject matter into a patent-eligible application.
Id. at *6.
 
 
 
12/11/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleWorld Class Tech. Corp. v. Ormco Corp., No. 2013-1679, 2014-1692 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 20, 2014).
IssueThe heart of the parties’ dispute is what constraints claim 1 places on the “support surface” during movement of the movable member (slide). As a complement to that issue, the parties also dispute what role is played by the “ledge” surface that lies on the other side of the wire-holding slot from the support surface.
World Class Tech. Corp., at *4.
Holding[W]e conclude that the specification makes clear that the district court correctly resolved the uncertainties in the claim language, adopting a construction that aligns with the description of the invention [which distinguishes “support surface” from a “ledge” surface, and assigns a unique operation to each term,” such that the two terms are not interchangeable].
Id. at *9 (text added).
 
 
 
12/08/14
Category: 101 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleUltramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, No. 2010-1544 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2014).
IssueUltramercial argues that the ’545 claims are not directed to the type of abstract idea at issue in Alice—one that was “routine,” “long prevalent,” or “conventional”— and are, instead, directed to a specific method of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown and never employed on the Internet before.
Ultramercial, Inc., at *8.
HoldingThe process of receiving copyrighted media, selecting an ad, offering the media in exchange for watching the selected ad, displaying the ad, allowing the consumer access to the media, and receiving payment from the sponsor of the ad all describe an abstract idea, devoid of a concrete or tangible application.
Id., at *9.
 
12/03/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor  
 
TitleJang v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2014-134 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2014).
IssueBoston Scientific Corporation and Scimed Life Systems, Inc. petition for permission to appeal an order of the United States District Court for the Central District of California that denied summary judgment.
Jang at *2.
Holding[W]e conclude that the limited circumstances under which an interlocutory appeal might be
permitted are not met in this case.
Id. at *9.
 
12/01/14

For the past 96 years, the Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society has been at the forefront of legal thought in the field of patents, trademarks and copyright. Our articles have launched the careers of countless academics and practitioners and are regularly cited by the Supreme Court. With this history in mind, I am pleased to announce the creation of Edison, a new open access journal which will supplement our print publications.

11/30/14
 
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TItle:American Calcar v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Fed. Circ. Sept. 26, 2014).
Issue:[Whether] the judgment of the [lower court] finding that U.S. Patent Nos. 6,330,497 ("497 patent"), 6,438,465 ("465 patent"), and 6,542,795 ("795 patent") were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct [was an abuse of discretion].
American Calcar, at *2, 6 (Text Added).
Holding:The defendant proves inequitable conduct "by clear and convincing evidence that the patent applicant (1) misrepresented or omitted information material to patentability, and (2) did so with specific intent to mislead or deceive the PTO." [...] This court held in Therasense that the standard for "the inequitable conduct is but-for materiality." In particular, undisclosed prior art is "but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of" it. [... In regard to the intent prong,] "because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare a district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence," provided that such intent is the single reasonable inference.
Id. at *5-6, 9 (Text Added, Internal Citations Omitted). 
 
 
11/27/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
Titlee.Digital Corp. v. Futurewei Tech., Inc., No. 2014-1019, -1242, -1243 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2014).
Issues
[1: Collateral Estoppel] Based on the Colorado Court’s previous construction, the defendants moved to apply collateral estoppel to the construction of the sole memory limitation in the ’774 and ’108 patents. The district court granted the motions and adopted the Colorado Court’s construction. The court reasoned that the ’774 patent reexamination never addressed the sole memory limitation, and further held that the ’108 and ’774 patents are “closely related.”
e.Digital Corp., at *4.
[2: Conversion of Partial Judgment to Final Judgment] e.Digital stipulated to non-final partial judgment of non-infringement with Pantech, GoPro, and Apple, who moved to stay their respective cases pending the Huawei appeal. Apple then moved to convert its judgment to a final judgment, and GoPro, but not Pan- tech, joined the motion.
Id. at *4-5.
Holdings
[1: Collateral Estoppel] We hold that the district court correctly applied collateral estoppel to the ’774 patent because reexamined claim 33 recites the sole memory limitation identical to claims 1 and 19, and because the ’774 patent reexamination never addressed that limitation or the presence of RAM.
Id. at *5.
[2: Conversion of Partial Judgment to Final Judgment] We also hold that the court did not abuse its discretion when it converted a stipulated partial judgment into a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Id. at *3 (text added).
 
 
11/24/14
 
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleVersata Soft., Inc. v. Callidus Soft., Inc., No. 2014-1468 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 20, 2014).
IssueThe district court considered each factor [for granting a stay pending an AIA CBM post-grant review] and concluded that “[d]espite the presence of Congress’ thumb on the scales of justice,” the balance of factors did not favor a stay [because: (A) a stay in favor of CBM would not simplify issues; (B)the trial date is scheduled within months of the PTAB decision; (C) the motion to dismiss/transfer was an improper tactical advantage; and (D) motion to dismiss/transfer increased the burden of litigation.
Versata Soft., Inc., at *5 (text added).
Holding[T]he district court’s order denying a stay pending the PTAB’s review must be reversed [because: (A) a stay may be warranted even when a CBM proceeding does not address all asserted patents, claims, or invalidity defenses; (B) the PTAB decision is schedule to issue months BEFORE the scheduled trial date and there is no articulation of any critical process prior to the scheduled trial date; (C) the district court did not article why the motion to dismiss is an improper tactic; and (D) the stay will reduce the future burdens of litigation.
Id. at *5 (text added).
 
11/18/14
Category: ITC   
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleuPI Semiconductor Corp. v. ITC, No. 2013-1157, -1159 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2014).
IssueBefore the court are the appeal of respondent intervenor uPI Semiconductor Corp. (“uPI”) and the companion appeal of complainant-intervenors Richtek Technology Corp. and Richtek USA, Inc. (together “Richtek”) from rulings of the International Trade Commission in an action to enforce a Consent Order, Certain DC-DC Controllers and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-698 (75 Fed. Reg. 446).
uPI Semiconductor Corp., at *3.
HoldingWe affirm the Commission’s ruling that uPI violated the Consent Order as to the imports known as “formerly accused products,” and affirm the modified penalty for that violation. We reverse the ruling of no violation as to the “post-Consent Order” products. The case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with our rulings herein.
Id. 
 
 
 
 
11/15/14
Category: Damages   
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleHighmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt., No. 11-1219 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2014).
IssueThis case comes to us on remand from the Supreme Court, which vacated our earlier opinion in which we set aside the district court’s award of attorney fees to appellee Highmark, Inc. (Highmark)..
Highmark, at *2.
Holdings“[Per Supreme Court guidance, instead of de novo review,] an appellate court should review all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination for abuse of discretion.” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1747 (2014).
Id. at *4 (text added).
 
 
 
 
 
11/12/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleWilliamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2014).
Issues
[1: Claim Construction] [T]he district court issued a claim construction order, construing, inter alia, the following limitations of independent claims 1 and 17: “graphical display representative of a classroom” and “first graphical display comprising...a classroom region” (collectively, the “graphical display” limitations). The district court held that these terms require “a pictorial map illustrating an at least partially virtual space in which participants can interact, and that identifies the presenter(s) and the audience member(s) by their locations on the map.”
Williamson at *8.
[2: Means-Plus] [T]he district court also concluded that the limitation of claim 8, “distributed learning control module,” was a means-plus-function term under 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6. The district court then evaluated the specification and concluded that it failed to disclose the necessary algorithms for performing all of the claimed functions.
Id. at *8.
Holdings
[1: Claim Construction] [W]e conclude that the district court incorrectly construed the graphical display terms to have a “pictorial map” limitation [because the e claim language itself contains no such limitation, and there is nothing in the intrinsic record to warrant narrow construction].
Id. at *11.
[2: Means-Plus] The district court here failed to give weight to the strong presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, did not apply based on the absence of the word “means.” […] [I]n determining that the strong presumption was overcome, the district court erred: (1) in failing to appreciate that the word “module” has a number of dictionary meanings with structural connotations; (2) in placing undue emphasis on the word “module” separate and apart from the claimed expression “distributed learning control module”; and (3) in failing to give proper weight to the surrounding context of the rest of the claim language and the supporting text of the specification in reaching the conclusion that the drafter employed means- plus-function claiming.
Id. at *14.
 
 
 
11/05/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleInterval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. 2013-1282, -1283, -1284, -1285 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 2013).
Issues
[1] “Because the district court failed to appreciate that the language describing display ‘in an unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user’ is tied to specific type of display described in the specification [of invalidated claims 4–8, 11, 34, and 35 of U.S. Patent 6,034,652 (“the ’652 patent”)],” Interval argues, the district court “improperly divorced its analysis from the context of the written description and incorrectly focused on irrelevant hypotheticals . . . .”
Interval at *13-14 (text added, internal citation removed).
[2a] What is in dispute, and what we must consider in reviewing the construction of “attention manager,” [as recited in claims 15–18 of the ’652 patent] is whether the district court read the embodiments too narrowly and thus improperly limited the scope of the claim term.
Id. at *20 (text added).
[2b] Interval asks us to clarify that “instructions,” in the context of [claims 15–18 of the ’652 patent], “may encompass ‘data’” and “need not be written ‘in a programming language.’”
Id. at *22-23 (text added, internal citation removed).
Holdings
[1] [A] term of degree [such as "unobtrusive manner"] fails to provide sufficient notice of its scope if it depends “on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion.” Interval at *13 (text added, internal citation removed). Had the phrase been cast as a definition instead of as an example—if the phrase had been preceded by “i.e.” instead of “e.g.”—then it would help provide the clarity that the specification lacks. [A] person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the “e.g.”phrase to constitute an exclusive definition of “unobtrusive manner that does not distract a user.”
Id. at *18 (text added).
[2a] [T]he patents’ [lexicographical] description [...] supports a broader reading [than the traditional term]. [...] [However, not all of] Interval’s proposed modification [...] is not taken directly from the cited “lexicography.”
Id. at *21-22 (text added).
[2b] “[I]f ‘data’ is a type of ‘instructions,’ then the phrase ‘instructions and/or data’ would not make sense.” Id. at *23. [...] [W]e have cautioned against relying on dictionary definitions at the expense of a fair reading of the claims, which must be understood in light of the specification. [...] [T]he [dictionary definition] on which the district court relied suggests a broader construction of “instructions” than the court adopted.
Id. at *25 (text added).
 
 
 
11/02/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor  
 
TitleFerring B.V., v. Watson Labs., No. 2014-1416 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2014).
IssueThis appeal raises questions of validity and infrignement[.]
Ferring B.V. at *8.
HoldingWe conclude that the district court did not err in holiding that Watson failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious [...] [and] conclude that the district court's finding that Watson's generic tranexamic acid product infringes Ferring's asserted claims was not in accordance with law and therefore reverse that judgment. Id. at *2.
 
 
 
10/30/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIris Corp. v. Japan Airlines Corp., No. 2010-1051 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 21, 2014).
IssueAL moved to dismiss IRIS’s suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). […] JAL argued that federal laws requiring the examination of passports conflict with the patent laws and therefore exempt JAL from infringement liability.
Iris Corp. at *3.
HoldingAccordingly, because JAL’s allegedly infringing acts are carried out “for the United States” under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss IRIS’s suit.
Id. at *6.
 
 
 
 
10/26/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleHill-Rom Serv., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., No. 2013-1450 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2014).
Issues
[1] Hill-Rom argues that the district court erred by limiting “datalink” to [...] a wired datalink. It argues that “datalink” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning[.] Hill-Rom at *4 (text added). [Similarly,] Hill-Rom argues that the “interface board including a processor” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning[.] Id. at *12 (text added).
[2] The parties also dispute [...] whether the claimed “message validation information” must verify that the message is properly received or received exactly, bit by bit, as sent. Id. at *17 (text added).
[3] [D]uring prosecution of a later, unrelated patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,121,856 [...], the examiner rejected claims as obvious over three references [including] [the Ulrich reference], which has the same specification as the [asserted U.S. Patent No. 5,699,038 (’038 patent)]. [...] In response, Hill-Rom added a limitation that the monitoring device receives a user request for a specific subset of data and that the specific subset of data be transmitted without transmitting the other available data. Hill-Rom argued that adding this limitation overcame the obviousness rejection because this added limitation was not disclosed in the Ulrich reference[.] [The district court, upon its conclusion that judicial estoppel prevented Hill-Rom from any broader construction] construed “bed condition message” as “a message not generated in response to any user request that contains the status of all conditions the bed is capable of monitoring.”
Id. at *19-20 (text added).
Holdings
[1] There are no magic words that must be used, but to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term to one of skill in the art, the patentee must, with some language, indicate a clear intent to do so in the patent.
Hill-Rom Serv., Inc., at *7 (text added).
[2] A construction that would exclude the preferred embodiment “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”
Id. at *19 (internal citation removed, text added).
[3a] [W]e are bound by prior panel decisions. [...] [S]tatements made during prosecution of a later, unrelated patent cannot form the basis for judicial estoppel. [...] [3b] For judicial estoppel to apply, a parties’ later position must be clearly inconsistent with the earlier position.
Id. at *22 (text added).
 
 
10/23/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor
 
TitleMformation Techs., Inc. v. Research in Motion Ltd., Nos. 2012-1679, 2013-1123 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2014).
Issues
[1] Whether "Mformation waived its right to argue that the district court changed its claim construction post-verdict . . . ."
Mformation Techs., Inc., at *7.
[2] Whether "the district court impermissibly added an order-of-steps claim requirement postverdict in its JMOL opinion . . . ."
Id. at *9.
[3] "[W]hether claim 1 of the '917 patent requires that a connection be completely established before transmission."
Id. at *12.
[4] Whether "BlackBerry is . . . entitled to JMOL even if an order-of-steps requirement is read into the claims."
Id. at *15.
Holdings
[1] "Mformation did not waive its right to challenge whether the district court altered its claim construct post-verdict . . . ."
Id. at *9.
[2] "[T]he district court at most clarified its previous construction that was already present in the jury instructions."
Id. at *11.
[3] "[C]laim 1 requires that a connection be established before transmission. . . . [T]he separate sub-step for establishing a connection would become 'superfluous' if we concluded that a connection did not have to be established (completed) before transmission."
Id. at *14.
[4] "[W]e affirm the district court's grant of JMOL of no infringement."
Id. at *16.
10/21/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleCardSoft, LLC v. Verifone, Inc., No. 2014-1135 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2014).
IssueVeriFone appeals the district court’s construction of “virtual machine,” found in all asserted claims. It argues that the district court erred by not requiring the claimed “virtual machine” to include the limitation that the applications it runs are not dependent on any specific underlying operating system or hardware.
CardSoft, LLC, at *5.
Holding[T]he district court’s construction does not reflect the ordinary and customary meaning of “virtual machine” as understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art [to mean an interpreter platform between applications and the underlying hardware or operating system.]
Id. at *5 (text added).
 
 
10/18/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleVermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., No. 2014-1481 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2014).
IssueMPHJ Technology Investments, LLC (“MPHJ”) petitions this court for a writ of mandamus, and also appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont remanding this case to state court.
MPHJ Tech. Invs., at *2.
HoldingBecause we lack jurisdiction to grant the requested relief, we dismiss the petition and appeal.
Id. at *2.
 
 
 
10/16/14
Category: Antitrust  
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TitleTyco Health Group LP v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Company, Inc. (Fed. Circ. August 6, 2014).
Issue[Whether the district court’s summary judgment order that Tyco did not violate the antitrust laws by [(1) filing an alleged “sham infringement lawsuit”] against Mutual or [(2)] by filing [an alleged sham “citizen petition”] with the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) seeking to bar Mutual from obtaining FDA permission to market its generic version of one of Tyco’s drugs [under Mutual’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) with the FDA].
Tyco Healthcare Group, at *2 (text added).
HoldingThere is a recognized exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity for “sham litigation,” which the Supreme Court has defined as litigation that (1) is “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits” (the objective element), and (2) is motivated by a desire “to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor” (the subjective element). Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993) (“PRE”). […] PRE’s two part test, however, is not limited to court litigation; it has been applied to administrative petitions, including FDA citizens petitions.
Id. at *8 15 (text added, internal citations omitted).
 
 
10/14/14
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleVirtualagility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 2014-1232 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2014).
Issue
[Factors A and D] The district court concluded that the first factor— simplification of the issues—was “essentially neutral, if not slightly against” granting a stay because it was “not convinced” by the PTAB’s assessment that cancellation of some or all of the claims during CBM review was “probable.”
Virtualagility Inc., at *6.
[CBM Amendment] Defendants argued that the fact that VA has already filed a motion to amend claims in the CBM proceeding increased the likelihood that the CBM proceeding will simplify issues. In its decision denying the motion to stay pending appeal, the court observed that VA’s proposed amendments to the ’413 patent claims in the CBM proceeding were not a part of the record at the time of its decision on the motion now on appeal.
Id. at *7.
[Factor B] Defendants argue that the district court correctly concluded that the early stage of the litigation favors a stay. Defendants contend, however, that the district court did not weigh this factor heavily enough in favor of the stay because it erroneously considered the case’s status at the time it ruled on the motion rather than at the time when the motion was filed—seven months earlier.
Id. at *15.
[Factor C] Defendants argue that the district court erred in concluding that a stay would unduly prejudice VA. They contend that VA will not suffer undue prejudice because the timeframe for CBM review is short. They argue that, in any event, mere delay in having one’s claim adjudicated does not constitute undue prejudice. Defendants argue that VA has not identified any actual risk of fading memories or potentially unavailable evidence.
Id. at *20.
Holdings
[Factors A and D] We conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that the first factor was neutral or slightly against a stay, and that the fourth factor weighed only slightly in favor of a stay. We hold that these factors strongly favor a stay in this case. The district court erred as a matter of law to the extent that it decided to “review” the PTAB’s determination that the claims of the ’413 patent are more likely than not invalid in the posture of a ruling on a motion to stay. Under the statutory scheme, district courts have no role in reviewing the PTAB’s determinations regarding the patentability of claims that are subject to CBM proceedings.
Id. at *11.
[CBM Amendment] We conclude that it is proper for us to consider the fact that VA filed a Motion to Amend in our review of the district court’s decision. Defendants did not waive the arguments regarding claim amendments. They argued to the district court that claim amendments during PTAB review are a distinct possibility and, in doing so, gave VA an opportunity to respond to this argument below. […] We also conclude that we are not improperly expanding the record on appeal if we consider the Motion to Amend. […] Cognizant of the limits imposed by Rule 201(b)(2), however, we reiterate that we consider only the fact that a Motion to Amend was filed— not the impact of the proposed amendments on the parties’ claim construction and infringement arguments.
Id. at *10-11 (internal citations omitted).
[Factor B] We hold that the timing factor heavily favors a stay. We note at the outset that it was not error for the district court to wait until the PTAB made its decision to institute CBM review before it ruled on the motion. Indeed, while some district courts ruled on motions to stay before the PTAB granted the petition for post-grant review […], others have waited until post-grant review was instituted, and still others denied as premature the motion to stay without prejudice to refiling after institution of post-grant review […]. We express no opinion on which is the better practice. While a motion to stay could be granted even before the PTAB rules on a post-grant review petition, no doubt the case for a stay is stronger after post-grant review has been instituted.
Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).
[Factor C] We conclude that the district court clearly erred in finding that the undue prejudice factor weighed heavily against a stay. At best, this factor weighs slightly against a stay. We agree with the district court that competition between parties can weigh in favor of finding undue prejudice.
Id. at 21.
 
 
 
 
10/08/14
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleTroy v. Samson Manuf. Corp., No. 2013-1565 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2014).
Issues
[1] Mr. Troy challenges the district court’s refusal to consider evidence pertaining to issues not raised before the Board [in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. § 146].
Troy at *4 (text added).
[2] [E]ven if [Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012)] requires that the district court admit such new evidence, this holding is applicable to [35 U.S.C. § 145] actions only.
Id. at *8 (text added).
Holdings
[1] "We conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hyatt permits new evidence to be admitted without regard to whether the issue was raised before the Board."  Troy at *5 (text added). "[T]o the extent that our prior precedent, see, e.g., Conservolite v. Widmayer, 21 F.3d 1098, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1994), held that new evidence on an issue not presented to the Board was generally to be excluded in district court proceedings, it is no longer viable following the Supreme Court’s Hyatt decision." Id. at *6 (text added).
[2] [T]he Supreme Court’s decision in Hyatt applies with equal force to both § 145 and § 146 actions.
Id. at *10 (text added).
 
 
10/06/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 

By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleTaylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., No. 2014-1212 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2014)(non-precedential).
Issue[Did] James T. lack[] standing because Mary T. [,James T.'s ex-wife,] was a co-owner of the '566 patent by virtue of the divorce, and she had not joined the suit.
Taylor at 2 (txt added).
Holding[Yes,] [t]he long-established rule is that a suit for patent infringement must join all co-owners of the patent as plaintiffs.
Id. at *3 (text added).
 
 
10/03/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings  
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleBenefit Funding Sys., LLC v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Centers Inc.., No. 2014-1122, -1124, -1125 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2014).
IssueAppellants’ argument on appeal rests on the single premise that the PTAB is not authorized to conduct CBM review based on § 101 grounds. Consequently, according to Appellants, the district court would not be bound by the results of the CBM review […]
Benefit Funding Sys., LLC, at *6.
HoldingThe argument that § 101 cannot support CBM review is a collateral attack [since a district court should not review the PTAB’s determination that contested claims are more likely than not invalid in the posture of a ruling on a motion to stay.]
Id. at *6-7 (text added).
 
 
10/01/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleEMD Millipore Corp. v. AllPure Tech., Inc., No. 2014-1140 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 29, 2014).
Issues
[A. No Literal Infringement] Millipore claims that when the TAKEONE device is disassembled, all components of the transfer member are still removed from the magazine part (135), even if the components of the seal [...] are no longer physically connected. […]
EMD Millipore Corp. at *7.
[B. Prosecution History Estoppel Bars Millipore’s Doctrine of Equivalents Arguments] AllPure argues that the district court should not have considered whether Millipore could maintain a claim for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because prosecution history estoppel bars such a claim.
Id. at *10.
Holdings
[A. No Literal Infringement] [W]e conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact relating to whether the TAKEONE device literally contains “at least one removable, replaceable transfer member[,]” [because the TAKEONE device lacks a seal when it is disassembled, it necessarily lacks the claimed “removable, replaceable transfer member.”]
Id. at *7 (text added).
[B. Prosecution History Estoppel Bars Millipore’s Doctrine of Equivalents Arguments] The district court should have proceeded under the presumption that prosecution history estoppel applies [because, at the time of prosecution, the patentee amended claims to alter the scope in response to an Office Action. The amendment including both deletions and additions to the claim scope.].
Id. at *12 (text added).
 
 
 
 
 
09/29/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor
 
TitleCEATS, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 2013-1529 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2014).
Issues[Whether the district court abused its discretion in] finding that [(1)] the mediator had no duty to disclose his dealings with one of the firms involved in the litigation [such that (2)] relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) was not warranted.
CEATS at *3 (text added).
Holdings
[1] We find that the district court erred in finding that a reasonably objective person would not have wanted to consider circumstances surrounding the Karlseng litigation when deciding whether to object to Faulkner’s appointment as mediator in this case. . . . In this case, at the same time Faulkner served as the court-appointed mediator, the Faulkner-Johnson-Fish relationship was directly at issue in a state appellate court. Importantly, this meant that Fish, as a firm, was actively defending Faulkner’s personal disclosure decisions while he was mediating this case. . . . Furthermore, the Texas appeals court’s decision . . . found that the Faulkner-Johnson-Fish relationship was a disqualifying, social and business relationship, which “could reasonably be seen as raising a question about the mediator’s impartiality” while this case was ongoing.
Id. at *14-15.
[2] We agree with Continental that CEATS has failed to show a meaningful risk of injustice in this case . . . , we do not believe there is a sufficient threat of injustice in other cases to justify the extraordinary step of setting aside a jury verdict . . . , [and] we do not believe that refusing to grant the relief CEATS seeks will undermine public confidence in the judicial process as a whole. . . . [W]e hold that the district court correctly denied CEATS relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), despite what we deem to be a failure of the mediator’s disclosure obligations.
Id. at *18-20.
 
 
 
 
 
09/28/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleH-W Tech., LC v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. 2014-1054, -1055 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2014).
Issues:
1) H-W appeals the district court’s construction of the claim terms “user of said phone” and “said user” to mean “a consumer operating the IP Phone.” H-W argues that the correct construction is “a person or thing that uses an IP phone.”
H-W Tech. LC, at *3 (internal citations omitted).
2a) [H-W appeals the summary judgment finding that claim 9, as presented prior to Certificate of Correction] is indefinite] H-W first argues that the district court itself had authority to correct the error in claim 9.
Id. at *5 (text added).
2b) H-W also argues that the district court “failed to factor the certificate of correction in [its] determination that claim 9 of the ‘955 Patent is indefinite and invalid.”
Id. at *8 (text added).
2c) Having concluded that the district court properly did not correct the patent claims itself or apply the certificate of correction to this lawsuit, the question remains whether H-W should be permitted to assert claim 9 uncorrected.
Id. at *9.
3) Finally, H-W appeals the district court’s holding that claim 17 is indefinite and invalid.
Id. at *10.
Holdings:
1) In sum, the only significant evidence that supports H-W’s position is a single, arguably marginally applicable, dictionary definition. The district court’s construction, on the other hand, is supported by the claims themselves, the specification, and the weight of the extrinsic evidence. We thus affirm the district court’s construction of “user of said phone” and “said user” to mean “a consumer operating the IP Phone.”
H-W Tech. LC, at *5.
2a) The parties appear to agree that the PTO’s error is clear on the face of the prosecution history. But this court has already deemed evidence of error in the prosecution history alone insufficient to allow the district court to correct the error. See Grp. One, 407 F.3d at 1303 (“The error here is not evident on the face of the patent. The prosecution history discloses that the missing language was required to be added by the examiner as a condition for issuance, but one cannot discern what language is missing simply by reading the patent. The district court does not have authority to correct the patent in such circumstances.”). In sum, we hold that the district court did not have authority to correct the error in claim 9 and correctly declined to do so.
Id. at *8.
2b) Based on the plain language of the statute, this court has specifically held that “[t]he certificate of correction is only effective for causes of action arising after it was issued.” Sw. Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1294–95 (Fed. Cir. 2000). [Since H-W filed before the Certificate of Correction issued, the District Court did not err.]
Id. at *9 (text added).
2c) When, as here, a claim issues that omits a material limitation, and such omission is not evident on the face of the patent, the patentee cannot assert that claim until it has been corrected by the PTO…. Regardless, the district court was correct to conclude that H-W cannot assert either the original or corrected versions of claim 9 in this lawsuit. The judgment of the district court in favor of Overstock and against H-W is thus correct. Still, in order to clarify that claim 9, as corrected, has not yet been litigated and, thus, has not been held invalid, we strike the portion of the judgment that holds claim 9 invalid.
Id. at *9-10.
3) And, as in those cases [IPXL and In re Katz], it is unclear here when infringement would occur. Claim 17 is thus indefinite. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s holding that claim 17 is invalid.
Id. at *13.
 
 
09/23/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Karthik Subramanian, Contributor 
 
TitleMedism Ltd. v. Bestmed, LLC, No. 2013-1451 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2014).
Issue“This appeal concerns Medisim’s challenges to the district court’s grant of JMOL on anticipation and unjust enrichment. Medisim argues that BestMed forfeited its right to JMOL under Rule 50(b) for both claims when it failed to properly move for JMOL under Rule 50(a) at the close of evidence. Medisim also challenges the district court’s grant of JMOL on anticipation and unjust enrichment on the merits. Finally, Medisim argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting a conditional new trial on anticipation. We address each of Medisim’s challenges in turn.”
Medisim at *6.
Holding“Because BestMed failed to preserve its right to JMOL on anticipation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, we vacate the district court’s grant of JMOL on that claim. However, we affirm the district court’s grant of JMOL on Medisim’s unjust enrichment claim and its conditional grant of a new trial on anticipation. We remand this case for further proceedings.”
Medisim at *2.
 
 
09/19/14
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
 
TitleSCA Hygene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, No. 2013-1564 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 17, 2014).
Issues
[1: Laches] SCA argues that the reexamination proceedings preclude application of the laches presumptions in this case because the reexamination period should be excluded from the total delay. The district court rejected that theory. In its view, because SCA filed suit more than six years after first learning of First Quality’s allegedly infringing activities, the laches presumptions applied.
SCA Hygene Prod. Aktiebolag at *9.
[2: Equitable Estoppel] The district court ruled that “SCA unquestionably misled First Quality though [sic] its 2003 letter and subsequent inaction.” [...] The court focused on SCA’s failure to respond to First Quality’s letter addressing the ’646 patent and on SCA’s decision to write First Quality regarding different products and a different patent.
Id. at *16 (internal citations omitted).
Holdings
[1: Laches] Because more than six years elapsed between the time SCA first learned of First Quality’s allegedly infringing activities and the time SCA filed infringement claims directed to those activities[, during which SCA monitored the infringing activities of First Quality], the district court properly found that the laches presumptions applied.
Id. at *9 (text added).
[2: Equitable Estoppel] SCA almost immediately filed a request for ex parte reexamination of the ’646 patent to address the issues raised by First Quality—an action that could reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with SCA’s alleged acquiescence. Thus, record evidence supports a version of events that differs from First Quality’s. A reasonable juror could conclude that First Quality raised an issue SCA had overlooked and that SCA, rather than acquiescing, took immediate action.
Id. at *19.


09/18/14
Category: ITC   
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TItleAlign Tech., Inc. v. International Trade Commission (Fed. Circ. July 18, 2014).
IssueThe International Trade Commission's regulations authorize the Commission to review a decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) when that decision is designated as an "initial determination." [...] Here, the ALJ denied a motion via an order. This case requires us to consider whether the Commission's review of that order was procedurally sound.
Align Technology, at *2.
HoldingBecause the Commission circumvented its own rules without waiving, suspending, or amending them, we find that its review of Order No. 57 was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."
Id. at *10. 
 
 
09/15/14
 Category: 103
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleScientific Plastic Prod., Inc. v. Biotage AB, No. 2013-1219, -1220, -1221 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 10, 2014).
IssuesThe examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to combine the cartridge of Yamada with the cap of either King or Strassheimer. On appeal to the Board, SPP challenged (1) the examiner’s determination that King and Strassheimer were “analogous art” and (2) that it would have been obvious to combine the LPLC cartridge of Yamada with the pressure-resistant resealable cap of either King or Strassheimer.
Scientific Plastic Prod., Inc., at *5 (emphasis added).
Holdings
[(1)] [T]he King and Strassheimer references address the problem of providing a fluid tight seal at elevated pressures, between a container and a resealable cap. This is sufficiently close to the problem addressed by the claimed invention; substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that King and Strassheimer are available as prior art
Id. at *9 (text added).
[(2)] We conclude that the Board did not err in holding that it would have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention to modify the chromatography cartridge of Yamada with the resealable threaded cap of King or Strassheimer [because by providing for the presence of an O-ring, the Yamada reference implicitly acknowledges that there is a potential leakage issue between the cap and column body of the plastic cartridge that could be cured by either King or Strassheimer].
Id. at *11 (text added).
 
09/10/14
 Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleMicrosoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 2014-1089 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue[Does the Federal Circuit have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)] based on the district court’s consolidation of Microsoft’s contract action with its patent infringement action[?]
Microsoft Corp. at *6 (text added).
HoldingThe patent infringement complaint is not part of this appeal, not having been decided by the district court. Under such circumstances, it is plausible to conclude, as the Ninth Circuit seems to have done here, that the act of “consolidation d[id] not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties.” Id. at *6 (internal citations removed).
 
 
09/09/14
Category: Licensing  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleWi-LAN USA Inc. v. Ericsson, Inc., No. 2013-1566 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2014).
IssueThe parties disagree about the correct interpretation of multiple parts of the [Most-Favoured Licensee ("MFL")] Provision, including whether it applies to patents that Wi-LAN acquried after the execution of the PCRA.
Wi-LAN USA, Inc., at *7.
HoldingBecause we conclude that the MFL Provision does not apply to patents acquired after the execution of the PCRA, Ericsson's rights under the MFL Provision were not triggered by the Texas suit. We therefore, reverse the Florida court's dismissal of Wi-LAN's infringement suit with respect to the Florida Patents. [...] We also affirm the Texas court's finding that the MFL provision did not bar Wi-LAN's Texas suit, albeit on different grounds.
Id. at *17. 
 
 
09/06/14
Category: Claim Construction   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleEpos Tech. Ltd. v. Pegasus Tech. Ltd., No. 13-1330 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 5, 2014).
Issues
[1: "Drawing Implement"] The district court construed “drawing implement” as “a conventional writing utensil that can be used alone or together with the invention.” […] [It] explained that the language of the claims is “exceedingly broad,” but that the remainder of the patent is not “so broad as to contemplate using something like ‘a piece of charcoal.’” […]
Epos Tech. Ltd. at *7 (internal citations omitted, text added).
[2: “Given Time Interval”] The district court construed “given time interval” as “fixed at a few seconds or less.” […] [It] explained that, “while the words of the claims do not limit the time interval, all evidence suggests there must be some upper-bound to the interval contemplated by the patentee.” […]
Id. at *8-9 (internal citation omitted, text added).
[3: "Marking Implement"] The district court construed “marking implement” as “an implement that has a marker tip (and not a pen tip).” […] It determined that, “while the specifications occasionally reference a ‘pen’ and ‘pen tip,’ the totality of the specifications makes clear that the patentee was merely using those terms as synonyms for a dry-erase marker.”
Id. at *11.
[4: “Temporary Attachment”] The district court construed “temporary attachment” as “an element that can be removed from the device’s ‘retrofittable apparatus.’”
Id. at *14.
Holdings
[1: "Drawing Implement"] Although it is true that the specifications recite embodiments including “conventional” writing implements, there is no clear indication in the intrinsic record suggesting that the claims are limited to “conventional” drawing implements [since the claims do not state the term, and the specification lists multiple drawing implements, only one of which is a “conventional” implement].
Id. at *8 (text added).
[2: “Given Time Interval”] Although the word “given” may indicate that a time interval is fixed, specified, or predetermined by an operator or a programmer, the intrinsic evidence does not limit “given time interval” to “fixed at a few seconds or less[,]” [because the patents do not require an upper bound for a period of time, but rather state that the disclosed periods of time as ‘preferable’ and ‘typical.’]
Id. at *9 (text added).
[3: "Marking Implement"] Given […] broad disclosures [which interchangeably refers to a “marking implement” as either a marker or a per], the district court erroneously construed “marking implement” to require a “marker tip” and to exclude implements with a “pen tip.”
Id. at *11 (text added).

[4: “Temporary Attachment”] The district court’s construction is incorrect because it reads out preferred embodiments [and there is no highly persuasive amount of evidentiary support for such an exclusion].
Id. at *14 (text added).

 
09/04/14
Category: 101    
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitlebuySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 13-1575 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2014).
IssueThe district court granted Google’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the asserted claims fall outside section 101. The court concluded that the patent “describes a well-known, and widely-understood concept—a third party guarantee of a sales transaction— and then applied that concept using conventional computer technology and the Internet.”
buySAFE, Inc. at *4.
HoldingUnder the approach to section 101 affirmed by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), the district court’s holding is correct [because: (1) the claims encompass only a contractual relationship, an abstract idea; and (2) the claimed computer functionality of receiving and transmitting ‘an offer of guarantee’ is a generic implementation that does not add an inventive concept.].
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
 
09/01/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor 
 
TitleIntouch Technologies, Inc. v. VGO Comm., Inc., No. 2013-1201 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2014).
Issues
[1] Claim construction[Whether the district court erred in construing] the ’030 patent claim term [a] “arbitrating to control” and the ’357 patent claim terms “arbitrator” and [b] “call back mechanism.”
InTouch at *17 (text added).
[2] Infringement[Whether the district court was correct to find that] all three [jury] verdicts of non-infringement [were] supported by substantial evidence [when considering certain] limitations: [a] arbitrator/arbitrating, [b] call back mechanism, [c] camera movement [...]
Id. at *22 (text added).
[3] Invalidity[Whether the district court was correct to find] that the record supports the jury’s verdict of invalidity for the ’357 and ’030 patents.
Id. at *33 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Claim construction
[a: Arbitrator/Arbitrating] [I]t is clear that, for the arbitrator to control access, it needs the capability to consider and resolve access requests from and among multiple users. . . . For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in construing the terms “arbitrator” and “arbitrating” to require a determination of which user among multiple users has exclusive control of the robot.
InTouch at *18-19.
[b: Call Back Mechanism] The plain language of the claim supports the district court’s construction. The phrase, “call back mechanism,” on its face connotes an intention to call back a user that was previously denied access.
Id. at *20.
[2] Infringement
[a: Arbitrator/Arbitrating] Because others cannot access the robot until the user releases control, the VGo system never considers and resolves competing requests for that robot, and thus, does not “determine” which user has exclusive control of the robot. Consequently, the VGo system lacks an “arbitrator.”
Id. at *24.
[b: Call Back Mechanism] [T]he VGo system cannot even identify any user that wants access, and it certainly does not know who may have previously sought access, but was denied. . . . Based on these conclusions, we find that substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of non-infringement of claim 79 of the ’357 patent.
Id. at *30.
[3] InvalidityWhile our standard of review regarding the jury’s implied factual findings is a stringent one, we agree with InTouch that the evidence on which VGo relies is not substantial enough to support an obviousness finding. Indeed, it did not even come close. Dr. Yanco’s testimony was plagued with numerous problems, including her failure to: (1) identify sufficient reasons or motivations to combine the asserted prior references; (2) focus on the relevant time frame of 2001; or (3) consider any objective evidence of nonobviousness. Dr. Yanco’s testimony was nothing more than impermissible hindsight; she opined that all of the elements of the claims disparately existed in the prior art, but failed to provide the glue to combine these references.
Id. at *34-35.
 
 
 
08/29/14
 
 
 
By: Karthik Subramanian, Contributor 
 
TitleLochner Tech., LLC v. Vizio, Inc., No. 2013-1551 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2014) (non-precedential).
IssueLochner takes issue with the district court’s belief that use of an open-ended term “including” requires patentees to disclose the recited as well as unrecited elements that are present in the accused infringing products.
Lochner Tech., LLC at *15.
Holding“After careful consideration, we find that the district court erred when it assumed that use of the term “including” somehow trumped consideration of the specification and prosecution history and displaced application of standard claim construction principles."
Id. at *16.
 
 
08/27/14
Category: Damages  
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor
 
TitleRectractable Tech., Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., No. 2013-1567 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 7, 2014).
IssueWhether "[the Federal Circuit's] mandate, reversing the infringement verdict [for one product but not the other], required the district court to conduct new damages proceedings because the original judgment is inconsistent with that mandate."
Retractable Tech. at *4.
Holding"The damages award was within the scope of the appealed judgment and thus was incorporated into the mandate when Becton failed to raise the issue of a remand to consider parsing damages by product." Id. at *8. "[T]he mandate rule forecloses the relief that Becton seeks . . . ." Id. at *11.
 
 
08/25/14
Category: Double Patenting  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleAbbvie Inc. v. Kennedy Inst. of Rheumatology Trust, No. 2013-1545 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2014).
Issues
[1: : ODP and Uruguay Round] Kennedy argues that the statutory and policy rationales underlying the obviousness-type double patenting doctrine no longer exist and the doctrine should be discarded. More specifically, Kennedy contends that the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA), Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, effective June 8, 1995, and its implementation of a 20-year period of patent protection that runs from a patent’s earliest claimed priority date, eliminated the need for the obviousness-type double patenting doctrine.
Abbvie Inc. at *10.
[2: ODP and Genus-Species Patent Family] [Whether] “[…]the differences in subject matter between the claims” of the ’766 and ’442 patents render their claims “patentably distinct” because the ’442 patent applies to [‘][treating] patients with active disease[,’] [which is a species of the ‘766 patent genus characterization as ‘treating all patients in need thereof’].
Id. at *21 (internal citations omitted, text added).
Holdings
[1: : ODP and Uruguay Round] Although this court has recognized that the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting is less significant in post-URAA patent disputes, we have also recognized its continued importance. […] We now make explicit what was implicit in Gilead: the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting continues to apply where two patents that claim the same invention have different expiration dates. We hold that Kennedy is not entitled to an extra six years of monopoly solely because it filed a separate application unless the two inventions are patentably distinct.
Id. at *12-13.
[2: ODP and Genus-Species Patent Family] [S]pecies are unpatentable when prior art disclosures describe the genus containing those species such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able to envision every member of the class. Here, we think it is clear that a reader of the ’766 patent could have easily envisioned a species limited to sicker patients [because the disclosure of the genus in the ‘766 parent patent relied on a T-14 study that serves as the basis for the species in the ‘422 child patent].
Id. at *24 (text added).
 
 
 
08/22/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor 
 
TitleAugme Tech., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc. (Fed. Circ. June 20, 2014).
Issue[Whether] the district court's determination [in its summary judgment ruling] that Yahoo!'s accused systems do not infringe the Augme patents either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents [was erroneous].
Augme Tech., at *2 (text added).
Holding[Because the district court correctly concluded that the] plain and ordinary meaning of ["]embedded code["] is code written into the HTML code of the web page [, and not linked to another web page, it properly ruled that Yahoo! 's accused system did not infringe the Augme patent literally or under the doctrine of equivalents].
Id. at *10 (text added). 
 
 
 
08/19/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleGemalto S.A. v. HTC Corp., No. 13-1397 (Fed. Cir.June 19, 2014).
Issues
1) [Integrated Circuit Claims Claim Construction:] Gemalto first challenges the district court’s construction of the “memory” limitation in the integrated circuit card claims to require all program memory on a single semiconductor substrate (or chip). Gemalto does not dispute that an integrated circuit card is “a card containing a single semiconductor substrate having a central processing unit and memory,” J.A. 31, but contends that the card should be able to access applications stored in off-chip memory, i.e., memory located on chips other than the chip containing the processor.
Gemalto, at *8 (text added).
2) [Programmable Device Claims Claim Construction:] Gemalto asserts that the term should be construed broadly to mean “a device that can execute a computer program.” Appellant’s Br. 37. Gemalto suggests that its proposed construction reflects the ordinary meaning of “programmable device” to one of skill in the art.
Id. at *13.
3) [Infringement by Doctrine of Equivalents:] Gemalto argues that the accused devices infringe the asserted claims, as construed by the district court, under the doctrine of equivalents… Gemalto contends that the accused devices infringe under the doctrine of equivalents when they temporarily load program instructions from off-chip memory into onchip cache memory before execution.
Id. at *17.
Holding
1) [Integrated Circuit Claims Claim Construction:] The claim language does not support Gemalto’s theory. The claim language requires a “memory” that stores an “application” and a “processor” that is coupled to the memory. ’317 patent col. 19 ll. 42, 43, 64. The specification demonstrates that the entire purpose of the invention was to enable the application to be stored within the memory on the chip of the integrated circuit card…. In short, we agree with the district court that the memory recited in the integrated circuit card claims should be construed as “all program memory,” which means “sufficient memory to run the Java code [i.e., the application and interpreter] in accordance with the patentee’sinvention.”
Id. at *8, 13 (text added).
2) [Programmable Device Claims Claim Construction:] In any event, Gemalto’s central problem is that the limitation is not “programmable device” but “memory.” The meaning of terms appearing in the ’727 patent must be construed in light of the same terms recited in the ’317 patent. All three asserted patents are directly related … Statements made by the applicant concerning the “memory” limitation in the ’317 patent’s claims therefore apply with equal force to the “memory” limitation in the ’727 patent’s claims with the same limitation.
Id. at *14 (text added).
We thus agree with the district court that the programmable device of claim 3 of the ’727 patent should be construed as “a single semiconductor substrate integrating electronic circuit components that includes a central processing unit and all program memory making it suitable for use as an embedded system.” J.A. 33.
Id. at *16-17 (text added).
3) [Doctrine of Equivalents.:] Establishing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires particularized testimony and linking argument as the equivalence between the claim limitation and the alleged equivalent. Texas Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567. Such testimony is missing here.
Id. at *19 (text added).
Gemalto provided no testimony asserting that the difference in functionality between cache memory and permanent memory is in fact insubstantial… Absent any testimony suggesting that cache memory is equivalent to permanent memory, no reasonable fact finder could find that the two types of memory function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially similar results
Id. at *19-20 (text added).
 
 
 
08/18/14
Category: Inequitable Conduct 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleApotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., No. 2013-1674 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 15, 2014).
IssueApotex argues that merely advocating a particular interpretation of the prior art cannot support an inference of deceptive intent [and that there is no duty to disclose an inventor’s own suspicions or beliefs regarding relevant prior art.].
Apotex Inc. at *16 (text added).
HoldingThe district court’s findings regarding materiality and intent are not clearly erroneous, and its ultimate determination that Dr. Sherman [, the sole inventor of the patent at issue,] breached his duty of candor, good faith, and honesty before the PTO was not an abuse of discretion [because Dr. Sherman was aware that prior art, Univasc, was made according to his claimed process, concealed this knowledge from the PTO, and misrepresented the nature of Univasc and other prior art through his counsel’s arguments and Dr. Lipp’s declaration.]
Id. at *12-13 (text added). 
 
 
 
08/15/14
Category: Claim Construction   
 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleRotatable Tech. v. Motorola Mobility, No. 2014-1042 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2014)(non-precedential).
IssueRotatable appeals, among other things, that the preamble term “selectively rotating” is not a claim limitation and that, if the term is a claim limitation, the distrcit court erred in its construction of the term.
Rotatable Tech. at *4.
HoldingBecause the intrinsic record emphasizes the importance of “selectively rotating” and because the prosecution history shows that the patentee relied on the term “selectively rotating” to distinguish the claimed invention from prior art, the district court correctly determined that “selectively rotating” is a claim limitation.
Id. at *2.
 
 
 
08/12/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor
 
TitleAbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., No. 2013-1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2014).
Issues
[1] AbbVie argues that Centocor’s [(Jannsen's)] invalidity defenses as to [U.S. Patent 6,914,128] should not have been tried to the jury because of the preclusive effect of the [Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences'] prior judgment.
AbbVie at *14 (text added).
[2] [W]hether the ['128 patent] sufficiently otherwise describe[s] representative species to support the entire genus.
Id. at *22-23 (text added).
[3a] [T]hat the district court’s exclusion of the interference file history from evidence allowed Centocor to relitigate invalidity [for lack of written description support] from a clean slate.
Id. at *28 (text added).
[3b] [T]hat the district court erred in excluding expert testimony on the detailed reasoning of the PTO on the issues of written description, enablement, and obviousness during ex parte prosecution.
Id. at *28 (text added).
[3c] [T]hat the prejudicial effect of the contested evidentiary rulings was exacerbated by the jury instruction that new information presented at trial that was not considered by the PTO would make it easier for Centocor to carry its burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at *30 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Because a district court can make a de novo determination of facts upon the submission of new evidence, a Board decision that is reviewed under [35 U.S.C. § 146 (2006)] is not a “binding final judgment” to preclude a losing party from litigating the same or related issues in a parallel proceeding.
AbbVie at *16-17 (text added).
[2] [M]erely drawing a fence around a perceived genus is not a description of the genus. One needs to show that one has truly invented the genus, i.e., that one has conceived and described sufficient representative species encompassing the breadth of the genus.
Id. at *23 (text added).
[3a] [W]e need only address whether the evidentiary rulings affected AbbVie’s substantive rights concerning [the verdict for lack of written description support]. The evidence of the interference or other proffered evidence concerning obviousness is of little probative value to the written description determination.
Id. at *28 (text added).
[3b] In view of the record as a whole, including the substantial evidence of structural differences between Stelara [(the alleged infringing drug patented by Centocor)] and the antibodies [of AbbVie's patents] and the fact that the jury considered the number of structurally similar antibodies disclosed in AbbVie’s patents, [...] the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding [testimony that the PTO concluded that the written description requirement was met.]
Id. at *30 (text added, internal citations removed).
[3c] “[I]f the PTO did not have all material facts before it, its considered judgment may lose significant force” and that “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sustain.” [...] "[T]he jury may be instructed to evaluate whether the evidence before it is materially new, and if so, to consider that fact when determining whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence."
Id. at *32 (text added, quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011)).
 
 
 
08/10/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleScriptro, LLC v. Innovation Asso., Inc., No. 2013-1561 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 6, 2014).
IssueWe have a narrow issue: whether the absence of sensors from the claims at issue means that those claims are unsupported by the written description as a matter of law [in a summary judgement motion].
Scriptro, LLC at *7 (text added).
Holding[T]he specification itself creates a genuine issue of material fact on this question [that would necessitate denial of summary judgment]: a trier of fact could find that a skilled artisan would understand the specification to disclose a system that relies on the computer memory, without sensors, to fulfill the central purpose of keeping track of slot use by particular customers and slot availability, with sensors optionally providing confirmation only.
Id. at *11(text added).
 
 
 
08/08/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Nintendo of Am., No. 2014-132 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2014).
Issue[Did] [t]he distrcit court [correctly] den[y] the motion of Nintendo and the [eleven retailer defendants (the "Retailers")] to sever and stay the claims against the Retailers, and transfer the separated action against Nintendo to the Western District of Washington.
In re Nintendo of Am., at *2 (text added).
HoldingThe benefits of trying the case against Nintendo in the Western District of Washington are indisputable. We conclude that the district court should have exercised its discretion to grant the petition.
Id. at *6. 
 
 
08/06/14

Category: Civil Procedure  

  

 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor

TitleMicrosoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., No. 2013-1184 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2014).
Issue
[1] Whether "the district court had jurisdiction over . . . Microsoft's and SAP's declaratory judgment challenges to [U.S. Patent Nos. 5,937,402 and 6,101,502]."
Microsoft Corp., at *3.
[2] Whether the district court properly construed "the scope of the . . . summary judgment grant to SAP."
Id. at *3.
[3] Whether "the district court's grant of summary judgment that certain [Microsoft] and [SAP] products do not infringe [the '402 and '502 patents]" was proper.
Id. at *2-3.
Holding
"[T]he district court had jurisdiction over both Microsoft and SAP's declaratory judgment challenges to the '502 patent and over SAP's challenge to the '402 patent, but not over Microsoft's challenge to [the] '402 patent."
Id. at *3.
"[T]he district court erred in granting summary judgement of noninfringement to SAP for products other than BusinessObjects."
Id. at *21.
"[W]e affirm summary judgment of SAP's noninfringement of the '502 patent," id. at *18; "we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the '502 patent to Microsoft," id. at *19; "we deny Microsoft’s declaratory judgment challenge to the ’402 patent on jurisdictional grounds and . . . our grant of summary judgment of noninfringement to SAP with regard to the ’402 patent does not require consideration of any claim construction issues, [therefore] we do not reach any of the ’402 patent claim construction issues in the Microsoft appeal," id. at 23 n.8.

 

 

08/04/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
Title Amdocs, Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., No. 2013-1212 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2014).
Issues
[1] [A]ll asserted claims of the ’065 Patent require the use of accounting information to “enhance” a network accounting record. The district court construed “enhance” to mean “to apply a number of field enhancements in a distributed fashion.” […] [2] Third, common to all asserted ’797 Patent claims is the limitation of “single record represent[ing] each of the plurality of services.” The district court construed the term to mean “one record that includes customer usage data for each of the plurality of services used by the customer on the network,” with the understanding that the term does not encompass a record that aggregates usage data. […]
Amdocs, Ltd., *17-18 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[3] Based upon its decision that enhancement occurs “in a distributed fashion” and “close to the source” of the network account information, the district court determined that there was “no evidence” of infringement and granted summary judgment in Openet’s favor.
Id. at *23.
Holdings
[1] The district court properly concluded that the embodiments define the outer limits of the claim term and did not err in reading the “in a distributed fashion” and the “close to the source” of network information requirements into the term “enhance.” We therefore affirm the district court’s construction of “enhance” as “to apply a number of field enhancements in a distributed fashion.”
Id. at *21.
[2] Because the specification shows that the separate record can represent a plurality of records by aggregation, the ordinary artisan would also understand that a separate record can represent a plurality of services by aggregation. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s construction of “single record represent[ing] each of the plurality of services” and substitute it with a plain mean- ing interpretation.
Id. at *23.
[3] We hold that Amdocs’ documentary evidence describing the structure and operation of the accused products creates genuine factual issues regarding whether the products enhance “in a distributed fashion” “close to the source” of the network information.
Id. at *23.
 
 
 
08/02/14
Category: Damages   
 
 
 
By: Karthik Subramanian, Contributor 
 
TitleCartner v. Alamo Group, Inc., No. 2013-1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues"[1] Cartner argues its infringement contentions were objectively reasonable and that the district court clearly erred in finding the case exceptional. [2] Alamo cross appeals the attorney fees award, contending Cartner’s infringement arguments became frivolous long before this court’s invalidity decision, and arguing the fee award should be calculated from an earlier date.”
Cartner, at *8 (text added).
Holdings"[1] Because the district court properly found this case exceptional [in light of Cartner’s frivolous infringement arguments and his bad faith conduct regarding equivalents], and [2] because it did not abuse its discretion in determining the fee award [by selecting one date applicable to all accused products], this court affirms.”
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
 
 
07/31/14
 
 
 
 By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor
 
TitleBraintree Lab., Inc. v. Novel Lab., Inc. (Fed. Circ. April 22, 2014).
Issues
[1] [Whether the district court erred in construing the limitations of U.S. Patent 6,946,149 (a)] "purgation" to mean "an evacuation of a copious amount of stool from the bowels after oral administration of the solution [....and (b)] "clinically significant electrolyte shifts" to require "alterations in blood chemistry that are outside the normal upper or lower limits of their normal range and other untoward effects.
Braintree Lab., at *5, 8 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[2] [Whether] the district court's grant of summary judgment of infringement [, based on the above claim construction, in favor of Braintree was erroneous].
Id. at *12 (text added).
[3] [Whether] the district court [erred in finding] that [the] Hechtor [reference] does not anticipate the asserted claims of the '149 patent....[and] in finding that Novel failed to demonstrate that the asserted claims of the '149 patent would have been obvious at the time of the invention.
Id. at *14, 16 (text added).
Holdings
[1(a)] In construing claim terms, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to "particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention." The asserted claims here only require that the compositions "induce" (i.e., bring about or start) diarrhea. The claims do not contain language that requires achieving a fully cleansed colon for a colonoscopy. Thus, while cleansing the goal specifically articulated in the composition, it is not a claim requirement.
Braintree Lab., at *6-7 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[1(b)] Under our precedent, the patentee's lexicography must govern the claim construction analysis. We reverse the district court's claim construction and construe "clinically significant electrolyte shifts" to be "alterations in blood chemistry that are outside the normal upper or lower limits of their normal range or other untoward effects.
Id. at *9 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[2] [We] conclude that there remains a genuine dispute as to whether SUPREP avoids producing any clinically signficant electrolyte shifts in a patient populuation. We vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment of infringement, and we remand this matter to the district court for further factual findings concerning whether such alterations qualify as "clinically significant electrolyte shifts" in accordance with the proper claim construciton articulated here within.
Id. at *12 (text added).
[3] "Novel 'did not show proof that met the clear and convincing standard' that the asserted claims were ancticipated by the Hechter [reference]." Id. at *13 (text added, internal citations omitted). "[Moreover, as] the district court correctly noted, Novel did not prove that one of skill in the art would have been motiviated to combine [16] references. In other words, it failed to prove a 'plausible rationale as to why the prior art references would have worked together.'" Id. at *15-16 (text added).   

 
07/29/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
 By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
CaseSource Vagabond Sys. Ltd. v. Hydrapak, Inc., No. 2013-1270, -1387 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2014).
IssuesSource Vagabond Systems, Ltd., Pearl Cohen Zedek Latzer LLP, Guy Yonay, and Clyde Shuman (collectively, “Source” or “Appellants”) appeal the decision of the district court sanctioning Source under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) for bringing a frivolous patent infringement suit against Hydrapak, Inc. (“Hydrapak”) [based on [1] an unsupported proposed claim construction and [2] a literal infringement allegation lacking any evidentiary support.]
Source Vagabond Sys. Ltd. at *2 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Source was required to “perform an objective evaluation of the claim terms” to satisfy its obligation to conduct a reasonable pre-suit evaluation. [...] By proposing a definition that ignores the canons of claim construction, Source did not meet that standard. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions based upon Source’s frivolous claim construction arguments.
Id. at *15-16 (internal citations omitted).
[2] Since Source’s claim construction is […] inadequate, and, indeed, the literal infringement claim “lacked evidentiary support no matter how the claim was construed,” […], the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Rule 11 sanctions.
Id. at *17.
 
07/28/14
Category: Injunctions 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., No. 2013-1506, -1587 (July 25, 2014).
IssuesThis case raises two issues. [1: Injunction] The first is whether an injunction can continue after the PTO has cancelled the only claim on which the injunction was based. [2: Civil Contempt Remedies] The second is whether civil contempt remedies based on the violation of an injunction are appropriate when the injunction has been overturned on direct appeal.
ePlus, Inc. at *3.
Holdings
[1: Injunction] Under these authorities, there is no longer any legal basis to enjoin Lawson’s conduct based on rights that claim 26 of the ’683 patent previously conferred as those rights have ceased to exist. The PTO found claim 26 invalid, we affirmed that decision, our mandate issued, and the PTO cancelled the claim. Claim 26 no longer confers any rights that support an injunction against infringement.
Id. at *11.
[2: Civil Contempt Remedies] We conclude that the compensatory award for the violation of the injunction must be set aside in light of the cancellation of claim 26 [because the modified injunction was not final].
Id. at *18 (text added).
 
 
07/25/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleSTC.UNM v. Intel Corp., No. 2013-1241 (Fed. Cir. June 6, 2014).
Issue[Whether] Sandia can[] be involuntarily joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 [to allow STC to assert the '998 patent against Intel].
STC.UNM at *2 (text added).
Holding[T]his court holds that the right of a patent co-owner to impede an infringement suit brought by another co-owner is a substantive right that trumps the procedural rule for involuntary joinder under Rule 19(a).
Id. at *11.
 
07/23/14
Category: 102  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
TitleSuffolk Tech., LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. 13-1392 (Fed. Cir. May 27, 2014).
Issues
[1a] Suffolk argues that the district court erred in construing the claim term “generating said supplied file” [as recited in dependent claim 6] as “creating or tailoring a file, as distinct from selecting an existing file, in dependence upon the received identification signal.” Suffolk’s position is that the generated file could depend on the content of the requesting web page and not just the received identification signal.
Suffolk Tech. at *6 (text added, internal citation and emphasis removed).
[1b] Suffolk argues that the specification implicitly defines “generating said supplied file” [as depending on the content of the requesting page] and that the district court erred in ignoring that implicit definition.
Id. at *7 (text added).
[1c] Suffolk argues that the district court’s construction effectively excludes the preferred embodiment that this claim language was intended to cover.
Id. at *8.
[2a] According to Suffolk, [a Usenet Post is not prior art because] the Post’s audience was not those of ordinary skill in the art and locating the Post would be too difficult.
Id. at *10 (text aded).
[2b] [S]erious questions undermining the reliability and accuracy of the Post should have been submitted to the jury.”
Id. at *12 (text added).
[2c] [T]he district court improperly excluded testimony from [Suffolk's] validity expert.
Id. at *13 (text added).
[2d] According to Suffolk, there are genuine factual issues concerning whether the Post disclosed every limitation in the contested claims.
Id. at *15.
Holdings
[1a] [T]he undisputed construction of “identification signal”—“digital information that identifies the source, origin, or location of a file”—says nothing about the content of the requesting page.
Suffolk Tech. at *6 (text added, emphasis removed).
[1b] [T]he specification, when viewed in context, supports the district court’s construction that “generating said supplied file” depends on the received identification signal and not the content of the requesting web page.
Id. at *8 (text added).
[1c] [The preferred embodiment is not excluded] when the entire description of the preferred embodiment is considered.
Id. (text added).
[2a] [T]he record indicates that those of ordinary skill in the art actually [at the time] were using such newsgroups [and] a printed publication need not be easily searchable after publication if it was sufficiently disseminated at the time of its publication.
Id. at *10-11 (text added, internal citation removed).
[2b] [T]he asserted evidentiary weaknesses in the Post are insufficient, without more, to create a genuine issue of material fact.
Id. at *13 (text added).
[2c] [T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in [excluding testimony when the expert goes from having no opinion concerning a claim to having an opinion because the expert] did opine on the validity of dependent claim 6 in his initial report and the district court’s construction did not vary greatly from the parties’ proposals.
Id. at *14 (text added).
[2d] Google bears the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact. It has met that burden. And Suffolk’s attorney arguments, with no affirmative evidence, are insufficient to undermine Google’s showing.
Id. at *15.  
 
 
07/21/14
Category: Civil Procedure    
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleArlington Ind., Inc. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., No. 2013-1357 (Fed. Cir. July 17, 2014).
IssueBridgeport argues that we have jurisdiction over its appeal [for contempt of an injunction] under both § 1292(c)(1) and § 1292(c)(2).
Arlington Ind., Inc. at *5.
HoldingBecause the district court’s order simply interpreted the 2004 Injunction and is not an otherwise final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at *5.
 
07/19/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings  
 
 
 
 By: Karthik Subramanian, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., No. 2014-122 (Fed. Cir. May 5, 2015) (non-precedential).
Issue“The Board of Trustees for the University of Illinois (“University”) petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) and its Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) to withdraw its orders instituting inter partes review in cases IPR2013-401 and IPR2013-404.”
In re Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill. at *1.
Holding“The petition is denied [because a party seeking issuance of a writ to vacate an inter partes review cannot establish a clear and indisputable right to relief].”
Id. at 3 (text added).
 
 
07/16/14
Category: 101   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleDigitech Image Tech., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., No. 2013-1600, -1601, -1602, -1603, -1604, -1605, -1606, -1607, -1608, -1609, -1610, -1611, -1612, -1613, -1614, -1615, -1616, -1617, -1618 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2014).
Issues[1] First, Digitech asserts that the district court erred in finding that the device profile claims are directed to a collection of data that lacks tangible or physical properties. [2] Second, Digitech argues that the district court erred in finding that the asserted method claims encompass an abstract idea and are not tied to a specific machine or apparatus.
Digitech Image Tech., LLC at *6 (text added).
Holdings
[1] We […] hold that the device profile claims of the ’415 patent do not encompass eligible subject matter as required by section 101 and are therefore not patent eligible [because the claimed “device profile” is a collection of intangible color and spatial information, and there is nothing in the claims that require said information to be in a tangible medium].
Id. at *10.
[2] [W]e hold that the process described in the asserted claims is directed to an abstract idea and is not patent eligible under section 101 [because the claims recite an abstract process of gathering and combining data that does not require input from a physical device].
Id. at *13.
 
 
07/15/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleGolden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2013-1496 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2014).
Issues
[1: Claim Construction] GBT disputes the portion of the district court’s construction requiring that the preamble be spread prior to transmission. It argues that […] It argues that its submission of its stipulated construction to the PTO in an IDS does not constitute a disclaimer of the broader claim scope.
Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. at *6.
[2: Waiver of Alternate Arguments] GBT also argues that the district court erred by declining to modify its judgment of noninfringement on reconsideration. GBT’s argument is two-fold. [...] [I]t contends that it did not waive its signature sequence infringement theory because that theory was not introduced for the first time in its motion for reconsideration.
Id. at *12.
Holdings
[1: Claim Construction] We conclude that GBT’s submissions during prosecution of its stipulated construction for the term preamble constitute disclaimer. Although we generally construe terms according to their plain and ordinary meanings to one of ordinary skill in the art, we depart from that meaning where there is disclaimer. […] Here, GBT clearly and unmistakably limited the term preamble to “a signal used for communicating with the base station that is spread before transmission[,]” [during reexamination of the ’267 patent and prosecution of the ’427 patent].
Id. at *6 (text added).
[2: Waiver of Alternate Arguments] We conclude that GBT’s signature sequence infringe- ment theory was raised for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. Prior to its motion for reconsideration, GBT did not argue that the signature sequence alone in the accused device was itself a preamble, but instead that the PRACH preamble met the preamble limitations in the claims.
Id. at *13.
 
 
07/15/14
Category: 102   
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor  
TitleIn re Reijers, No. 2014-1052 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue[Whether] Braun [] disclose[s] a method for blowing liquid from a food product, as required by Claim 11.
In re Reijers at *5 (text added).
HoldingBecause substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Braun anticipates Claim 11 [because based on inherency, the device in Braun would necessarily blow liquid off a food product as part of its drying process].
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
07/12/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
  By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor
 
TitleKrauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., No. 2013-1461 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2014).
Issues
[1] [Does] Krauser’s complaint [raise] a substantial patent law issue [that requires the Federal Circuit to accept a transfer from a sister circuit, according to the following theories?]
Krauser at *7 (text added).
[1a] Krauser’s original complaint contained a patent law claim of inventorship.
Id. (text added).
[1b] [T]he well-pleaded complaint rule requires [the Federal Circuit] to consider the issue of patent law inventorship even when adjudicating Krauser’s claims of ownership [based on past agreements] and a quantum meruit theory.
Id. at *10 (text added).
[1c] [E]ven if Krauser’s [ownership] claims are based in state law, there is federal jurisdiction because Krauser seeks remedies that might be preempted by federal patent law.
Id. at *11 (text added).
[2] [E]ven if [the above theories are] ultimately incorrect, [the theories] are nonetheless “plausible” and require [the Federal Circuit] to follow the law of the case of [the] sister circuit.
Id. at *8 (text added).
Holdings
[1a] We have repeatedly held that an amendment to the complaint that dismisses the patent law claims without prejudice, as here, deprives this court of jurisdiction over the case. Krauser at *10 (internal citation removed).
[1b] The resolution of the inventorship question is neither “necessary” nor “substantial” to the case.
Id. at *11.
[1c] [In an analogous situation, we found no] federal jurisdiction where plaintiff “[sought] remedies that might be preempted by federal patent law” because federal preemption was only a defense to the plaintiff’s suit.
Id. at *12 (text added, internal citation removed).
[2] [The Supreme Court] held that a transferee court would “not exceed its power in revisiting the jurisdictional issue, and once it conclude[s] that the prior decision was ‘clearly wrong’ it [is] obliged to decline jurisdiction.”
Id. at *8 (text added, internal citation removed).
 
 
 
07/10/14
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleStauffer v. Brooks. Bros. Group, No. 2013-1180 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2014).
IssueAfter the AIA became law and eliminated the qui tam provision of the false-marking statute, Mr. Stauffer acknowledged that he no longer had standing to pursue his lawsuit [which was initially brought prior to enactment of the AIA]. The district court subsequently issued an order directing him to show cause why, in light of the AIA, his suit should not be dismissed for lack of standing. Mr. Stauffer responded by arguing that the AIA amendments were unconstitutional because [1] they amounted to a pardon by Congress, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers. He also argued [2] that, by making the elimination of the qui tam provision applicable to pending suits, the statute violated the common-law principle that prohibits use of a pardon to vitiate a qui tam action once the action has commenced.
Stauffer at *3 (text added).
Holding
[1] We […] conclude that the AIA amendment to the false-marking statute that eliminated liability for expired patents does not constitute an impermissible pardon [because the amendments amount to a repeal of a law, and not an attempt to set aside an already adjudicated punishment].
Id. at *11-12.
[2] [W]e conclude that the AIA amendments do not violate the common-law principle on which Mr. Stauffer relies because (1) he has no vested rights in his lawsuit, and (2) the AIA amendments do not constitute a pardon.
Id. at *12.
 

 
07/08/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleX2Y Attenuators, LLC v. ITC, No. 2013-1340 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2014).
IssueX2Y contends that the ITC improperly read several functional and structural limitations into the meaning of the term “electrode[“ based on statement on parent patents.] It contends that the plain meaning of “electrode” denotes a single conductor rather than three conductors, let alone a three-conductor sandwich structure having paired electromagnetically opposite conductors flanking the central conductor.
X2Y Attenuators, LLC at *6 (text added).
HoldingWe conclude that the ITC correctly construed the electrode terms. The patents’ statements that the presence of a common conductive pathway electrode positioned between paired electromagnetically opposite
Id. at *7.
 
 
 
 
07/05/14
Category: Injunctions  
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor 
 
TitleTrebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, No. 2013-1437 (Fed. Cir. April 9, 2014).
Issues[Whether, in denying a motion for preliminary injunction,] the district court erred in determining that [(1)] Trebro failed to prove a likelihood that FireFly infringes the ’638 patent, that [(2)] FireFly raised a substantial question of the ’638 patent’s validity, and that [(3)] Trebro failed to prove a likelihood of irreparable harm.
Trebro Mfg., Inc. at *10 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Likelihood of InfringementThe only basis on which the district court found no likelihood of success was the erroneous requirement that a bed frame be moved vertically. Absent an explicit claim construction favorable to FireFly (which, of course, does not include a “bed frame”), this court holds that the district court erred.
Id. at *14.
[2] Substantial Question of Validity[T]he record does not contain a single prior art reference that raises a substantial question as to the ’638 patent’s validity. Without even a reference to call validity into question, the district court abused its discretion in concluding there was no likelihood of success on the merits on the basis of validity.
Id. at *16.
[3] Likelihood of Irreparable HarmThe district court clearly erred in finding as speculative the harm Trebro is likely to suffer if its direct competitor is able to sell an infringing product in the small, niche sod harvester market . . . Further, the district court committed legal error by giving no weight to Trebro’s evidence of likely loss of market share and customers.
Id. at *16.
 
 
07/02/14
The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.
  • The Patentability Of Human Embryonic Stem Cells In Light Of Myriad Brandon Smith
  • A Patent Problem: Can Chinese Courts Compare with the U.S. in Providing Patent Holders with Adequate Monetary Damages Yieyie Yang
  • Process Stories: Patenting Natural Law Processes under Prometheus - How Much Addition to a Patent Claim is Enough? Arun Mohan
  • Eligibility Of DNA and cDNA Daniel Leo
  • A Slippery Slope: The Future of Patents from Government-Funded R&D Tanya S. Gillis
  • Private Industry's Impact on U.S. Trade Law and International Intellectual Property Law: A Study of Post-TRIPS U.S. Bilateral Agreements and the Capture of the USTR Katrina Moberg
  • “The Knockoff Economy: How Imitation Sparks Innovation” by Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman (Oxford University Press, 2012) Book Review by Lynn Bristol
  • Frederico and Rossman Awards Eric Keasel, Committee Chairman
07/02/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleMadstad Eng'g., Inc. v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 2013-1511, 1512 (Fed. Cir. July 1, 2014).
Issues
[1: Jurisdiction] Because MadStad does not assert a claim under the AIA and, instead asserts a claim directly under the constitution challenging the AIA’s constitutionality, we must determine whether MadStad’s claims “arise under” an Act of Congress relating to patents as that jurisdictional principle has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
Madstad Eng., Inc. at *5.
[2: Standing] MadStad contends that the district court’s reliance on Clapper was misplaced because the threats of harm upon which it relies are far less speculative than those asserted in Clapper. It also asserts that it faces a sufficient “substantial risk” of suffering the injuries it identifies to satisfy Article III standing under traditional standing principles which the Clapper Court did not expressly reject.
Id. at *12.
Holdings
[1: Jurisdiction] [W]e find, as we did impliedly in Patlex, that MadStad’s claims and this appeal “arise under” an Act of Congress relating to patents within the meaning of both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338 and 1295(a)(1) [because assessing the use and scope of the term ‘inventor’ in the Constitution and the AIA is within the CAFC’s domain] and that we, thus, may properly exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.
Id. at *8-9 (text added).
[2: Standing] [W]e hold that the district court did not err by relying on Clapper or concluding that MadStad lacked standing to assert the constitutional claims in its complaint [because there is no evidence of a likelihood that any of the alleged harms are specifically attributable to the AIA, the alleged harms including: computer hacking, time and effort to file additional patent applications, competitive disadvantage, of lost business].
Id. at *27 (text added).
 
 
 
 
 
06/30/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor
 
TitleK-Swiss, Inc. v. Glide N Lock GMBH, 2013-1316, -1317 (Fed. Circ. April 23, 2014) (non-precedential)
Issues
[1a] On Clouds argues that the Board’s decision that Szentes anticipates claims 1 and 9 is not supported by substantial evidence because Szentes does not disclose the limitation in the first, unloaded configuration—the resilient member that elastically absorbs oblique shoe loads using the relative motion between the upper and lower layers.
K-Swiss, Inc. at *7.
[1b] On Clouds argues that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s conclusion that Okabe anticipates claim 1 because Okabe does not meet the limitation in the second configuration (the loaded state) that the upper and lower layer of the resilient member engage to “substantially prevent” relative motion.
Id. at *9.
[2a] [Whether] a person having ordinary skill in the art would not have combined Szentes with any of [the prior art] references because Szentes disparaged the use of small channels like those in Pagani, Takahashi and Inohara.
Id. at *11 (text added).
[2b] As for claims 6 and 7, which specify the percentage the outsole deforms in the loaded position, the specific percentages are not explicitly disclosed in Pagani, Takahashi or Inohara [but are nonetheless rejected by combining these references with Szentes].
Id. at *12 (text added).
Holdings
[1a] Because the Szentes sole is made of an elastically resilient material, it absorbs oblique shoe loads in the unloaded state, the first configuration, through the movement of the elastic materials.
Id. at *7.
[1b] Okabe teaches that rubber pins would frictionally engage with the upper layer in the loaded state, thereby preventing relative motion between the two layers.
Id. at *9.
[2a] Szentes does not disparage the use of small channels, but uses them as another example of the floating problem that [Szentes] was attempting to solve-"[an outsole with multiple small cavities] shows the same deficiencies [] as the previous one [i.e., a large hallow cavity], weaing results in an unsure and wobbling walk."[...]Id., at *11 (internal citations omitted).
[2b] [W]e find that substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding that claims 6 and 7 would not have been prima facie obvious in light of Szentes, Pagani, Takahashi, or Inohara [because the (i) percentages are inherent in the prior art, and (ii) because it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation.]
Id. at *14 (text added).
 
 
06/29/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleGE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. Agilight, Inc., No. 2013-1267 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2014).
IssueGE Lighting Solutions, LLC (GE) appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment that AgiLight, Inc.'s (AgiLight) accused products and processes do not infringe asserted claims of GE's U.S. Patent Nos. [A] 7,160,140 [the '140 Patent] [and] 7,520,771 [the '771 Patent] [based on a construction of "IDC connector"], [B] 7,832,896 [the '896 Patent] [based on a construction of "substantially ellipsoidal"] and [C] 7,633,055 [the '055 Patent] [based on a construction of "annular gasket"].
GE Lighting Solutions, LLC at *2 (text added).
HoldingWe reverse the grant of summary judgment with regard to the '140, '771 and '896 patents and remand [because [A] the district court's construction of "IDC connector" departed from its plain and ordinary meaning without being necessitated by the intrinsic recor, and [B] the district court's construction of "substantially ellipsoidal" would exclude an actual example embodiment is the specification]. [C] We affirm the grant of summary judgment with regard to the '055 patent [because the district court's construction of "annular gasket" was consistent with its plain and ordinary meaning].
Id. (text added).
 
 
 
 
06/25/14
Category: Copyright
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleAm. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (June 25, 2014).
IssueWe must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes [the] exclusive right [to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance of a copyrighted work to the public] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. 
Am. Broad. Co. at *1 (text added).
Holding[H]aving considered the details of Aereo’s practices, we find them highly similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter. And those are activities that the 1976 amendments sought to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act. Insofar as there are differences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it provides the service. We conclude that those differences are not adequate to place Aereo’s activities outside the scope of the Act. For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo “perform[s]” petitioners’ copyrighted works “publicly,” as those terms are defined by the Transmit Clause.
Id. at *17-18.
 
 

 
Editor Comments
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc. by clicking here.
  
 
06/23/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor  
 
TitleHowlink Global LLC v. Network Comm., No. 2013-1181 (Fed. Cir. April 2, 2014)(non-precedential).
IssueHowLink challenges the construction of two terms: (1) “temporarily transmitting voice of a caller to the called terminal to identify the caller when the second communication link is established,” and (2) “prohibiting voice transmission until a collect call acceptance arrives after the temporary voice transmission.” The dispute over these claims is about whether the claims of the [U.S. Patent No. 7,876,744 B2] patent require that a caller be able to talk to the called party temporarily before a decision to accept the collect call is made.
Howlink Global LLC at *2 (text added).
HoldingConsistent with the claim language, the description of the embodiments points to a construction where “transmitting the voice of a caller” requires a “live” voice.
Id. at *15.
 
 
 
06/22/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings    
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re The Proctor & Gamble Co., Misc. Docket No. 121 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 2014).
IssueWhether "a decision by the Director [of the United States Patent & Trademark Office ('USPTO')] to institute inter partes review[s]" of the patents at issue "may [] be directly reviewed by this court through the extraordinary means of mandamus."
In re The Proctor & Gamble Co. at *2 (emphasis removed from original).
Holding"We conclude that immediate review of such a decision is not available in this court. We therefore deny P&G’s petition for mandamus relief."
Id. at *2.
 
 
 
06/19/14
Category: 101  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleAlice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int., No. 13-298 (June 19, 2014).
IssueThe patents at issue in this case disclose a computer- implemented scheme for mitigating “settlement risk” (i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial transaction will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary. The question presented is whether these claims are patent eligible under 35 U. S. C. §101, or are instead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea.
Alice Corp. at *1.
HoldingWe hold that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. We therefore affirm the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Id. at *1.
 
 
 
 
Editor Comment
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int. by clicking here.
 
06/19/14
Category: Administrative Law 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleQ.I. Press Controls, B.V. v. Lee, No. 2012-1630, -1631 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2014).
Issues
[1: Obviousness Rejection of Claims 61-72] Quad/Tech argues that the Board erred in rejecting claims 61–72 for obviousness over Ross and Sainio by using hindsight bias to combine the two references […] [and] that Ross and Sainio cannot be combined because the circular lighting configuration of Ross does not teach a high intensity illumination system […]
Q.I. Press Controls, B.V. at *11.
[2: Contradictory 103 Rejection Regarding Claims 1-60] Q.I. Press asserts that the Board’s decision is inherently contradictory, finding that claims 1–60 would not have been obvious because Maruyama and Ross do not disclose a printing press, but also finding that the similar claims 61–72 would have been obvious over a combination of the printing press in Sainio and Ross.
Id. at *16.
Holdings
[1: Obviousness Rejection of Claims 61-72] [C]ombining Ross and Sainio would have been obvious to one having skill in the art at the time of the invention [because the claim language at issue is broad and the asserted combination would give the predictable result of greater degree of illumination].
Id. at *12 (text added).
[2: Contradictory 103 Rejections] [W]hen all [the] references were before the Board, and this court, an obligation is owed to the public not to permit inconsistent results when a proper challenge to that inconsistency is made on appeal. The Board should have observed the similarities between the claims, noted those similarities between the claims and the references before the Board on appeal, analyzed whether the combination of Sainio and Ross would have rendered claims 1–60 obvious, and if so, issued a new ground of rejection.
Id. at *19.
 
 
 
06/18/14
Category: 112 - Means Plus   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleTriton Tech. of Tex., LLC v. Nintendo of Am., No. 2013-1476 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2014).
IssueEach asserted claim [in the ‘181 patent] recites an “integrator means.” The district court held that this term rendered the asserted claims indefinite [because the ’181 patent broadly discloses using “numerical integration,” without specifying a class of algorithms that can be used to calculate definite integrals].
Triton Tech. of Tex., LLC at *3 (text added).
HoldingWe affirm the district court’s determination that the asserted claims of the ’181 patent are indefinite because the specification does not disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed integrating function of the “integrator means.”
Id. at *6.
 
 
 
06/17/14
Category: Licensing 
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleEndo Pharma. Inc. v. Actavis, Inc., No. 20130-1628, -1662 (Fed. Cir. March 31, 2014).
Issues
[1: Express License] Endo contends that the plain language of the agreements, which limit “Licensed Patents” to several enumerated patents and applications claiming priority to them, does not grant Appellees an express license to practice the asserted patents [US 8,309,122(‘122), US 8,329,216(‘216), US 7,851,482(‘482)] [which are not listed on the agreement, but claim priority to enumerated patents in the agreement]. It argues that the “No Implied Rights” provision further makes clear that the agreements do not cover the asserted patents.
Endo Pharma. Inc., at *6 (text added).
[2: Implied License and 3: Injunction / Estoppel] Endo contends that the plain language of the Endo argues that the district court legally erred in concluding the Appellees are impliedly licensed to practice the asserted patents due to legal estoppel.
Id. at *10.
Holdings
[1: Express License] The ’216 and ’122 patents do not cross-reference the applications that issued as any of the licensed patents. Therefore, it is quite clear that the ’122 and ’216 patents do not “claim priority to” any of the licensed patents [...] There is no reading of [the Roxane and Actavis contract] language that extends coverage to patents that merely have a provisional application in common with the licensed patents [...]. Finally, the ’482 patent is completely unrelated to any of the previously licensed patents, and is likewise not covered by the agreement.
Id. at *8-9.
[2: Implied License] “Appellees seek to capture via implied license subject matter in addition to that for which they bargained.”
Id. at *12.
[3: Injunction / Estoppel] Endo is not estopped from asserting the patents at issue in these appeals because none of the asserted patents is a continuation of any of the licensed patents [and is therefore beyond the terms of what was bargained for].
Id. at *13-14 (text added).
 
 
 
06/15/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor 
 
TitleTakeda Pharma. Co. v. Zydus Pharma USA, Inc., No. 2013-1406 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 20, 2014).
Issues
[1] Claim construction and Infringement[Whether the district court erred in finding that claim 1 was infringed because it] construed the claim term “fine granules having an average particle diameter of 400 μm or less” . . . to mean “fine granules up to and including the enteric coating layer having an average particle diameter of 400 μm (±10%) or less.”
Takeda at *3 (emphasis added) (text added).
[2] Indefiniteness[Whether] the '995 patent is indefinite because it does not specify the method of measurement that should be used to determine average particle diameter.
Id. at *10-11 (text added).
[3] Written Description[Whether claim 1 is invalid for lack of written description because it] addresses average particle size in the finished tablet, while the specification only teaches how to measure particle size pre-tableting with no discussion of how to ensure particle size is not altered by that process.
Id. at *14 (text added).
[4] Enablement[Whether] the patent is invalid for lack of enablement because a skilled artisan would not be able to determine the average particle diameter using the coulter counter method of measurement without undue experimentation.
Id. at *17 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Claim construction and Infringement
[T]he district court erred in reading a margin of error into the disputed claim term . . . when the phrase "400 μm or less" is not qualified by the word "about" or any other indicator of imprecision.
Takeda at *6.
[Without the added breadth of the margin of error,] there can be no dispute that Zydus’s ANDA product does not literally infringe claim 1 of the ’994 patent.
Id. at *9-10 (text added).
[2] IndefinitenessThat there is more than one way of determining the average particle diameter of a particular sample does not render that clear claim language indefinite.
Id. at *13.
[3] Written Description[A] hypothetical possibility that tableting could affect particle size in a relevant way [does not warrant finding] that the district court committed clear error by finding that such evidence was not clear and convincing proof of invalidity.
Id. at *15 (text added).
[4] Enablement[B]ecause the patent identifies laser diffraction as a viable measurement technique, and there is no dispute that a skilled artisan would know how to use laser diffraction to measure particle diameter, Zydus has not established that the patent is invalid for lack of enablement on this basis.
Id. at *16. 
 
 
06/13/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleBristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharma. USA, Inc., No. 2013-1306 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2014).
IssueBMS attacks the lower court’s obviousness determination by contending that a skilled artisan would have had to make too many decisions to arrive at entecavir. Those decisions include selecting (1) the class of nucleoside analog compounds, (2) 2′-CDG as a lead compound from the class of carbocyclics, (3) the carbocyclic ring or guanine base of 2′-CDG for modification, (4) the 2’ or 5’ position on the carbocyclic ring, (5) the specific chemical element on the 5’ position (carbon), and (6) the type of carbon to carbon bond (single or double).
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. at *9.
HoldingBased on (1) the structural similarity between entecavir and 2′-CDG, (2) the teachings of the Madhavan reference [teaching that adding an exocyclic methylene group to a carbocyclic nucleoside analog can result in a lead compound with improved antiviral activity], (3) the finding that the exocyclic methylene substitution would be a “small, conservative change[]”and (4) the “totality of the prior art” on 2′-CDG [teaching that 2′-CDG was a promising compound and subject to a multitude of modifications], the district court found [and the CAFC affirms] that a skilled artisan would have been motivated to substitute an exocyclic methylene group at the 5’ position of 2′-CDG, with a reasonable expectation of success of creating a compound with beneficial antiviral properties.
Id. at *7 (text added, no direct correspondence between issue and holding  numbering).
 
 
06/11/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings   
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleIn re Dinsmore, No. 2013-1637 (Fed. Cir. June 10, 2014).
IssueThe applicants argue that, because the ’568 and ’086 patents are not and never have been commonly owned, the recorded terminal disclaimer was “an ineffective, invalid terminal disclaimer” and its filing therefore was an “error” within the meaning of the reissue statute, 35 U.S.C. § 251.
In re Dinsmore at *6.
HoldingWe affirm the Board’s ruling because the applicants have not identified an “error” underlying the choices made in the original patent that they now seek to revise [and revising a conscious choice is not tantamount to remedying the result of a mistaken belief].
Id. at *7 (text added).
 
 
 
06/10/14
Category: 102  
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleIn re Rambus, Inc., No. 2013-1192 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2014).
Issue[Micron argues that] multiplexed lines in Fig. 25a [of prior art reference Bennet] cause a delay of known value (one clock cycle) before data transfer. Setting Parameter VI to 1 causes the lines to be multiplexed. Therefore, [according to Micron,] Parameter VI [discloses] a “value that is representative of an amount of time to transpire after which the memory device outputs the first amount of data.”
In re Rambus, Inc. at *7 (text added).
HoldingParameter VI is only “representative” of one source of delay because the actual delay can be longer due to other factors. [Since changing Parameter VI does not necessarily create a one clock cycle delay], Parameter VI is not a “value that is representative of an amount of time to transpire after which the memory device outputs the first amount of data.”
Id. at *8 (text added).
 
 
06/09/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleVaillancourt v. Becton Dickson & Co., No. 2013-1408 (Fed. Cir. April 24, 2014).
IssueVaillancourt claims [...] that despite his assignment of the entire right, title, and interest in [U.S. Patent No. 6,699,221] to VLV [during reexamination], he was “authorized to continue with all related proceedings including further appeals” in connection with the reexamination.
Vaillancourt at *5, (text added, internal citation removed).
HoldingThe unambiguous language of [35 U.S.C.] § 141 provides that a patent owner alone can appeal a final decision in an inter partes reexamination to this court.
Id. at *4 (text added).
 
 
 
06/04/14
Category: Post-Grant Proceedings  
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleConsumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., No. 2013-1377 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2014).
Issue[Attempting to establish an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing,] Consumer Watchdog relies on the Board’s denial of Consumer Watchdog’s requested administrative action—namely, the Board’s refusal to cancel claims 1–4 of the ’913 patent [in an inter partes reexamination].
Consumer Watchdog at *5 (citations omitted).
HoldingBecause Consumer Watchdog has not identified a particularized, concrete interest in the patentability of the ’913 patent, or any injury in fact flowing from the Board’s decision, it lacks standing to appeal the decision affirming the patentability of the amended claims.
Consumer Watchdog at *8.
 
 
 
Editor's Notes
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found. by clicking here.
 

 
06/02/14
Category: 112 - Definiteness  
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleNautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., No. 13-369 (June 2, 2014).
IssueThis case, involving a heart­ rate monitor used with exercise equipment, concerns the proper reading of the statute’s clarity and precision de­ mand. According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the §112, ¶2 threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.” 715 F. 3d 891, 898–899 (2013).
Nautilus, Inc. at *1.
HoldingWe conclude that the Federal Circuit’s formulation, which tolerates some ambiguous claims but not others, does not satisfy the statute’s definiteness requirement. In place of the “insolubly ambiguous” standard, we hold that a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.
Id. at at *1.
 
 
 
 
Editor's Notes
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments by clicking here.
 
06/02/14
Category: Infringement  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleLimelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc., No. 12-786 (June 2, 2014).
IssueThis case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U. S. C. §271(b) when no one has directly infringed the patent under §271(a) or any other statutory provision.
Limelight Networks, Inc. at *1.
HoldingThe statutory text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in the negative [because inducement liability may arise if, and only if, there is direct infringement].
Id. at *1 (text added).
 
 
 
Editor's Notes
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Limelight Networks v. Akamai by clicking here.
 
 
 
05/29/14
 
 
 
 
By: Roy Rabindranath, Contributor
 
TitleRealtime Data, LLC v. Morgan Stanley, No. 13-1092 (Fed. Circ. January 27, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues
[1] "Realtime [argues] that the district court erred in its construction of three claim terms: [a] “descriptor indicates,” [b] “data field/block type,” and [c] “data stream.” [...]
Realtime Data, LLC at *18 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[2] Realtime argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of noninfringement of [various claims in the ‘568, ‘747 and ‘651 patents] by the accused systems because aspects of the Defendants’ Fast System meet the [a] “descriptor indicates,” [b] “data field/block type,” and [c] “data stream” limitations as construed by the court.
Id. at *23-24 (text added).
[3] [Whether] the district court abused its discretion in precluding [Appellant] from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, applying its local rules in doing so.
Id. at *28 (text added).
Holdings
[1][a] “Although the written description does define the ‘data compression type descriptor’ as ‘any recognizable data token or descriptor that indicates which data encoding technique has been applied to the data,’ the preceding sentence [in the Specification] also teaches that "an appropriate data compression type descriptor is appended to the encoded data block. [Therefore, the court did not unnecessarily add] additional limitations, requiring that the indicator be appended to the encoded data for the purposes of specifying the encoder used.” Realtime Data, LLC at *18 (text added, internal citations omitted). [b] “The district court was correct in concluding that, based on the specifications of the patents, the ‘data field/block type’ term must be tied to some analysis of the content of the data field or block and cannot simply encompass any characteristic or attribute of data. Id. at *20 (text added). [c] “[Finally,] [Realtime is bound to its expert’s description during reexamination proceedings, who] described the process of ‘receiving a data stream’ from an external source as a ‘passive one requiring no control over the characteristics of the received data stream by the receiver.’“ Id. at *21-23 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[2][a] “[The] Defendants' accused Fast systems [do not] meet the ‘descriptor indicates’ limitation by appending both a PMAP and Template ID to the message for purpose of specifying the encoders used to encode that message.” Realtime Data, LLC at *24 (text added). [b] “[Also, the Fast systems] process does not analyze the content of the data block for categorization as one of several different data types, as required by the ‘data field/block type’ claim construction, but simply looks to see whether certain fields in the Template can be encoded to minimize the size of the message. The accused systems thus cannot infringe the claims requiring a ‘data field/block type’ limitation.” Id. at *24-25 (text added, internal citations omitted). [c] [Finally, the evidence was] ‘one sided’ in showing that the accused products received data from internal sources, and the district court thus did not err in concluding that the accused systems did not meet the ‘data stream’ limitation. [In addition, the] parties stipulated that this limitation means that ‘the systems (or method) selects the lossless encoders based on an analysis of content of the data blocks (or data fields).’ […] Realtime cannot now change the construction that it had agreed to in the district court.” Id. at *25-26 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[3] The district court was well within its discretion to preclude Realtime from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. In asserting its allegations of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents two and a half years into the litigation, Realtime failed to comply with the local rules of both the Eastern District of Texas and the Southern District of New York, which require complete infringement assertions within 10 and 14 days, respectively.
Id. at *29.  
 
 
05/27/14
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleK/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Tech., LLC, No. 2013-1549 (Fed. Cir. 2013-1549).
IssueHIMPP argues that the CRU Examiner and the Board failed to consider the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art [as articulated by the prosecuting examiner of the patent application] solely because HIMPP did not provide documentary evidence to prove purportedly well-known facts.
K/S HIMPP at *5 (text added).
HoldingsWe agree with Hear-Wear that the Board was correct to require record evidence to support an assertion that the structural features of claims 3 and 9 of the ’512 patent were known prior art elements. […] HIMPP must […] “point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these findings[,]” [in order to reject a claim limitation].
Id. at *6 (text added).
 
 
 
05/27/14

Category: Injunctions 

 

By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 

TitleEnergy Recovery, Inc. v. Hauge, No. 2013-1515 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2014).
Issue[W]hether Mr. Hauge by his conduct violated any terms of the district court’s 2001 Order [and was therefore rightly held in contempt of court].
Energy Recovery, Inc. at *7 (text added).
HoldingBecause the finding of contempt is reversed [since Mr. Hauge's conduct did not violate any specific terms of an injunction], there is no remedy necessary [as acutal patent infringement was not asserted]; the injunction is therefore vacated.
Id. at *12 (text added).

 

  

05/23/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor
 
TitleShire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharma., Inc., No. 2013-1409 (Fed. Cir. March 28, 2014).
Issues
[1] [Did the district court err by construing] “'lipophilic matrix' [as] a matrix that includes at least one lipophilic excipient[?]”
Shire Development, LLC at *9-10 (text added, internal citation removed).
[2] In construing the matrix terms, the district court rejected Watson’s position that the inner matrix and outer matrix must be “separate and distinct.”
Id. at *10 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [Lipophilic] is an adjective that modifies matrix. [...] Thus, the matrix [itself] must exhibit the [...] lipophilic characteristic.
Id. at *10 (text added, internal citation removed).
[2] A court must identify “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention.” [, therefore, a proper interpretation is that the inner and outer matrices must be “separate and distinct” such that they retain their claimed properties and are consistent with their respective group limitations]
Id. at *14 (text added).
 
 
 
 
 
05/22/14
Category: Damages  
 
 
 
  By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleMonsanto Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., No. 2013-1349 (Fed. Cir. May 9, 2014).
IssueDuPont contends that interpreting the objective meaning of the License was a question of law and that the district court improperly sanctioned DuPont for making reasonable legal arguments that section 3.01 of the License permitted stacking and commercialization of glyphosate-tolerant traits.
Monsanto at *11.
HoldingWe agree with Monsanto that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing narrowly-tailored sanctions on DuPont for making factual misrepresentations concerning its subjective understanding of the License in order to advance its reformation counterclaims [because DuPont asserted said counterclaim on the grounds that the parties original intent was to have no stacking restrictions in the License, while at the same time using attorney-client privilege to withhold documents showing that DuPont in fact was aware that the contract included stacking restrictions].
Id. at *11-12 (text added). 
 
 
 
05/20/14
Category: Interferences 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleTobinick v. Olarmarker, No. 2013-1499 (Fed. Cir. May 19, 2014).
Issue[T]he parties dispute the meaning of “administered locally” and whether Tobinick’s patent application contains written description support for this claim limitation.
Tobinick at *2.
HoldingWe find that Tobinick’s application contains sufficient written description support for local administration because it describes administering the relevant therapeutic compound to the epidural space adjacent to a herniated spinal disc, which is the site where the com- pound “is intended to act” and “the location where the nucleus pulposus is causing the symptoms of the nerve disorder.”
Id. at *2.
 
 
 
05/19/14
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor   
 
TitleIn re Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2014-113 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).
IssueWhether the Eastern District of Texas's conclusion that "the convenience factors do not indicate that transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan would be clearly more convenient" was an abuse of discretion.
In re Toyota at *3; see id. at *5.
Holding"With nothing on the transferor-forum side of the ledger, the analysis shows that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient. In these circumstances, the district court's no-transfer conclusion was a clear abuse of discretion."
Id. at *5 (citations, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
 
05/16/14
Category: Inventorship 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleGen. Electric Co. v. Wilkins, No. 13-1170 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2014).
IssueWilkins argues that the district court erred in concluding that he is not a co-inventor of GE’s ’985 patent because the court did not compare the conception described in Wilkins’s Design and Cost Analysis document [which was introduced as corroborating evidence of inventorship].
Gen. Electric Co. at *10-11 (text added).
HoldingWilkins did not prove his inventorship claim by clear and convincing evidence because he did not present any credible testimony that could be corroborated [since Wilkins was biased due to a financial arrangement with another party and all his answers to questions during litigation were purposefully evasive].
Id. at *11 (text added).
 
05/15/14

To the readers of The Journal, its Blog, and members of The Patent and Trademark Office Society: This is my last day as Editor-in-Chief.  I want to wish you all well and thank you for letting me be your editor.  It’s been an amazing five plus years with The Journal in a variety of roles.  It’s been a privilege these past 4 years to serve you as your Editor-in-Chief.  I’ve been fortunate enough to work with some great people during that time.  During my tenure with The Journal we’ve seen some amazing transformations.  I’ve been fortunate enough to be a part of transitioning The Journal to having an increased online presence.  We started an electronic issue distribution concurrent with our print issue.  We launched a blog.  We switched to a quarterly format.  We expanded our article selection into newer areas of technology law while still maintaining our primary intellectual property focus.  

I hope you’ve found the last 5 plus years amazing as well.  I can’t take all of the credit for all of that.  I’ve been lucky to be part of a team working with some very talented people.  I can only hope they know how much I appreciate them. I want to start listing them all, but am afraid I might forget to list someone, so I’m going to give a general blanket thank you.  I want to thank The Journal’s Board of Governors and The Board of Directors of The Patent and Trademark Office Society for taking a chance on a bright-eyed new employee all those years ago.  I want to thank in no particular order, my editorial staff, my blog contributors, The Journal’s Financial, Executive, and Assistant Directors during my term, the PTO for the compliments and supportive comments I’ve heard over the years, the authors who trusted me to shepherd their work, my friends who were understanding when editing deadlines often cut into my social life, my parents, and lastly The Academy for this great honor.  Well, maybe the Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences had nothing to do with this.  
I leave The Journal behind in the hands of some very capable people, who are working in ways to expand The Journal into new areas even further.  I hope they’ll continue to amaze you.  I believe they will.

Farewell.

Joshua Schwartz
Editor-in-Chief 
 
 
05/13/14
Category: 112 - Definiteness   
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Packard, No. 2013-1204 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 2014).
IssueThis case raises an important question: what standard for indefiniteness should the U.S. Patent and Trade- mark Office (“USPTO”) apply to pre-issuance claims? The parties point to no case in which we previously have addressed this question.
In re Packard at *2.
HoldingWe conclude that, when the USPTO has initially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or other- wise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a satisfactory response, the USPTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the statutory requirements of § 112(b). The satisfactory response by the applicant can take the form of a modification of the language identified as unclear, a separate definition of the unclear language, or, in an appropriate case, a persuasive explanation for the record of why the language at issue is not actually unclear.
Id. at *7.
 
 
 
 
05/12/14
Category: Infringement  
 
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
 
05/08/14
Category: 101 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
 
TitleIn re Roslin Inst. (Edinburgh), No. 13-1407 (Fed. Cir. May 8, 2014).
IssueWhile Roslin does not dispute that the donor sheep whose genetic material was used to create Dolly could not be patented, Roslin contends that copies (clones) are eligible for protection because they are “the product of human ingenuity” and “not nature’s handiwork, but [their] own.” [...]. Roslin argues that such copies are either compositions of matter or manufactures within the scope of § 101 [because of phenotypic and mitochondrial differences between the original and the clone].
In re Roslin Inst. at *7 (internal citations omitted, text added).
HoldingDolly herself is an exact genetic replica of another sheep and does not possess “markedly different characteristics from any [farm animals] found in nature.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 [...] (stating that “the clones are genetic copies”). Dolly’s genetic identity to her donor parent renders her unpatentable [because of it is indistinguishable from a natural occuring sheep, and because the asserted phenotypic and mitochondrial differences between the clone and the original are not claimed].
Id. (some citations omited; text added).
 
 
 
 
05/07/14
Category: 112 - Definiteness  
 
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
 
 
05/07/14
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor  
 
TitleNissim Corp. v. Clearplay, Inc., 2013-1429 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14,2014) (non-precedential).
Issue[Can] a party can waive review of [a] discretionary [non-jurisdictional] decision[?] [...] [Are] interlocutory rulings [...] the basis for collateral estoppel[?]
Nissim at *3-4.
Holding[Appeallate courts] may only review final judgments. Because Nissim explicitly waived its right to challenge the only final judgment properly on appeal [since interlocutory rulings are not final judgments], we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Id. at *2 (text added).
 
05/07/14
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor 
 
TitleMedtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., Nos. 2011-1313, 1372 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues[1] With respect to literal infringement the issue is . . . whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Berger’s report lacked foundation sufficient to deem him a reliable infringement expert." Medtronic at *3. [2] "With respect to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, [the issue is again whether] Berger's opinion was unreliable." Id. at *4.
Holding
[1] "Concluding that Dr. Berger was an unreliable infringement expert on this record was not an abuse of discretion."
Id. at *4.
[2] "Having excluded Dr. Berger's opinion, the district court was correct to include that MFV failed to prove infringement of the doctrine of equivalents by a preponderance of the evidence"
Id. at *4-5.
 
 
Contributor Note
This case is on remand from the SCOTUS. The SCOTUS opinion is available here.
 
 
 
05/01/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor
 
TitleUnited Video Properties, Inc. v. Amazon.com, No. 2013-1396 (Fed. Cir. April 8, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue
[1] [Does] removing “Internet delivered data” [from the disputed claim] during prosecution in response to the PTO examiner’s written description rejection, act as a clear disavowal of the [claimed] data feed being delivered to the users via the Internet[?] United Video Properties at *7 (text added).
[2] [W]hether [the term "schedules"] limited the interactive program guide to displaying current and “forward-looking” programs.
Id. at *5 (text added).
Holdings
[1] We do not rely on the prosecution history to construe the meaning of the claim to be narrower than it would otherwise be unless a patentee limited or surrendered claim scope through a clear and unmistakable disavowal.
Id. at *7.
[2] The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning that a term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art after reviewing the intrinsic record at the time of the invention. [...] The intrinsic record includes the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history.
Id. at *9 (text added, internal citation omitted).
 
 
 
04/30/14
Category: Damages 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleOctane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184 (April 29, 2014).
IssueSection 285 of the Patent Act authorizes a district court to award attorney’s fees in patent litigation. It provides, in its entirety, that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” […] In Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Du­ tailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F. 3d 1378 (2005), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “[a] case may be deemed exceptional” under §285 only in two limited circumstances: “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” or when the litigation is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” […] The question before us is whether the Brooks Furniture framework is consistent with the statutory text.
Octane Fitness, LLC at *1 (internal citations omitted).
HoldingWe hold, then, that an “exceptional” case is simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated. District courts may determine whether a case is “exceptional” in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at *7-8.
 
 
 
Editor's Notes
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Octane Fitness v. Icon Health & Fitnes by clicking here.
 
 
04/30/14
Category: Damages 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleHighmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Syst., Inc., No. 12-1163 (April 29, 2014).
IssueWe granted certiorari to determine whether an appellate court should accord deference to a district court’s determination that litigation is “objectively baseless.”
Highmark, Inc. at *1.
HoldingWe therefore hold that an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s §285 determination. Although questions of law may in some cases be relevant to the §285 inquiry, that inquiry generally is, at heart, “rooted in factual determinations,”
Id. at *5.
 
 
 
Editor's Notes
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of oral arguments in Highmark v. Allcare Health by clicking here.
 
 
04/29/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC, Misc. No. 2014-109 (Fed. Cir. April 24, 2014).
IssueIn November 2013, Dominion filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus in this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, challenging the Director’s non-institution [of an inter partes review] decision directly in this court.
In re Dominion Dealer Solutions, LLC at *3 (text added).
Holding[Since an inter partes review challenger may not appeal non-institution decision of the PTAB,] Dominion has no “clear and indisputable” right to challenge a non- institution decision directly in this court, including by way of mandamus.
Id. at *4 (text added).
 
04/28/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Chaganti, No. 2013-1372 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue
[1] "The parties dispute whether Manolis[, U.S. Patent No. 7,243,079 (Manolis),] is analogous art."
In re Chaganti at *5.
[2] "[T]he Board found that Glassman does not teach away from the claimed invention. Mr. Chaganti argues that the Board's finding lacks substantial evidence [and] contends that Glassman's statement that existing lock servers are undesirable on an open network teaches away from using existing lock server architectures to provide controlled access to copyrighted material on an open network."
Id. at *5-6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
[3] "Mr. Chaganti argues that the Board erred by failing to articulate th[e] reason[ to combine Manolis with Glassman, U.S. Patent No. 6,453,305 (Glassman)]. He contends that the Board's reason to combine [...] was motivated by hindsight bias[ and] that the Board erred by failing to make factual findings with respect to the ordinary skill in the field of the invention."
Id. at *6-7.
[4] "Mr. Chaganti [...] argues [(a)] that Glassman does not examine license information to determine [a number] N [of authorized concurrent users], as required by claim 48[; (b)] that Glassman does not disclose the step of receiving licensing information indicating that the license is for access of information for a predetermined time . . . as required by claim 49[; and (c)] that Glassman does not disclose the step of determining a time period [...] during which the copyright-protected information object may be accessed as required by dependent claim 50. With respect to claims 51, and 57-60, Mr. Chaganti seems to argue that the Board misconstrued the terms 'formatting,' formatter,' and 'format.'"
Id. at *8.
Holding
[1] "We agree with the PTO that Manolis is analogous art [because both Manolis and the claimed invention are directed to the controlled distribution of content via the Internet]."
In re Chaganti at *5 (text added).
[2] "While Glassman describes the then-existing lock servers as 'undesirable,' we disagree that this constitutes a teaching away from mechanisms for controlling Internet access to copyrighted materials."
Id. at *6.
[3] "The Board found that a person of ordinary skill would have had a reason to use the online print service of Manolis to provide licensed access to copyrighted images in order to provide account users with the ability to control access to their copyrighted images while at the same time providing concurrent access to the images as suggested by Glassman [...]. Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding."
Id. at *7 (citations, interal quotation marks, and alteration markings omitted).
[4] "We agree with the PTO that substantial evidence supports the Board's findings that the combination of Manolis and Glassman discloses each limitation of dependent claims 48-50, 51, and 57-60."
Id. at *9.
 
 
 
04/28/14
Category: Copyright
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
04/27/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
Titlee2Interactive, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network, Inc., No. 2013-1151 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 12, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue The central issue in this appeal is whether the asserted claims [of U.S. Pat. No. 7,578,439 (the '439 patent)] require using the recited “terminal identifier” for determining if the terminal is authorized to make the requested transaction. 
e2interactive at *3 (text added).
HoldingWe hold that through clear and unmistakable disclaimer, InComm[,] [which includes e2Interactive,] limited the scope of the asserted claims to require use of the terminal identifier for determining if a terminal is authorized to make the requested transaction.
Id. at *7.


 
04/24/14
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleSt. Jude Medical v. Volcano Corp., No. 2014-1183 (Fed. Cir. April 24, 2014).
IssueSt. Jude has appealed the Director’s decision not to institute an inter partes review, asserting that this court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295 and that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) does not bar this court’s immediate review of the Director’s decision.
St. Jude Medical at *4.
HoldingWe hold that we may not hear St. Jude’s appeal from the Director’s denial of the petition for inter partes review. We base that conclusion on the structure of the inter partes review provisions [which only permit appeal of written decisions], on the language of section 314(d) within that structure [which distinguishes the standard for conducting a review from the standard for issuing a ‘written decision’], and on our jurisdictional statute read in light of those provisions [which permit appeal only of 'instituted' reviews].
Id. at *4 (text added).
 
04/23/14
Category: Double Patenting 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
  
TitleGilead Sciences, Inc. v. NATCO Pharma Ltd., No. 2013-1418 (Fed. Cir. April 22, 2014).
Issue[W]hether a later-issued patent can serve as a double patenting reference for an earlier-issued patent if the later one expires first.
Gilead Sciences, Inc. at *10.
HoldingWe […] hold that an earlier-expiring patent can qualify as an obviousness-type double patenting reference for a later-expiring patent under the circumstances here [where the ’483 patent and the ‘375 patent have substantially similar specifications, but are not related to each other (e.g., divisional, continuation, CIP)]. In cases where such obviousness-type double patenting is present, a terminal disclaimer can preserve the validity of the later-expiring patent by aligning its expiration date with that of the earlier-expiring patent. That disclaimer will most effectively enforce the fundamental right of the public to use the invention claimed in the earlier-expiring patent and all obvious modifications of it after that patent’s term expires.
Id. at *16 (text added).
 
04/22/14
Category: 103  
 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleSanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH v. Glenmark Pharma. Inc., No. 2012-1489 (Fed. Cir. April 21, 2014).
Issues
[Obviousness] Glenmark argues that the verdict cannot stand, as a matter of law, on the premise that if a combination of classes of components is already known, all selections within such classes are obvious to try, as a matter of law. Glenmark argues that it is irrelevant that the combination is ultimately found to have unpredicted or superior properties if those properties, though unknown in the prior art, could be attributed to one of the prior art components of the combination.
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMBH at *6-7.
[Spoliation/Jury Instructions] Glenmark argues that the district court’s instruction was improper and prejudicial […] for the statement that prejudice occurs when “there is a reasonable possibility” that the error affected the result. Glenmark argues that the Plaintiffs did not show that any deleted emails contained relevant evidence [pertaining litigation of the ANDA generic drug].
Id. at *13 (text added, internal citations omitted).
Holdings
[Obviousness] [Because in the medical arts potential solutions are less likely to be genuinely predictable, as compared with other arts such as the mechanical devices,] [t]he jury could reasonably have relied on the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ expert, that persons skilled in the art in 1986 would not have predicted the longer-lasting hypertension control demonstrated by the double-ring structures of quinapril and trandolapril in combination with calcium antagonists, because of the widespread belief that double-ring inhibitors would not fit the pocket structure of the ACE.
Id. at 11 (text added).
[Spoliation/Jury Instructions] The destroyed records were from the period that was acknowledged to include discussion of the generic drug, marketing in the United States, preparation of the ANDA, and the Paragraph IV Certification challenging the patent. Glenmark did not negate the reasonable inference that the destroyed emails related to relevant issues. […] Absent any reasonable negation of this inference, the district court’s finding that the documents were likely to be relevant was not clearly erroneous, and informing the jury of the destruction program was not an abuse of discretion. […].
Id. at *14-15 (internal citations omitted).
 
04/17/14
Category: 112 - Means Plus  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleElcommerce.com v. SAP AG, No. 2011-1369 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24,2014).
IssueSAP argued [...] that the means-plus-function terms in [U.S. Patent No. 6,947,903 ("the ’903 patent")] do not have supporting “structure or acts” in the specification, [and, therefore,] SAP could satisfy its burden on indefiniteness without expert testimony or other evidence of the existing knowledge in the field of the invention. SAP urged that Federal Circuit precedent does “not require” such evidence, citing [a prior case stating] that “the testimony of one of skill in the art cannot supplant the total absence of structure from the specification.”
Elcommerce.com at *20-21 (text added, internal citations omitted).
HoldingsWithout evidence, ordinarily neither the district court nor this court can decide whether, for a specific function, the description in the specification is adequate from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. We do not of course hold that expert testimony will always be needed for every situation; but we do hold that there is no Federal Circuit or other prohibition on such expertise.
Id. at *29 (citation removed).
 
 
 
 
04/16/14

Category: 112 - Definiteness 

 

 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor

TitleChicago Bd. Options Exch, Inc. v. Int'l Secs. Exch., LLC, No. 2013-1326 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2014)
Issue
[1] [a] Whether "the district court erred by 'holding that' Hybrid is the accused product and 'precluding [International Securities Exchange )]ISE[)] from accusing CBOEdirect of infringement,'" Chicago Bd. Options Exch. at *9 (text added), and [b] whether "the district court improperly added additional limitations to [the Federal Circuit's] construction of 'automated exchange' [...] [thereby] violat[ing] the mandate rule," id. at *10-11 (text added).
[2] Whether "the district court [correctly] found that claim 2 was indefinite because the specification did not disclose a step-by-step algorithm for performing the claimed function." Id. at *12 (text added).
Holding
[1] [a] "[T]he court did not preclude ISE from accusing CBOEdirect of infringing. Rather, it expressly invited ISE to show that CBOEdirect was independent of the open-outcry aspects of Hybrid . . . ," id. at *10, and [b] "because this factual issue [i.e., whether the two systems were integrated or separate] was unresolved in the previous appeal, the trial court did not violate the mandate rule by allowing this unresolved issue to go to the jury," id. at *11 (text added).
[2] "The district court erred in inding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the specification did not disclose sufficient structure such that a person of ordinary skill in the art would know how to match on a pro rata basis. While it is true that the specification also discusses pro rata allocating, this does not detract from the disclosure of pro rata matching such that claim 2 is indefinite." Id. at *15.

 

 

04/15/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
 By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleCISCO Sys., Inc. v. Lee, No. 2012-1513, -1514, -1297 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (nonprecedential).
Issues
[1a] [Regarding the construction of "networks",] Teles argues packet-switched network and the line-switching network [of Claim 68] must be “two independent and distinct networks” … [and that the Board’s holding of the D and B channels of a single ISBN network cannot constitute packet- and line-switching networks… because the D and B channels are part of the same network].
Cisco, at *11-12 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[1b] Teles argues the Board should have construed both [“telephone call” and “data transfer with real-time properties”] to mean “end-terminal-to-end-terminal communications connections with a communications time delay of less than 0.5 seconds.”
Id. at *14(text added, internal citations omitted).
[2] [Teles] further argues the Board improperly failed to interpret the terms “control signal” and “communications connection.”
Id. at *10(text added).
[3] Claim 91 and 104 … add the limitation of “a multiplexer device for multiplexing data of several origin end terminals over a single line connection through the line-switching network.” … Cisco argues claims 91 and 104 are anticipated by Focsaneanu, and would have been obvious over Foxsaneanu, Jonas (or Yoshida), and Lucent. With respect to anticipation, Cisco argues Focsaneanu discloses changing-over between packet and line switching during an active transmission, and that the Board lacked substantial evidence in finding otherwise.
Id. at *19-20.
Holdings
[1a] Although “ISBNs are conventionally known as line-switched networks,” the Board correctly determined that “the networks in the instant claims” can “be read onto an ISBN under a broadest reasonable interpretation.” This court therefore affirms that the claimed packet-switching network and line-switching network includes a single telecommunications network with multiple channels, such as an ISBN network [because the specification does not disclose that two separate networks are required].
Cisco, at *13 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[1b] Teles is therefore incorrect that the broadest reasonable interpretation of “telephone call” and “real-time” data transfer requires a specific time delay limit [because the specification does not mention a 0.5 second time delay in the context of line switching]. See Toshiba Corp., v. Imation Corp., 681 F. 3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“We do not read limitations form the specification into claims.”). This court affirms the Board’s construction of the terms as any “structure capable of sustaining a telephone call or providing real-time properties.”
Id. at *14-15 (text added. Internal citations omitted).
[2] Contrary to Teles’s argument [regarding “control signal” and “communications connection”], the Board had no obligation to consider claim construction challenges that were not actually raised before it. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.67(c)(1)(vii).
Id. at *16 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[3] Because the Board’s improper limitation of the claimed multiplexer was its sole reason for finding claims 91 and 103 not obvious, the Board’s allowance of claims 91 and 104 is reversed. Once the proper scope of claim 91 and 104’s multiplexer is understood, it is apparent that including such a multiplexer in the combination of Focsaneanu, Lucent, and inter alia, Jonas, is no more than “the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
Id. at *22 (footnote omitted).
 
04/11/14
Category: 103  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor    
 
TitleHoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., No. 2013-1128, -1161, -1162, -1163, -1164 (April 11, 2014).
IssueThe issue in this case is whether it would have been obvious at the time of invention to select a once monthly oral dosing regimen of ibandronate to treat osteoporosis and to set that dose at 150 mg [based on prior art references teaching a daily dosage amount].
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. at *9 (text added).
Holding[T]he prior art pointed to a monthly treatment of 150 mg of ibandronate. At the very least, the 150 mg dose was obvious to try: There was a need to solve the problem of patient compliance by looking to less-frequent dosing regimens. And, based on Ravn and Daifotis, in light of Riis’s total-dose concept [in which a daily dosage over a month may be the equivalent of a single monthly dosage], there were only a “finite number of identified, predictable solutions.” [...] Id. at *13 (internal citations omitted, text added).



 
04/09/14
Category: Enablement
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Hoffmann, No. 2013-1657 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 25, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issue

Eugene Hoffmann and David Lund appeal the [lack of enablment] rejection of their application for a patent on a “[t]ropical hurricane control system.” In re Hoffmann at *2.

Holding

[Hoffmann and Lund have not provided] enough information to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the method without undue experimentation [because of unclear 'preliminary calculations' and a statement requireing "further experimentation" concerning claimed subject matter]. 
Id. at *5 (text added).

 
 
 
04/08/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Teles AG Informatinstechnologien, No. 2012-1297 (Fed. Cir. April 4, 2014).
Issues
[1] While we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal pursuant to § 1295(a)(1), the question is whether we also have jurisdiction to review the Board’s action [if the district court lacked jurisdiction and improperly dismissed the case].
In re Teles AG Informatinstechnologien at *3 (text added).
[2] In 1999, Congress amended § 145 and related provisions [authorizing patent applicants to challenge the Board’s adverse examination decisions in district court instead of directly appealing to the CAFC]. This case raises the question of whether § 145 civil actions remained available to patent owners seeking to challenge adverse reexamination decisions after Congress amended the statute in 1999 and before 2011 [AIA], when Congress amended the statute to clarify that § 145 review was not available to patent owners.
Id. at *3 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [Because of the different language in § 145 concerning appeals by patent owners versus patent applicants,] [w]e […] hold that the 1999 amendments eliminated the right of patent owners to secure review under § 145, and affirm that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the § 145 action.
Id. at *14 (text added).
[2] [T]he statutory deadline for filing an appeal to this court had passed, and no evidence suggested bad faith in Teles’ filing with the district court. Under these circumstances, it was in the interest of justice to transfer the case pursuant to §1631, and we “treat [Teles’] petition for review, which was timely filed with the district court, as if it had been properly transferred” to this court rather than dismissed.
Id. at *5.
 
 
 
04/07/14

Category: 101 

 

By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  

 

04/05/14

The Governors of the Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society are pleased to announce a writing competition open to all currently enrolled JD and LLM students. Applicants are invited to submit a paper on any topical issue regarding U.S. or international intellectual property law. Selected entries will appear in the Journal’s upcoming electronic edition.

04/02/14
Category: Design Patents 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleMRC Innovations, Inc. v. Hunter MFG., LLP, No. 2013-1433 (Fed. Cir. April 2, 2014).
Issues
[1: Primary Reference] If the district court had translated the claimed design into a verbal description as required by High Point, MRC insists, it would have concluded that neither the Eagles jersey nor any other prior art reference contained design characteristics that were “basically the same” as the claimed design.
MRC Innovations, Inc. at *7.
[2: Secondary References] MRC argues that the district court erred by failing to explain why a skilled artisan would have chosen to incorporate those features of the V2 and Sporty K9 jerseys with the [primary reference] Eagles jersey [because the prior art included substantial differences and that said differences were not de minimis].
Id. at *11 (text added).
Holdings
[1: Primary Reference] [Although the district court did not expressly translate the claimed design into a verbal description], High Point makes clear that the purpose of requiring district courts to describe the claimed design in words is so that the parties and appellate courts can discern the trial court’s reasoning in identifying a primary reference. […] It is entirely clear from the district court’s opinion what it considered to be the relevant design characteristics of the ’488 patented design.
Id. at *7-8 (text added).
[2: Secondary References] [Because (1) the secondary references were so similar to the primary reference that that they could serve as the primary reference themselves, and (2) adding ornamental surge stitching on top of a preexisting seam is a de minimis change,] [w]e […] agree that those references were “so related” to the Eagles jersey that the striking similarity in appearance across all three jerseys would have motivated a skilled designer to combine features from one with features of another.
Id. at *13.
 
 
04/01/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleSenju Pharma. Co. v. Apotex Inc., No. 2013-1027 (Fed. Cir. March 31, 2014).
IssueThis is a patent case calling on us to consider the application of claim preclusion doctrine (res judicata) to a second suit on the same patent based on amended claims resulting from a reexamination of the patent.
Senju Pharma. Co. at *2.
HoldingWe hold that, in the absence of a clear showing that such a material difference in fact exists in a disputed patentable reexamination claim, it can be assumed that the reexamined claims will be a subset of the original claims and that no new cause of action will be created. This applies whether the judgment in the original suit was based on invalidity of the claims or simply on non-infringement. We conclude […] that the claims in this case that emerged from reexamination do not create a new cause of action that did not exist before.
Id. at *15.
 
 
 
 
03/30/14
Category: ITC   
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor   
 
TitleMotorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC, No. 2012-1666 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues[Whether the] Commission [was supported by substantial evidence when it] found that [1] the accused mobile devices imported and sold by Apple did not infringe claim 12 of Motorola’s U.S. Patent No. 6,272,333 (“’333 patent”) and that [2] Motorola failed to establish the technical prong of the domestic industry requirement.
Motorola at *2-3 (text added).
Holdings
[1] Motorola’s [infringement] argument fails because Motorola has not identified a single change in accessibility in the accused Apple devices that causes both an update to the application registry and a communication of the change in accessibility to the fixed portion of the wireless network as required by the asserted claim.
Id. at *7 (text added).
[2] Motorola’s Droid 2 ha[s] the same relevant features as the corresponding operations on the accused Apple devices. As with infringement, Motorola’s arguments [are] inconsistent with the claim’s requirements that there be at least one change that alone triggers both an update to the application registry and for that specific change to be communicated to the fixed portion of the network.
Id. at * 10-11 (footnotes removed, text added).
 
 
03/28/14
Category: Infringement   
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor  
 
TitlePfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Nos. 2012-1576, -1601, -1602, -1603, -1604, -1605, -1607 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 6, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues"Appellants[] appeal from a final judgment . . . that found various claims of the asserted patents infringed and from the court's holdings regarding enablement, written description, and obviousness." Pfizer at *4 (citations omitted). "Due to its scope and the breadth of the injunction entered, the disposition of this appeal rests entirely on a single claim: claim 2 of [U.S. Patent No. 6,197,819 (the ']'819 patent[')]." Id. at *5. At issue are (1) whether "the district court [correctly] construed the term '4-amino-3-(2-methylpropyl) butanoic acid' to mean 'the chemical compound 4-amino-3-(2-methylpropyl) butanoic acid,' without limitationas to stereochemical form," Pfizer at *6; and (2) whether "claim 2 is not invalid for lack of [a] enablement, [b] insufficient written description, or [c] obviousness," Id. at *7.
Holdings
(1) "We perceive no error in the district court's construction. . . . The patent specification discusses 4-amino-3-(2-methylpropyl) butanoic acid [hereinafter 3-isobutylGABA] as the 'preferred compound' generally and without regard to its stereochemistry. The specification makes clear that the patentee expressly used the word 'racemate,' 'racemic,' or its standard prefix (R, S) to refer to the chiral compound's racemate. Likewise, the patentee used standard prefixes (R) or (S) to designate a particular enantiomer of the compound. Because the patentee included no such references or prefixes in claim 2, it should not be so limited." Pfizer at *9 (citations omitted).
(2)(a) "In view of the finding that enantiomer separation methods are well-known and routine to a person of ordinary skill, we agree with the district court that the inventors were not required to provide a detailed recipe for preparing every conceivable permutation of the compound the invented to be entitled to a claim covering that compound. . . . [C]laim 2 satisfies the requirements under § 112(a) because the '692 application's disclosure, coupled with the methods for synthesis and resolution that were found to be well-known and routine in the art, is sufficiently enabling." Id. at *12 (citations omitted).
(2)(b) "[W]ritten description does not require inventors . . . to reduce to practice and be in physical possession of every species . . . of a genus . . . claim. [A]n application satisfies the written description requirement when it details 'relevant identifying characteristics' such that the compound can be distinguished from other compounds. Here, the '692 application not only disclosed the structure of 3-isobutylGABA as the preferred embodiment of the invention, but also set forth in vitro and in vivo data for the compound, and described a method of synthesizing the compound. [S]uch a description is sufficient for persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that the inventor invented what is claimed." Id. at *14 (citations omitted).
(2)(c) "The district court did not err in finding that Appellants failed to establish that gabapentin or 3-isopropylGABA would have been selected as lead compounds, or that Appellants failed to set forth evidence identifying the necessary teachings for a skilled artisan to modify alkyl groups at GABA's 3-position to improve anticonvulsant activity. Because we agree with the district court that the Appellants failed to prove that claim 2 would have been prima facie obvious over the asserted prior art compounds, we need not address the court's findings regarding secondary considerations of nonobviousness." Id. at *20 (citations omitted).
 
 
03/26/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleStoneEagle Services, LLC v. Gillman, No. 2013-1248 (Fed. Cir. March 26, 2014).
Issue[Did] the district court [lack] subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit because there was no actual controversy regarding StoneEagle’s inventorship claim—the sole claim in StoneEagle’s original complaint arising under federal law [?]
StoneEagle Services, LLC at *4.
HoldingAs StoneEagle’s only factual allegations concerning inventorship are that Gillman authored the patent application, the complaint, viewed in its totality, has not alleged a controversy over inventorship that satisfies Article III. [...] Additionally, StoneEagle did not allege any other facts existing at the time this com- plaint was filed which would give rise to a federal ques- tion or other cause of action properly before a federal court. […] For these reasons, the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. […]
Id. at *7 (internal citations omitted).
 
 
 
 
 
03/25/14
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleBrain Life, LLC v. Elekta Inc., No. 2013-1239 (Fed. Cir. March 24, 2014).
Issues
[1: Claim Preclusion] First, Brain Life contends that, because the asserted claim limitations in this suit differ from the asserted claims in the MIDCO suit, claim preclusion is inapplicable.
Brain Life, LLC at *9.
[2: Claim Preclusion] Next, Brain Life contends that, because the trial court in the MIDCO Litigation dismissed the method claims without prejudice, Supreme Court precedent counsels that those claims are not subject to res judicata. Brain Life contends that, when a claim is dismissed without prejudice, a party can sue again on the same claim, against the same defendant, in the same court.
Id. at *9-10.
[3: Issue Preclusion and Kessler Doctrine] Finally, Brain Life argues that Elekta’s ERGO++ product did not exist until after the first suit reached final judgment. Because that product did not exist, Brain Life contends that it could not have been accused in the MIDCO Litigation and that neither claim nor issue preclusion could apply to that product.
Id. at *10.
Holdings
[1: Claim Preclusion] [The] principles [of claim preclusion] bar the assertion of infringement of either the method or system claims to the extent the alleged acts of infringement predate the final judgment in the MIDCO Litigation [but not to acts of infringement after the MIDCO litigation].
Id. at *11 (text added).
[2: Claim Preclusion] [T]o the extent Brain Life’s allegations of infringement are directed to products created and, most importantly, acts of alleged infringement occurring after entry of the final judgment in the MIDCO Litigation, those claims are not barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion [because under the principles of res judicata, a party could not assert claims for any conduct that has not taken place yet].
Id. at *13 (text added).
[3: Issue Preclusion and Kessler Doctrine] [Because] Elekta only acquired the ERGO++ product after the MIDCO Litigation was finalized [...], the ERGO++ has never acquired the status of a noninfringing device in connection with the ’684 patent. [Therefore] neither claim preclusion, issue preclusion, nor the Kessler Doctrine stand as a bar to Brain Life’s current allegations of infringement regarding the ERGO++.
Id. at *22 (text added).
 
 
 
03/24/14
Category: 103  
 
 
 
 By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Enhanced Security Research, LLC, No. 2013-1114 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2014).
Issues
[1] [Obviousness] With respect to obviousness, the critical issue is whether the Manual in combination with Liepins teaches a person of ordinary skill in the art how to assess the severity of an attempted security breach and then block that attempted breach based on its severity. Enhanced Security Research, LLC at *8 (text added).
[2] [Prior Art] [The second issue is that Enhanced Secuirty Research] contends that the [NetStalker] Manual is not prior art. Id. at *6. (text added)
Holdings[1] [Obviousness] [W]e hold that the examiner and Board properly treated the NetStalker Manual as publically-available prior art and, having done so, correctly concluded that the teachings of the Manual and Liepins render the amended ’236 patent claims at issue obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103. [2] [Prior Art] We further hold that ESR has failed to demonstrate the requisite attorney diligence under Rule 131, and, therefore, the ’236 patent does not predate the publication date of the Manual. Id. at *23 (text added).
 
 
03/23/14
Category: Civil Procedure   
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor  
 
TitleHemphill v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2013-1503 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2014) (non-precedential).
IssuesAllegra Hemphill appeals from two decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. [1] The district court denied Hemphill’s Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), in which she sought to have the court set aside its January 2013 order dismissing Hemphill’s complaint for failure to state a claim. [2] The district court also granted defendant Johnson & Johnson’s motion for sanctions under Rule 11(b), barring Hemphill from filing future patent infringement actions against Johnson & Johnson without first obtaining leave of the district court. Hemphill at *2 (text added).
Holding[1] Hemphill has not shown any grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) [because their patent expired more than six years ago], and we affirm the district court’s decision. . . . [2] We have reviewed the record and find that the district court’s analysis complies with [the guidelines for anti-filing injunctions], particularly in light of Hemphill’s multiple unmeritorious filings against J&J and others. Hemphill at *4 (text added).
 
 
 
03/20/14
Category: Infringement   
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleAlcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Lab., Inc., No. 2012-1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. March 18, 2014).
Issues
[1: infringement] Alcon argues that the district court erred in finding that Barr’s ANDA product did not infringe the asserted claims of Alcon’s ’287 and ’062 patents because its testing of travoprost formulations containing the same PECO [polyethoxylated castor oil] in the same concentration as Barr’s proposed generic product demonstrated that the PECO added to Barr’s composition enhances the stability of the prostaglandin.
Alcon Research at *7 (text added).
[2: enablement] Alcon argues that the district court erred in holding the asserted claims of the ’287 and ’062 patents invalid for lack of enablement because it only weighed the breadth of the claims against the detail of the patent disclosures […] that Barr presented no evidence that any experimentation would be required for a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention as claimed.
Id. at *11.
[3: written description] Barr [argues] that the claims “flunk the written description requirement” because they encompass “a method for enhancing the chemical stability of innumerable prostaglandins by adding to them PECO in an endless number of combinations and concentrations” and there- fore are not precise and “overreach” the scope of the patent disclosures.
Id. at *15 (text added).
Holdings
[1: infringement] We thus conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the data in Alcon’s Table 7 had no bearing on whether Barr’s proposed generic product infringed Alcon’s patents. The formulations tested in Alcon’s stability study were meaningfully different from the product described in Barr’s ANDA and thus provided no basis from which to draw any reliable inferences regarding whether the PECO in Barr’s composition would chemically stabilize the prostaglandin.
Id. at *10.
[2: enablement] The district court erred here because its enablement analysis did not address that determinative question: Barr failed to make the threshold showing that any experimentation is necessary to practice the claimed methods, i.e., to use PECO to enhance the stability of a prostaglandin given the disclosures of Alcon’s ’287 and ’062 patents. Instead, the district court’s holding rested on its finding that the full scope of the claims was not enabled after applying the Wands factors as if they were a generalized test for deciding whether a patent disclosure is sufficiently detailed to support a broad claim.
Id. at *12.
[3: written description] [T]he ’287 and ’062 patent disclosures demonstrate that the inventors possessed the claimed invention: they conceived of and described their invention at the time the respective original patent applications were filed, including the idea that adding PECO would enhance the chemical stability of prostaglandins across a range of various formulation parameters as cited by the district court. […] That is all that the written description requirement demands.
Id. at *17 (internal citations omitted).
 
 
 
 
 
03/19/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor  
 
TitleApple Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1338 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 2013).
IssueThe Federal Circuit is reviewing (1-2) whether the ITC properly determined that U.S. Patent No. 7,663,607 (the “‘607 Patent”) was obvious in view of the prior art and whether the ITC properly determined that the ‘607 Patent was anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 7,372,455 (“Perski ‘455”), and (3) whether the ITC properly determined that Motorola did not infringe U.S. Patent No. 7,812,828 (the “‘828 Patent”).
Holding
(1-2) “[S]ubstantial evidence supports the ITC’s finding that Perski ‘455 anticipates claims 1-7 of the ‘607 patent. The ITC’s decision that Perski ‘455 anticipates claim 10, however, lacks substantial evidence.” Apple at *10. “[T]he ITC fact findings regarding the scope and content of the prior art . . . are supported by substantial evidence[, but] remand so the ITC can consider that evidence in conjunction with the evidence of secondary considerations [...].” Id. at *17-18.
(3) “[T]he ITC erroneously construed the ‘mathematically fitting an ellipse’ limitation [...].” Id. at *19. “[The Federal Circuit] vacate[s] [...] and remand[s] the case to the ITC to consider in the first instance whether the accused products infringe under the correction construction [...].” Id. at *20.
 
03/17/14
Category: Damages
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleTherasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. 2012-1504 (Fed. Cir. March 12, 2014).
Issues
[1] Becton and Nova first contend that they are entitled to itemized appellate and remand fees because the district court’s August 21, 2008 exceptional case finding “permeated” the appeal and remand phases. They argue that these additional fees and costs should receive treatment independent of those awarded at the trial phase.
Therasense at *5.
[2] As an alternative theory, Becton and Nova assert that Abbott’s appeal and petition for rehearing en banc qualify independently as exceptional circumstances [that justify additional itemized appellate and remand fees].
Id. at *6 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [T]he district court did not err in denying Becton and Nova’s motion for additional fees predicated on the vacated determination of inequitable conduct [because the district court’s pre-existing inequitable conduct ruling was not “upheld on appeal” as required by its district court fee order].
Id. at *6 (text added).
[2] Becton and Nova present zero evidence of bad faith. Expressions of outrage and suspicion in the form of attorney argument are not evidence of bad faith. Nor does the mere act of pursuing appellate review—available as a matter of right and frequently necessary to preserve future rights of appeal—by itself suggest an abuse of the legal system.
Id. at *7.
 
03/16/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleVederi, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2013-1057, -1296 (Fed. Cir. March 14, 2014).
IssueVederi stated that the limitation “depicting views of objects . . . the views being substantially elevations of objects” means “front or side views of objects.” Google contended that the limitation means “vertical flat (as opposed to curved or spherical) depictions of front or side views.”
Vederi at *9.
HoldingHaving analyzed the claims, the specification and the prosecution history [which permit a construction broader than flat views], this court concludes that the district court erred in construing “images depicting views of objects in a geographic area, the views being substantially elevations of the objects in the geographic area” as “vertical flat (as opposed to curved or spherical) depictions of front or side views.” To the contrary, the record shows that “views being substantially elevations of the objects” refers to “front and side views of the objects.” Thus, as properly construed, the claims do not exclude curved or spherical images depicting views that are substantially front or side views of the objects in the geographic area.
Vederi at *14 (text added).
 
03/14/14
The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.
  • Title Defense: Creating Consistency in Video Game Title Trademark Law Suzanne Jackiw
  • The PTAB’s Interpretation of the Real Party in Interest and Privy Provisions in the AIA: A Look at the PTAB’s Rulings for Several Fact Scenarios Gregory J. Gonsalves and Kathy Grubbs
  • A New Approach to Combating the Piracy of Intellectual Property: Develop the Rule of Law and Increase the Supply of Legitimate Goods Andrew D. Getsinger
  • The Trajectory of China's Trademark Systems Leading Up to the New Trademark Law Taking Effect in May 2014 Jayanth S. Swamidass and Paul M. Swamidass
  • Keep It American: Preventing Foreign Acquisition of Federally Funded Intellectual PropertyBrice Lauer Biggins
  • A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences Charles L. Gholz
03/13/14
Category: Claim Construction   
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor  
 
TitleSuperior Ind., LLC v. Masaba, Inc., No. 2013-1302 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2014).
Issue“[The District Court’s opinion and order] ”did not explain how the construction of any particular term affected the infringement analysis. [Can Superior appeal claim construction?]” Superior, at *2(text added).
Holding:“Superior expressly reserved the right to challenge the district court’s claim construction on appeal, and does so now. But because it is unclear from the record how the disputed constructions relate to infringement, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for further clarification.” Id. at *2.
 
03/12/14
Category: Civil Procedure  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleDanisco US Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, No. 2013-1214 (March 11, 2014).
IssueThe district court […] dismissed Danisco’s declaratory judgment claims [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction], holding as a matter of law that the facts as alleged did not create a justiciable Article III case or controversy as to Counts 1 and 2. […] The court acknowledged that Novozymes’s ’573 patent presented a substantial risk to Danisco, but found that a justiciable controversy did not exist because Danisco had challenged Novozymes’s ’573 patent on the day that it issued, and thus that Danisco’s action “was filed prior to the time Novozymes took, or even could have taken, any affirmative action to enforce its patent rights.” […]
Danisco US Inc. at *5 (internal citations omitted, text added).
Holding[B]ecause a totality of the circumstances shows that Novozymes’s posturing [(e.g., litigious conduct since 2001)] put Danisco in a position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior, i.e., infringement, or abandoning that which it claims a right to do, i.e., make and sell the RSL products that are the embodiments of its ’240 patent, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Counts 1 and 2 of Danisco’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. […]
Id. at *12 (internal citations omitted).
 
03/11/14
Category: 101 
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor   
 
 
TitleCyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN Interactive Group, Inc., Nos. 2012-1673, -1674 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (non-precedential).
IssueWhether the United States District Court for the District of Delaware properly "found that the subject matter of [U.S. Patent No. 8,019,060] was nothing more than a disembodied concept of data sorting and storage and granted summary judgment of invalidity under [35 U.S.C. ]§ 101[ (2012)]." Cyberfone at *5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Holding"We agree with the district court that the '060 patent claims ineligible subject matter--an abstract idea--and that the patent is invalid under § 101." Id. at *10.
 
 
03/09/14

Category: Civil Procedure 

 

By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 

TitleIn re Apple, Misc. No. 156 (Feb. 27, 2014).
IssueThe question before the court on mandamus is whether there was such a “‘clear’ abuse of discretion” that refusing transfer would produce a “patently erroneous result[,]” [when the requesting party vaguely identifies witnesses and sources of information].
In re Apple at *3 (text added, internal citations omitted).
HoldingBased on the sparse, and general, record before the district court[, including vague identification of witnesses and sources of information], we cannot say “that the facts and circumstances are without any basis for a judgment of discretion.” […]
Id. at *5 (text added, internal citations omitted).

 

03/09/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Barnes & Noble, Misc. No. 162 (Feb. 27, 2014).
IssueBarnes & Noble argued that only Hoyle [B.E. Tech. founder, the plaintiff, and inventor of patent at issue] is located in the Western District of Tennessee, whereas many of the relevant Barnes & Noble witnesses reside in California[…] California is where all of its relevant evidence is located […] [and] many third party witnesses with knowledge about potential prior art are closer to the transferee venue.
In re Barnes & Noble at *2 (text added).
HoldingBarnes & Noble has failed to meet its exacting burden to demonstrate that the district court was clearly and indisputably incorrect in concluding that the case should not have been transferred to the Northern District of California [because the plaintiff B.E. Tech.’s operational presence in the original venue is as equally compelling as Barnes & Noble’s grounds for transfer, and, as such, such evidence is not grounds to reverse the district court’s findings].
Id. at *5 (text added).
 
03/06/14
Category: Antitrust 
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor  
 
TitleCascades Comp. Innovations LLC v. RPX Corp., No. 4:12-cv-01143 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
Issues
[1] Cascades' Section 1 claims require Cascades to allege a plausible conspiracy—in this case, a hub-and-spoke conspiracy in which RPX is the hub and the Manufacturing Defendants are the spokes. Cascades Comp. Innovation at *10.
[2] Defendants further contend that, even if the Court finds a restraint of trade, Cascades has pled no unreasonable restraint of trade [under Section 1]. Id. at *20.
[3] [Cascades' Section 2 claims] must allege [among others] monopsony power in the relevant market. Id. at *25 (text added).
Holdings
[1a] The allegations plausibly describe an invitation to common action [i.e., agreement among the Manufacturing Defendants], and to have RPX coordinate that action. Cascades Comp. Innovations  at *18 (text added).
[1b] [Refraining] from exercising [...] right to negotiate individually [and] deal [...] either through [RPX] or not at all [supports] the inference of a second, "off-the-books" agreement or understanding between each Manufacturing Defendant and RPX. Id. at *19 (text added, citations removed).
[2a] [In view most favorable to Cascades,] settlements by [other RPX members] could support an inference that [Cascade's U.S. Patent No. 7,065,750] was valid and infringed, lends a competitive advantage, and had been driven to sub-competitive prices by the three Manufacturing Defendants' domination of the buyer's market, leading smaller players to capitalize on the market conditions [i.e., restraint on trade] created by the alleged conspiracy. Id. at *20-21 (text added).
[2b] [In alleging an unreasonable restraint on trade the] proper focus of the market analysis in monopsony cases is "the commonality and interchangeability of the buyers, not the commonality or interchangeability of the sellers." Id. at *23.
[3] Nothing in [Cascades' First Amended Complaint ("FAC")] suggests that anyone would or could participate in the "upstream" market for the '750 Patent except for the makers of the Android devices. Id. at *26.
 
 
03/05/14
Category: 102 
 
 
 
 By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor 
 
TitleDey, L.P. v. Sunovion Pharm., Inc., No. 2012-1428 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 2013).
Issue[Whether] Sunovion was entitled to summary judgment of invalidity because Sunovion’s own clinical trial constituted clear and convincing evidence of a third-party public use of Dey’s inventions. Dey, at *8.
Holding[W]e conclude that Sunovion has not shown that it is entitled to summary judgment based on its assertion that its use of formulations meeting the limitations of Dey’s later-issued patents constituted a public use of Dey’s inventions within the meaning of section 102(b). We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment for Sunovion. Id. at *3.
 
03/04/14
Category: 112 - Definiteness 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleAncora Tech., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2013-1378, -1414 (Fed. Cir. March 3, 2014).
Issues
[1] [Relying on examples in the specification and prosecution history], Apple has argued that the term “program” (which is to be verified for authorization under a license) is limited to an application program, i.e., one that relies on an operating system in order to run, thus excluding an operating system itself.
Ancora Tech., Inc. at *4 (text added).
[2] Apple also has argued that the terms “volatile memory” and “non-volatile memory” are indefinite because an example given in the specification is irreconcilable with the ordinary meaning of the terms [which refers to a “hard disk” as volatile memory, although “hard disks” are understood in the art to be non-volatile memory].
Id. at *4 (text added).
Holdings
[1] A claim term should be given its ordinary meaning in the pertinent context, unless the patentee has made clear its adoption of a different definition or otherwise disclaimed that meaning. […] There is no reason in this case to depart from the term’s ordinary meaning [since the specification does not deviate from the ordinary meaning, and statements made during prosecution implicate a specific aspect of the program and are not sufficient to narrow the ordinary meaning of "program" to exclude an operating system].
Ancora Tech., Inc. at *5 (internal citation omitted, text added).
[2] [The specification acknowledges that a “hard disk,” which is generally understood as a non-volatile memory, can also act as a virtual volatile memory source. Therefore,] under the demanding standards for displacing as clear an ordinary meaning as exists in this case, we doubt that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have a reasonable uncertainty about the governing scope of the claims […].
Id. at *12 (text added).
 
03/03/14
Category: Damages
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
03/03/14
Category: Damages
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
02/27/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleStarhome GMBH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 2012-1694 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2014).
IssueOn appeal, Starhome asserts the same construction of “intelligent gateway” that it urged in the district court (“a network element that uses knowledge implemented in databases or the like and application logic to perform its operations”). In support of that construction, Starhome argues that the specification does not require the gateway to be connected to an external network.
Starhome GMBH at *7-8.
HoldingConsidering “gateway” in the context of the claims and specification of the ’487 patent, one of ordinary skill would have understood that the inventors did not depart from the ordinary meaning of “gateway” with their use of the term “intelligent gateway[,” because the specific embodiments discussed in the written description describe structures (e.g., database, data packet switch network), that conform with a consistent definition throughout various technical dictionaries.]
Id. at *11-12.
 
 
 
02/26/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleGlaxoSmithKline, LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., No. 2013-1593, -1594, -1595, -1598 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 24, 2014).
IssueThis appeal presents a single issue: whether, under what is now 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), the written description of the ’467 patent adequately supports the claims to “solvates” of dutasteride[, in the claim recitation, “pharmaceutically acceptable solvate”]. […] The only argument actually developed in the [defendant’s] brief is that there is no adequate description of “solvates,” whether that term is limited to crystalline structures (as Defendants argue) or covers crystalline and non-crystalline structures, produced through reaction with a solvent or precipitation or crystallization from a solution (as the parties understand the district court’s construction).
GlaxoSmithKline, LLC at *7-8 (text added).
HoldingWe conclude that Defendants have not properly presented any other contention in this court, especially given the lack of elaboration on the distinct issues that would be raised by a written- description challenge to the phrase “pharmaceutically acceptable.” On the sole issue properly presented, we reject Defendants’ challenge. Under either the district court’s claim construction or Defendants’ claim construction, the claim term “solvate” refers to a molecular complex defined by structure and by the process of creating it, not by what the molecule does.
Id. at *8.
 
02/25/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleFrans Nooren Asdichtingssystem v. Stopaq Amcorr, Inc., No. 2013-1200 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014).
Issues
[1] [T]he limitation at issue is a claim construction—that “a filler” in [U.S. Patent No. 5,898,044] can contain only “one material.” Frans Nooren at *6 (citations removed, text added).
[2] Second, Amcorr argued, polypropylene in the accused products is not a “filler” at all. Id. at *5 (text added).
Holdings
There has been insufficient exploration in the record, both here and in the district court, of too many questions of apparent relevance to identifying a proper construction of the limitation, which requires, among other things, that the construction itself supply “a meaningfully precise claim scope.” Frans Nooren at *11-12 (citations removed).
[1] We see no basis in the language or specification for limiting “a filler” to “one material.” We have been pointed to nothing about a customary usage of the term itself, and nothing in the specification’s use of it, that excludes from being “a filler” a mixture of two different “materials.” Id. at *7 (citations removed, text omitted).
[2] [The district court] does not state a claim construction of “a filler,” let alone justify a particular construction by addressing the parties’ respective contentions about the term’s meaning through the usual analysis. Id. at *9 (text added).
 
02/21/14
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleLighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips. Elect. N. Amer., Corp., No. 2012-1014 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (en banc).
IssueThe court en banc granted the petition filed by patentee Lighting Ballast Control, in order to reconsider the holding in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) establishing the standard of appellate review of district court decisions concerning the meaning and scope of patent claims—called “claim construction.” Implementing the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (Markman II) [...], this court in Cybor held that patent claim construction receives de novo determination on appeal, that is, review for correctness as a matter of law.
Lighting Ballast Control, LLC at *6.
Holding[W]e apply the principles of stare decisis, and confirm the Cybor standard of de novo review of claim construction, whereby the scope of the patent grant is reviewed as a matter of law. After fifteen years of experience with Cybor, we conclude that the court should retain plenary review of claim construction [...]. The totality of experience has confirmed that Cybor is an effective implementation of Markman II, and that the criteria for departure from stare decisis are not met.
Id. at *7.
 
 
Editor Note
For further insight, check out the Audio Brief of Lighting Ballast Control v. Philips, which condenses oral arguments before the en banc CAFC into 10 minutes.
 
02/19/14
Category: Infringement  
 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleRing & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. Arb Corp., No. 2013-1238 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 19, 2014).
IssueThus, the parties agreed that the outcome of the case would be determined by the resolution of a single legal issue: whether an equivalent is barred under the doctrine of equivalents because it was foreseeable at the time of the patent application. […]
Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. at *3.
HoldingWe conclude that the foreseeability of an equivalent at the time of patenting is not a bar to a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. at *5.
 

02/18/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleButamax Adv. Biofuels LLC v. Gevo, Inc., No. 2013-1342 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2014).
IssueThe primary dispute between the parties concerns whether the claimed KARI must be “NADPH-dependent.” […] [The district court] concluded that in the “state of the art,” the “KARI enzyme known by the EC number 1.1.1.86 was generally understood to be NADPH- dependent.” […] This decision is premised in large part on the district court’s conclusion that the patentees acted as their own lexicographers in defining KARI by reference to EC number 1.1.1.86 and the enzyme’s “use” of NADPH rather than use of NADH or both NADPH and NADH. […]
Butamax Adv. Biofuels LLC at *10 (internal citations omitted, text added).
Holding[The "KARI enzyme" is not “NADPH-dependent,” because (i) the specification’s definition does not exclude the possibility of using additional cofactors, and (ii) the specification’s incorporation of an enzyme classification standard (EC number 1.1.1.86) is not a clear intent to define KARI. Therefore], the term “acetohydroxy acid reductoisomerase” is construed as “an enzyme, whether naturally occurring or otherwise, known by the EC number 1.1.1.86 that catalyzes the conversion of acetolactate to 2,3-dihydroxyisovalerate.”
Id. at *20-21 (text added).
 
02/17/14
Category: Damages
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleCBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Return Path, Inc., No. 2013-1036 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2013).
Issues
[1] Congress changed the language as of October 13, 2008, to encompass electronically stored information as well as information on paper. Section 1920(4) now covers “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed section 1920(4) since it was amended [and the district court in this case interprets new Section 1920(4) as expanding the scope of its previous version].
CBT at *5 (text added).
[2] [Due to the change in language of 28 U.S.C. §1920(4) covering fees from “copies of papers” to “the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case”], what constitutes “making copies” for the purposes of sifting the activities that go into producing electronic documents [In other words, does Section 1920 allow recovery for e-discovery costs?]. Id. at *6 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [W]e see no significance in the change from “copies” to “making copies”, a change that appears to reflect no more than the linguistic aim of using activity-describing phrases (“exemplification,” “making copies”) on both sides of the conjunction in section 1920(4). Id. at *6.
[2] [C]osts incurred in preparing to copy [such as discussions, planning, meetings] are not recoverable. Id. at *14(text added). [Costs of activities that] are part of the large body of discovery obligations, mostly related to the document-review process [are not included by Congress in section 1920(4)]. Id. at *15 (text added).
 
02/13/14
Category: Infringement  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleSpecialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Okla., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9179, (N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011).
Issues
[1] [Does] federal patent law waive tribal sovereign immunity because [35 U.S.C. § 271] is a statute of general applicability[?] Specialty House at *2 (text added).
[2] [Did] the Quapaw Tribe waived any sovereign immunity it possessed in the Tribal-State Gaming Compact Between the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma and the State of Oklahoma[?] Id. at 4 (text added).
Holdings
[1] “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’” Id. at *2 (citation removed).
[2] Patent infringement claims are not claims for “personal injury or property damage” that arose “out of incidents occurring at a facility” and therefore the Gaming Compact does not waive the Tribe’s immunity from such suits. Id. at 4.
 
02/12/14
Category: 102 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleSolvay S.A. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., No. 2012-1660 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
IssueThe question at the heart of this appeal is when an invention conceived by a foreign inventor and reduced to practice in the United States qualifies as prior art under § 102(g)(2) [since, under the facts at hand, Russian inventors conceived an invention outside of the US, and Honewell personnel reduced it to practice in the US.].
Solvay S.A. at *2 (text added).
Holding[T]he process invented by the Russian engineers was made in this country when Honeywell successfully performed the process because the Russians authorized Honeywell personnel to practice the invention and specifically contemplated that they would do so[, therefore, the invention qualifies as prior art].
Id. at *17 (text added).
 
02/11/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleTemple Lighting, Inc. v. Tivoli, LLC, No. 2013-1140 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2014).
Issues
[1] Tempo argues that the Board erred in construing “inert to light” differently from the examiner.
Temple Lighting, Inc. at *3.
[2] Tempo argues that it did not waive its arguments concerning alternative grounds for affirming the examiner’s rejections under Tivoli’s proposed construction of “inert to light.”
Id. at *3.
Holdings
[1] The language of the claims in this case does not contextually define “inert to light.” Nor does the specification expressly reference that term. Nonetheless, the intrinsic evidence supports the Board’s construction. […] In claim construction, this court gives primacy to the language of the claims, followed by the specification. Additionally, the prosecution history, while not literally within the patent document, serves as intrinsic evidence for purposes of claim construction. This remains true in construing patent claims before the PTO.
Temple Lighting, Inc. at *6.
[2] [O]ne of the threshold conditions for a cross-appeal is a final decision favorable to patentability. In this case, the examiner rejected all the claims. Thus, the record presented no decision favorable to patentability for Tempo to appeal [such that the alternative grounds of affirming the rejection were not waived].
Id. at *9 (text added).
 
02/05/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Samuel Dillon, Contributor 
 
TitleAugust Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, LTD., No. 2012-1681, 2013-1023 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 18, 2013) (non-precedential).
Issues"On appeal, Camtek argues that the district court erred when it: (1) awarded $645,946 in sanctions for civil contempt; and (2) found that a post-trial sale constituted willful infringement." August Tech. at *8. "The threshold issue before us is whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal." Id.
Holdings
[1] Because the district court’s civil contempt order is not a final appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
August Tech. at *8.
[2] Likewise, we do not have jurisdiction to consider the court’s willfulness finding because: (1) as the prevailing party, Camtek lacks standing to appeal the court’s decision denying enhanced damages; and (2) there is no final judgment on willfulness.
Id.
 
02/03/14
Category: Claim Construction  
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleAstrazeneca AB v. Hanmi USA, Inc., No. 2013-1490 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2013) (non-precedential).
IssueThis appeal presents a single issue: whether the written description limits "alkaline salt" in [ AstraZeneca AB's U.S. Patent No. 5,714,504] to certain specifically named salts [found in the disclosures of AstraZeneca's patents]. Astrazeneca AB at *2 (text added).
HoldingWe hold that [the written description limits "alkaline salt" in the '504 patent to certain specifically named salts].The written description describes the invention clearly and narrowly as including only those salts and AstraZeneca points to nothing in the intrinsic record that is sufficient to overcome that disclaimer. Id. at *2 (text added).
 
01/31/14
Category: Priority
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleEnOcean GMBH v. Face Int’l Corp., No. 2012-1645 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 31, 2014).
IssuesThis appeal concerns two sets of EnOcean’s claims, the receiver claims and the means-plus-function claims, and presents two main issues: [1] whether the Board erred in finding that the receiver claims invoke § 112, ¶ 6; and [2] whether the Board erred in finding that both sets of claims are not entitled to claim priority to the German and PCT applications [on the grounds of inadequate structural support in the parent applications].
EnOcean at *2 (text added).
HoldingsFor the foregoing reasons, we hold: [1] that the receiver claims in EnOcean’s application do not invoke § 112, ¶ 6 [because the term “receiver” connotes sufficiently adequate structure]; [and] [2] that the “means for receiving” limitations found in EnOcean’s means-plus-function claims are adequately supported by the written descriptions found in the German and PCT applications for purposes of claiming priority; and […] that the “receiver” limitations found in EnOcean’s receiver claims are adequately supported by the written descriptions found in the German and PCT applications for purposes of claiming priority [because a specific structure of a “receiver”/“receiver means” is not required, since said terms have a well-known structural meaning.].
Id. at *11-12 (text added).
 
01/30/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor   
 
TitleSimpleAir, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:11-cv-416-JRG (E.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2013).
IssueGoogle seeks to compel SimpleAir, Inc. ('SimpleAir') to produce four documents listed as entried 205, 206, 207, and 208 ('Withheld Documents') in SimpleAir's privilege log. Each of the Withheld Documents is correspondence involving AirMedia, Inc. ('AirMedia'), the predecessor-in-interest to SimpleAir, dated between 1998 and 1999." SimpleAir at *1 (citations omitted).
Holding"[T]he Court finds that SimpleAir's assertion of attorney-client privilege over the Withheld Documents, at the time they were created, is meritorious." Id. at *2. "[C]ontrol of a business cannot be divorced from ownership of substantially all of the business assets, even if the nature of such business changes direction over time. Control follows ownership and not the other way around. The Court is not persuaded that the transfer[s] of the Asserted Patents . . . amounted to only a mere transfer of some assets through which the privilege failed to survive. . . . AirMedia's attorney-client privilege as relates to the Withheld Documents has survived the transfers discussed above and is now properly vested in SimpleAir." Id. at *7.
 
01/28/14
Category: 103 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Eaton, No. 2013-1104 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 22, 2013) (non-precedential).
Issues[1] Mr. Eaton appeals the Board's anticipation rejection of claim 1 because Jungkeit does not describe a vitamin composition that is essentially free of anti-oxidants and thus cannot anticipate claim 1 [which recites that the composition is "essentially free of anti-oxidants."]. [...] [2] Similarly, Mr. Eaton appeals the Board's obviousness rejection of claims 1 and 8-10 over Jungkeit and Mantynen because Mantynen fails to rectify the deficiencies of Jungkeit. In re Eaton at *5 (text added).
Holdings[1] The Office has not established that the cited references disclose compositions whose effectiveness is not reduced at all due to the presence of the antioxidants.[...] [Therefore,] substantial evidence [does not] support a finding that Jungkeit met the "essentially free of antioxidants" element[.] In re Eaton at *7-9. [2] [Secondly, regarding the obviousness rejection, the Board's] finding does not provide a rationale for adjusting the concentrations of antioxidants in Jungkeit or Mantynen to be “essentially free of antioxidants.” Id. at *9 (text added).
 
01/27/14
Category: 101
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleSmartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Lab., No. 2013-1186 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24, 2014) (non-precedential).
Issues
[1] Based on the failure of ABL’s briefing to contest SmartGene’s characterization of claim 1 of the ’786 patent as representative of all claims, the district court found “that the differences between the various method and system claims within the patents-in-dispute are immaterial with respect to whether the patents constitute eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101” and, therefore, analyzed only [method] claim 1 of the ’786 patent. [ABL contends that the district court erred in invalidating simlarly worded system and Beauregard claims based solely on the analysis of the method claim.]
Smartgene, Inc. at *5 (text added).
[2] The [district] court held claim 1 of the ’786 patent [directed to a method for guiding the selection of therapeutic regimens], and hence all asserted claims, “invalid” under section 101 [as being directed to no more than an abstract mental process since the claim is drafted in steps that can be performed by a person]. […]
Id. at *5 (text added, citations omitted).
Holdings
[1] It is well established that arguments that are not appropriately developed in a party’s briefing may be deemed waived.[…] We view the court’s ruling as essentially one that ABL forfeited any argument that any patent claims here are to be treated differently from claim 1 of the ’786 patent.
Id. at *7.
[2] [T]his court [has] held that section 101 did not embrace a process defined simply as using a computer to perform a series of mental steps that people, aware of each step, can and regularly do perform in their heads. […] Claim 1 does no more than call on a “computing device,” with basic functionality for comparing stored and input data and rules, to do what doctors do routinely.
Id. at *7-8 (internal citations omitted, text added).
 
01/24/14
Category: Priority
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleMedtronic Corevalve, LLC v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., No. 2013-1117 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2013).
IssueMedtronic’s appeal asks us to determine whether the district court erred in holding that the ’281 patent could not claim the benefit of an earlier priority date for failure to comply with the requirements of both 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120 [for failure to include intermediate applications in the priority claim].
Medtronic Corevalve, LLC at *7 (text added).
HoldingBecause Medtronic failed to specifically reference each earlier filed application in the intervening applications in the chain of priority for the ’281 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 120, the district court was correct to limit the priority date of the patent to no earlier than April 10, 2003 and thereafter find the Asserted Claims invalid as anticipated.
Id. at *14.
 
01/22/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
  
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleMedtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Fam. Ventures, LLC, No. 12-1128 (Jan. 22, 2014).
IssueThis case asks us to decide whether the burden of proof shifts when the patentee is a defendant in a declaratory judgment action, and the plaintiff (the potential infringer) seeks a judgment that he does not infringe the patent.
Medtronic, Inc. at *1.
HoldingWe hold that, when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee to establish that there is no infringement, the burden of proving infringement remains with the patentee. We reverse the Federal Circuit’s determination to the contrary.
Id. at *1.
 
 
 
01/20/14
Category: 112 - Means Plus  
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleVistan Corp. v. FIDEI USA, Inc., No. 13-1216, -1217 (non-precedential) (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
Issue"[W]hether the disclosure of a “mechanical linear actuator” in the [U.S. Patent No. 5,870,949] specification is a sufficient description of structure that 'one skilled in the art will know and understand what structure corresponds' to the claim limitations."  Vistan, at *6, 7 (text added, citation removed).
Holding"The evidence makes clear that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand mechanical linear actuators to be a distinct and identifiable class of actuators."  Id. at *6.
 
01/16/14
 
Fountain of Youth
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleNovartis AG v. Lee, No. 2013-1160, -1179 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 15, 2014).
Issues
[1] [With regards to some of the asserted patents,] Novartis argues that the 180-day period [for challenging the Director's determination in a civil action] is not applicable to its challenges to the final patent term adjustment determinations because, it says, the Director did not make those determinations under paragraph (b)(3) [which governs request for reconsideration before the Director].
Novartis AG at *9 (text added).
[2] Novartis argues that, once three calendar years from the application-filing date have come and gone, time spent in the PTO after that date must be added to the patent term even if it is time spent on a continued examination [RCE] requested after that date.
Id. at *13 (text added).
[3] [T]he PTO contends that any time up until the patent issues, even after allowance, should be excluded from the adjustment awarded to the patentee.
Id. at *15.
Holdings
[1] The applicable version of paragraph (b)(3)—the whole of which subparagraph (b)(4)(A) refers to—addresses all patent term adjustment determinations, not just some. Subparagraph (b)(3)(A) broadly declares that “[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations establishing procedures for the application for and determination of patent term adjustments under [(b)].”
Novartis AG at *9-10.
[2] [T]he patent term adjustment time should be calculated by determining the length of the time between application and patent issuance, then subtracting any continued examination time (and other time identified in (i), (ii), and (iii) of (b)(1)(B)) and determining the extent to which the result exceeds three years. Such a reading ensures that applicants recover for any “delay[s] due to the failure of the [PTO],” without allowing the applicant to recover for “any time consumed by continued examination,” as the statute requires. […]
Id. at *14 (internal citations omitted, text added).
[3] We reject the PTO’s view that the time after allowance, until issuance, is “time consumed by continued examination” and so is excluded from adjustments given to the patentee. Such time from allowance to issuance undisputedly would count toward the PTO’s three-year allotment in a case not involving a continued examination.
Id. at *15.
 
01/15/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Gianelli, No. 2013-1167 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2014).
IssueGiannelli argues that the Board’s decision sustaining the examiner’s rejection is based on an incorrect assertion that the chest press machine disclosed in the ’447 patent could be used as a rowing machine [per the claims] rather than considering how it would be used.
In re Gianelli at *6 (text added).
HoldingBecause the Board determined that the machine claimed in the ’261 application would have been obvious by merely showing that a rowing exercise could be performed on the machine disclosed in the ’447 patent, and not whether it was obvious to modify the chest press machine to contain handles “adapted to” perform the rowing motion by pulling on them, the Board erred in concluding that the examiner had met his initial burden of establishing a case of prima facie obviousness. [...]. Physical capability alone does not render obvious that which is contraindicated.
Id. at *9 (internal citations omitted).
 
01/14/14
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleProveris Sci. Corp. v. Innovasystems, Inc., No. 2013-1166 (Jan. 13, 2014).
IssueThe first question we must answer [in an infringement analysis during a contempt of an injunction suit] is whether the preamble is properly construed as importing a limitation into the claim.
Proveris Sci. Corp. at *7 (text added).
Holding[R]eading the patent as a whole, the inventors clearly relied on both the preamble and the body of claim 3 to define the claimed invention [because (i) the specification discusses essential features that are recited only in the preamble, and (ii) the body of the claims refers back to these features in the preamble]. Accordingly, the preamble of claim 3 should be construed as importing a limitation into the claim.
Id. at *9 (text added).
 
01/10/14
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleNazomi Comm., Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 2013-1165 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 10, 2014).
Issues
[1] The district court construed the claims [directed to a CPU] as claiming an apparatus, comprising both hardware and software, capable of practicing the claimed functionality. The [district] court rejected Nazomi’s construction requiring only hardware that was capable of performing the claimed functionalities.
Nazomi Comm., Inc. at *9-10 (text added).
[2] [W]e have held that “an apparatus claim directed to a computer that is claimed in functional terms is nonetheless infringed so long as the product is designed in such a way as to enable the user of that [product] to utilize the function without having to modify the product.” […] Nazomi argues that installation of the JTEK software is not a modification that precludes a finding of infringement.
Id. at *14 (internal citations omitted, text added).
Holdings
[1] The face of the claims shows that each particular functionality is a claim limitation [since hardware cannot meet functional claim limitations in the absence of enabling software].
Id. at *10 (text added).
[2] The purchase and installation of the JTEK software clearly constitutes a “modification” of the accused products [because the accused products infringe only if presently structured to perform the claimed function, rather than after a modification - such as installation of software].
Id. at *14 (text added).
 
01/09/14
Category: Design Patents 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitlePacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Marine Hardware Inc., No. 2013-1199 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2014).
IssuePacific Coast, in its briefs, argued that prosecution history estoppel should not apply to design patents at all.
Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. at *10.
HoldingWe conclude that the principles of prosecution history estoppel apply to design patents as well as utility patents.
Id. at *11.
 
01/07/14

Category: Post-Grant Proceedings 

 

 

 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor

01/03/14
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Abby Lin, Contributor 
 
TitleOrenshteyn v. Int’l. Business Machines, Corp., No. 02 Civ. 5074 (JFK), 2013 BL 295952 (S.D.N.Y. October 25, 2013).
Issues“IBM’s summary judgment motion asserts the invalidity of [2] Claims 14 and 56 of the ‘942 Patent, as well as [1] Claim 1 of the ‘569 patent. To decide the motion, the Court must determine the extent to which Plaintiff is collaterally estopped by the opinion from the Southern District of Florida affirmed by the Federal Circuit, which invalidated Claim 1 of the ‘942 Patent. If the Florida decision has preclusive effect, then any issues decided by that court cannot be relitigated here. If collateral estoppel does not apply, or if there are issues here that were not decided in Florida, then the Court must independently make a validity determination based on those outstanding issues” Orenshtyen at *10 (text added).
Holdings
[1] “[B]ecause Claim 1 of the ‘569 Patent contains no limitations that were not present in invalid Claim 1 of the ‘942 Patent, it presents no new issues to decide, and collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff’s argument.” Id. at *15.
[2] “[The ‘simultaneous connection’ limitation of Claims 14 and 56] is the only limitation not considered in the Florida ruling. [However, Plaintiff is estopped from arguing that the prior art] ‘lacks many of the other claim limitations’ of his patents, because the Florida court has already determined that those limitations (all of which were present in Claim 1 of the ‘942 Patent) were anticipated by the [] prior art.” Id. at *18 (text added).
 
01/03/14
The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.
  • The § 112, ¶ 6 Pitfalls for Computer Software System Claims Under the February 2011 Examination Guidelines Sean J. Holder
  • Towards a More Uniform Procedure for Patent Invalidation Arjun Rangarajan
  • Unique Copyrights Andrew Tutt
  • Software Patent Eligibility: A Call for Recognizing and Claiming Concrete Computer Programs Seong-hee (Emily) Lee
  • In re Yasuhito Tanaka - An Improper Expansion of Reissue Law and Practice Stephen Marcus
  • Inefficiencies in Overcompensating Design Patent Damages under 35 U.S.C. §289 in Complex Technologies Dennis M. White
  • Annual Index
01/02/14
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleInstitut Pasteur & Univ. Pierre et Marie Currie v. Focarino, No. 2012-1485, -1486, -1487 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2013).
Issues
[A] Pasteur proposed amendments both to independent claim 1 and to dependent claim 14 that limited the targeted “DNA of an organism” to chromosomal DNA only. While agreeing that the amendments changed the scope of claim 1, which is not at issue, Pasteur argues that they did not change the scope of claim 14, because the unamended claim 14 itself was implicitly limited to chromosomal DNA [and thus should not be dismissed during post-grant proceedings, during which the patent expired].
Institut Pasteur at *12-13 (text added).
[B] Pasteur challenges the Board’s determinations of obviousness as to […] claims 10 and 12 of the ’545 patent [because (1) the cited art did not actually teach the claimed subject matter; (2) the Board ignored a Nucleic Acids Research article which underscored the extreme difficulty of the proposed combination; and (3) the Board did not give proper weight to Pasteur’s objective indicia of non-obviousness (licensing and industry praise).] […].
Id. at *12 (text added).
Holdings
[A] Non-chromosomal DNA, such as mitochondrial DNA or DNA in an additional plasmid, can be homologous to chromosomal DNA. Thus, the original claim covered situations where non- chromosomal DNA is the targeted DNA. The amendment substantively narrowed the claim in requiring chromosomal DNA as the target. Because amending the claim to target only “chromosomal” DNA substantively altered (narrowed) its scope, the PTO may not issue the amended claim now that the patent has expired, as stated in applicable provisions of a PTO regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.530(j), (k).
Institut Pasteur at *13.
[B] Here, in ascertaining the scope and content of the prior art, the Board made factual determinations that were not supported by substantial evidence. The Board also failed to give proper consideration to at least two categories of evidence–[1 and 2] teachings in the prior art that targeting a cell’s chromosomal DNA could be toxic to the cell and [3] industry praise and licensing of Pasteur’s invention– that are important to the obviousness evaluation.
Id. at *15 (text added). 
 
12/28/13
Category: Damages
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleKilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., No. 2013-1193 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 26, 2013).
Issues
[1] Sidense first faults the district court for its reliance on our decision in MarcTec, LLC v. Johnson & Johnson, 664 F.3d 907 (Fed. Cir. 2012), which, in Sidense’s view, requires too great a showing to establish subjective bad faith [in determining whether to award attorneys’ fees].
Kilopass Tech., Inc. at *12-13 (text added).
[2] Sidense also argues that it should not even be required to prove that Kilopass acted in bad faith to show exceptionality. Proof of objective baselessness, in Sidense’s view, should be enough to demonstrate exceptionality under § 285. Sidense does not contend that a finding of exceptionality predicated on objective baselessness would demand that the district court shift fees, only that it should permit it to do so in its discretion in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at *17-18.
[3] Sidense also contends that it should not be required to prove exceptionality by clear and convincing evidence, as our law currently requires. According to Sidense, proof by a preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient under § 285.
Id. at *23.
Holdings
[1] [T]o the extent that the district court did require actual knowledge of objective baselessness, it erred. The language from [...] MarcTec that Sidense interprets as requiring actual knowledge does not reflect this court’s law governing § 285,[…] and is dictum.
Kilopass Tech., Inc. at *12-13.
[2] While Sidense’s arguments may constitute good faith assertions that our law should be something other than it is, as a panel, we are not able to entertain them. We must, and do, apply our current law, which requires proof of objective baselessness and subjective bad faith as a prerequisite to a finding of exceptionality—the first prong in the court’s § 285 inquiry.
Id. at *22.
[3] "In Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985), we cited Hycor for the proposition that “[t]he quantum of proof required to prove bad faith conduct is clear and convincing evidence.” […] The pronouncement in Reactive Metals, however, seems to reflect an unneeded expansion of the clear and convincing burden to all aspects of the § 285 analysis." Kilopass Tech., Inc. at *24. "Again, while we cannot fault Sidense for making good faith arguments asking that we change our current law, as a panel we may not indulge it [and hold that the standard of proof for subjective bad faith in the present situation is clear and convincing.]." Id. at *24 (text added).
 
12/18/13
Category: 102 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor    
 
TitleMotorola Mobility, LLC v. ITC, No. 2012-1535 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 2013).
IssueMotorola asserts that the claimed synchronization component refers to software that merely facilitates communication and synchronization, as opposed to more active management [and], with this understanding of the limitation, […] that a synchronization component must necessarily be present on both the Apple Newton MessagePad [prior art reference] and the desktop in order to accomplish synchronization.
Motorola Mobility, LLC at *6-7 (text added).
HoldingBecause substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determinations that Motorola did not show that the asserted claims are invalid [because inherency requires more than the mere possibility that the Apple Newton MessagePad encompasses the claimed "synchronization component"], and that Microsoft showed that it satisfied the domestic industry requirement, this court affirms.
Id. at *2.
 
12/15/13
Category: ITC  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleSuprema Inc. / Cross Match Tech., Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1170, 2012-1026, -1124 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2013).
Issues
[1] We consider the propriety of the Commission’s limited whether a § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) violation may be predicated on a claim of induced infringement where the attendant direct infringement of the claimed method does not occur until post-importation.
Cross Match Tech., Inc. at *13.
[2] Suprema challenges the ALJ’s claim construction of a term appearing in the asserted claims [“said second lens unit being on the image side of the firstlens unit”], the infringement finding based on that claim interpretation, and the holding that Suprema failed to prove that the ’993 patent would have been obvious. […] Specifically, Suprema argues that the claimed lens system excludes “non-lens elements” and “off-axis optics” because those were disavowed in the written description of the ’993 patent. So there can be no non-lens elements between the “lens units,” Suprema believes, and the ALJ erred by not limiting the claims in this manner.
Id. at *26-27 (text added).
Holding
[1] Given the nature of the conduct proscribed in § 271(b) [which requires a showing of direct infringement even to show inducement] and the nature of the authority granted to the Commission in § 337 [focusing on the infringing nature of articles at the time of importation], we hold that the statutory grant of authority in § 337 cannot extend to the conduct proscribed in § 271(b) where the acts of underlying direct infringement occur post-importation.
Id. at *20 (text added).
[2] We agree with the ALJ that the absence of “constructional data” regarding the achromatic lens disclosed in the ’060 patent provides insufficient motivation for a person of skill in the art to seek out that data from the ’051 patent, and that Suprema has shown insufficient evidence to substitute the triplet lens disclosed in the ’051 patent for the “achromatic lens 28” of the ’060 patent.
Id. at *34.
 
12/11/13
Category: 103
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleGolderma Lab., LP v. Tolmar, Inc., No. 2013-1034 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 11, 2013).
IssueThe relevant dispute in this case is thus not over whether the prior art discloses all of the claim elements or over the motivation to combine the prior art references [since all the features are taught, but for a concentration value that nonetheless falls within a range disclosed in the prior art]. Rather, the dispute is whether there was motivation to select the claimed 0.3% adapalene composition in the disclosed range.
Golderma Lab. at *9 (text added).
Holding[W]e hold that claims 35 and 36 of the ’181 patent, claims 24 and 27 of the ’060 patent, claim 5 of the ’558 patent, and claims 40 and 41 of the ’044 patent are invalid as obvious [because: A. the prior art does not actually disparage selection of 0.3% adapalene composition in the disclosed range; B. a percent increase constitutes only a difference in degree from the prior art; and C. evidence of commercial success diminishes when market entry by others is precluded by a blocking patent].
Id. at *15 (text added).
12/10/13
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
12/06/13
Category: 103
 
 
 
 By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor   
 
TitleIn re Haase, No. 2012-1690 (Fed. Cir. Oct 30, 2013) (nonprecedential).
Issues
[1] "Mr. Haase challenges the anticipation rejections […] He principally contends that the allegedly “critical” molecular-weight ranges for ammonium polymers in his application do not exist in Hassick."
In re Haase at *6-7.
[2] "The first category of rebuttal evidence [as to claim 3, and reiterated for claims 4, 22, and 76] pertains to unexpected results, for which Mr. Haase submitted data allegedly showing that his claimed methods outperformed Hassick’s in various comparisons of water-clarity results."
Id. at *10 (text added).
Holdings
[1] "All that is required to meet claims 1, 2, 56, and 75 is one individual ammonium polymer compound within the claimed range, no matter what else is in the composition or how much of the molecular-weight distribution disclosed in Hassick overlaps with the claimed ranges."
Id. at *7.
[2] "[T]he PTO established a prima facie case of obviousness for claim[s] 3[,] [4, 22, and 76], and Mr. Haase’s rebuttal evidence failed to overcome it [because his submitted evidence of unexpected results, a comparison of Mr. Haase's own test results and the references, did not correlate directly with the recited language in claims 3, 4, 22, and 76]."
Id. at *12 (text added).
 
12/04/13
Category: Civil Procedure 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleFuturewei Tech., Inc. v. Acacia Research Corp., No. 2013-1090 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 2013).
Issue"[In view of co-pending litigation in Texas and California,] [t]he [Central District of California] court [i] dismissed count 11[, that Huawei was a third party beneficiary,] for failure to state a claim." Futurewei Tech., Inc. at *6 [text added]. "As to [ii] count 16, […] the court reasoned that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), this count is a compulsory counterclaim to the claims in the Texas case and therefore must be brought in that case." Id. at *5. "Huawei appeals the district court’s dismissal of counts 11 and 16 of the complaint." Id., Inc. at *6.
HoldingWe affirm the dismissal of those counts, but we rely on the first-to-file rule, concluding that […] counts 11 and 16 both belong in the Eastern District of Texas [because: [i] interpreting count 11 as a declaratory judgment action, the substantive issues of that count are already being litigated in Texas; and [ii] count 16 amounts to a counterclaim that should be litigated in the same forum as overarching substantive claims].
Id. at *6 (text added).
 
12/03/13
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor   
 
TitleMicrosoft Corp. v. International Trade Commission, No. 2012-1445, -1535 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 3, 2013).
Issues
[1] Microsoft argues on appeal that the ALJ improperly “construed [resource state information] to require additional information about the version of the resource, akin to a version number [which was not recited in the claims].”
Microsoft Corp. at *7 (text added).
[2] The ALJ determined that Microsoft failed to make that domestic-industry showing because it did not offer sufficient proof of articles that were actually protected by the patent.
Id. at *10.
[3] The Commission’s grounds for finding no infringement rest ultimately on its view of what the claims require [which include: i. that the “a menu selection relating to a class of objects” requires specific classes of objects not recited in the claims, and ii. that "menu positioned in the proximate of a graphical representation" requires the positioning to be 'deliberate,' though not recited in the claims].
Id. at *19 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [T]he term “state” [in "resource state information"] is so general on its face that it begs for clarification from the specification regarding what aspect of the resource is to be identified. We conclude that the ALJ correctly understood “state” in the context of the whole patent as requiring information about the version of the resource.
Microsoft Corp. at *7-8 (text added).
[2] "Although Dr. Olivier [Microsoft's expert] purported to identify “client applications” in an example application that Microsoft provides to third- party phone manufacturers, Microsoft failed to show that any such “client applications” are actually implemented on any third-party mobile device." Id. at *10. "The Commission did not lack substantial evidence to support its finding that Microsoft simply failed to identify any actual phones with the required components performing as required." Id. at *11.
[3] There is no dispute here about how the accused products work, only about what the claims require. […] On a correct understanding of the claim requirements, we conclude, the main group of accused products infringe [because the ALJ read into the claims features that are not specifically recited or inherently required by the claims]
Id. at *19 (text added).
 
11/27/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Nintendo Co., No. 151 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 25, 2013) (nonprecedential).
IssueJoinder/Severance: “[P]etitioners argue that UltimatePointer should not have been allowed to use Rule 18 […] to add claims involving products by other manufacturers and to use the mere presence of those claims to defeat Nintendo’s request that the retailers be severed to facilitate transfer.”
In re Nintendo, at *6.
Holding“Because we find that the district court erred in failing to first consider whether the retailer defendants should have been severed and whether transfer was appropriate prior to addressing whether the non-Nintendo claims could be joined under Rule 18, we grant the petition and remand for further proceedings.” In re Nintendo, at *12. “The fact that Rule 18 permits the joinder of certain claims does not answer the question of how those claims should be adjudicated. Again, fairness and efficiency must guide that inquiry.” Id. at *14.
 
11/22/13
The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society.
  • Federal Circuit Appeals From The PTAB: A New Game Or Just The Same Old Practice? David L. McCombs, Debra J. McComas, Andrew S. Ehmke and Stephanie N. Sivinski
  • Enjoy Your TRIPS: The Problems with TRIPS Retaliation under Article 22.3 of the DSU Clinton Long
  • Intellectual Property’s Upcoming Quantum Leap: Projecting the Future Challenges Facing Quantum Information Technology through a Historical Perspective of the Computer Revolution Cason Schmit
  • The Revolutionary Influence of Low Enlightenment: Weakening Copyright in Developing Countries to Improve Respect for Human Rights and the Rule of Law Martin Skladany
  • The Ugly Stepchild of Patent Prosecution Gets Uglier: Information Disclosure Statements and Their Use of Copyright Licenses Derek Constantine
11/21/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleUnwired Planet LLC v. Google Inc., Case No. 3:12-CV-0504-MMD (VPC) (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2013).
Issues
[1] "[Google argues that] the order allows Unwired to assert more patent claims than even Unwired asked to assert [...]."
Unwired Planet LLC at *4 (citation removed, text added).
[2] "With respect to reductions of prior art references, Google’s view was that limitations on its prior art defenses 'has the effect of depriving Google of viable defenses to Unwired Planet’s claims.'" Order at *2. "Google [suggests] that the court committed clear error or that the order is manifestly unjust."
Id. at *3, 4 (text added).
Holdings
[1] "[I]n attempting to navigate through the parties’ briefs and the Federal Circuit Advisory Council’s proposed order, this court erred and increased the number of Unwired’s asserted claims beyond what the parties requested and beyond what is reasonable and manageable for trial."
Id. at *6.
[2] "Google has made a persuasive argument that if the court’s order stands, and Google is limited to 40 references to respond to 40 claims just after claim construction, and to 20 references to respond to 18 claims to be asserted before trial, this will have the effect of limiting Google to one reference per claim."
Id. at *7.


11/19/13
Category: Injunctions
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
Title
Issues
[1-2: Irreparable Harm] On appeal, Apple challenges the district court’s irreparable harm analysis on two main grounds. [1] First, Apple argues that the court erroneously adopted a causal nexus requirement in the permanent injunction context. [2] Second, Apple argues, in the alternative, that it satisfied any reasonable causal nexus requirement with respect to both the design patents and the utility patents.
Apple at *11-12 (text added).
[3: Inadequacy of Legal Remedies] Apple argues on appeal that the district court erred in several respects [, which include (i) that money damages are inadequate in this case due to the difficulty of quantifying the damages attributable to the market share and downstream sales, even if Samsung is able to pay it, and (ii) Apple’s past licensing practices does not suggest that it would have licensed the asserted patents to Samsung, a competitor.]
Id. at *28-29 (text added).
Holdings
[1: Irreparable Harm] [W]e reject Apple’s arguments and confirm that the district court was correct to require a showing of some causal nexus between Samsung’s infringing conduct and Apple’s alleged harm [because causal nexus is an necessary part of the irreparable harm inquiry that must be satisfied, irrespective of the type of product encompassed by the patent]. That said, we agree with Apple that certain of the standards arguably articulated by the district court go too far [, such as (i) requiring the patentee to show that one of the patented features is THE SOLE reason consumers purchased an infringer's products, and (ii) not permitting the patentee to aggregate patents in order to show harm].
Id. at *18 (text added).
[2: Irreparable Harm] We find no reason to dislodge the district court’s conclusion that Apple failed to demonstrate irreparable harm from Samsung’s infringement of its design patents [because anecdotal evidence is insufficient to support causal nexus finding]. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of injunctive relief with respect to those patents. However, with respect to Apple’s utility patents, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in its analysis [because it failed to consider survey testimony during its analysis of the irreparable harm inquiry,] and consequently remand for further proceedings.
Id. at *10 (text added).
[3: Inadequacy of Legal Remedies] [T]he district court abused its discretion by failing to properly analyze whether damages would adequately compensate Apple for Samsung’s infringement of these patents [because (i) Samsung’s ability to pay a judgment does not defeat a claim that an award of damages would be an inadequate remedy; and (ii) Applie's licensing history shows that it would not have licensed its patents to a direct competitor].
Id. at *32 (text added).
 
11/16/13
Category: Inequitable Conduct 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleThe Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps South, LLC, No. 2012-1642, 2013-1024 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 2013).
IssuesThe crux of our materiality determination therefore hinges on whether OWW [Ohio Willow Wood] [1] withheld or [2] misrepresented information that, in the absence of the withholding or misrepresentation, would have led the BPAI to credit Mr. Comtesse’s testimony that the pre-critical date SSGL was constructed using a Coolmax fabric.
The Ohio Willow Wood Co. at *19 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [W]e conclude that a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that OWW withheld evidence from the PTO during the second reexamination that sufficiently corroborated Mr. Comtesse’s testimony regarding the construction of the SSGL. The corroborating evidence that OWW did not disclose to the PTO includes witness testimony [from three prosthetists], [patent] documents [that OWW was aware of], and physical samples [that OWW did not provide to the PTO or the BPAI].
Id. at *21 (text added).
[2] [Because OWW misrepresented Mr. Comtesse's testimony while being aware of the fact that Mr. Comtesse had no personal stake in the outcome of the case] we find OWW’s misrepresentations to the BPAI tantamount to the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit.
Id. at *29 (text added).
 
11/13/13
Category: Interferences
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleSanofi-Aventis v. Pfizer Inc., No. 2012-1345 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2013).
Issue"[In order to establish conception and reduction to practice before the Sanofi benefit date,] Pfizer argued that its initial sequence was 99.3% accurate, and that the sequencing errors were routinely detected and corrected. […] Sanofi argues that as a matter of law Pfizer did not have a complete conception until Pfizer had the full correct nucleotide sequence […].
Sanofi-Aventis at *6 (text added).
HoldingWe conclude that the Board correctly based conception and reduction to practice on the possession of the isolated DNA segment that was shown to have the desired properties [because although a complete DNA sequence is the gold-standard for identifying a species with precision, it is not the only way to identify proteins and polynucleotides precisely.]"
Id. at *9 (text added).
 
11/08/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 
By: Christian Hannon, Contributor   
 
TitleK-Tech Telecommunications, Inc. v. Time Warner Cable Inc., No. 2012-1425 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2013).
Issues
[1] “K-Tech contends that its First Amended Complaints comply with Form 18 and that the district court applied the incorrect standard in analyzing the sufficiency of each complaint.” K-Tech, at *8.
[2] “The defendants [...] assert that the respective First Amended Complaints fail to meet either the plain language of Form 18 or the form interpreted through the lens of Twombly and Iqbal.” Id.
Holdings
[1] [I]t is clear the district court applied the wrong standard to K-Tech’s complaints in requiring that a plaintiff preemptively identify and rebut potential non-infringing alternatives to practicing the claims of an asserted patent. […] Form 18 includes no indication that a patent holder must prospectively anticipate such noninfringement arguments. For this reason alone, it is clear the rationale employed by the district court when dismissing K-Tech’s actions was erroneous.
K-tech at *13 (internal citations omitted).
[2] [W]e find that K-Tech’s amended complaints in both actions satisfy [the Form 18] standards. DirecTV and TWC know what K-Tech’s patents claim, and they know what K-Tech asserts their systems do, and why. K-Tech has alleged that DirecTV and TWC must and do modify or “translate” digital signals they receive, and it has alleged that they do so using K-Tech’s patented methods and systems. We find these allegations adequate to satisfy Form 18 and, thus, to satisfy the pleading standards that govern these actions [because K-tech is not required to identify specific infringing devices by name if they are not discernible prior to discovery].
Id. at *17 (text added).
 
11/07/13
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleLifescan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Tech., LLC, No. 2013-1271 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2013).
Issues
[1] LifeScan’s primary argument is that the distribution of its meters, whether by sale or gift, does not trigger exhaustion because its meters do not substantially embody the claims of the ’105 patent [per the requirements of the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta].
Lifescan Scotland, Ltd. at *8 (text added).
[2] LifeScan’s final argument is that even if its meters substantially embody the asserted claims, patent exhaustion is nevertheless inapplicable to the 60% of its meters that are not sold but instead distributed for free. LifeScan asserts that it received no “reward” for distributing them (because they were distributed without charge), and that the district court therefore properly found that patent exhaustion did not apply. We are therefore asked to decide, as a matter of first impression, whether patent exhaustion applies to a product distributed for free.
Id. at *22-23 (text added).
HoldingsIn summary, we hold [2] that patent exhaustion principles apply equally to all authorized transfers of title in property, regardless of whether the particular transfer at issue constituted a gift or a sale. We further conclude [1] that LifeScan’s OneTouch Ultra meters substantially embody the methods claimed in the ’105 patent [because intrinsic evidence supports that error-detecting functions are the inventive concept of the claims] and [as a result] that [the] distribution [of LifeScan’s OneTouch Ultra meters] therefore exhausts LifeScan’s patent rights.
Id. at *29 (text added).
 
11/04/13
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleIntegrated Tech. Corp. v. Rudolph Tech., Inc., No. 2012-1593, 1618 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 4, 2013).
Issues
[1] Rudolph argues that the court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the amendment was not narrowing. […] Rudolph argues that the amendment narrowed the scope of the claim by reciting that the probe tip must be “driven in contact with said window” in both recited states. It argues that prosecution history estoppel presumptively applies because the narrowing amendment was in response to patentability rejections.
Integrated Tech. at *5.
[2] Whether ITC [Integrated Tech. Corp. ] met its burden of proving that an exception [such as tangential relation or forseeability] to prosecution history estoppel applies.
Id. at *7 (text added).
Holdings
[1] We hold that ITC’s narrowing amendment during prosecution surrendered the equivalent from the scope of the asserted claims and that prosecution history estoppel bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Integrated Tech. at *10.
[2] We hold that [Integrated Tech. Corp. ] has not [proven any exceptions apply because (i) the narrowing amendment was purposely related to the equivalent and (ii) the surrendered subject matter was forseeable at the time of amendment], and therefore prosecution history estoppel bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. at *7 (text added).
 
10/31/13
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleRandall MFG., v. Rea, No. 2012-1611 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30, 2013).
IssueIn its decision reversing the [Examiner's findings of non obviousness during inter partes reexamination], the Board did not consider the background references Randall had cited as evidence of the knowledge of one of skill in the art. Instead, the Board looked to “the content of the prior art relied upon in rejecting FG Products’ claim 1.
Randall at *8-9 (text added).
HoldingBy narrowly focusing on the four prior-art references cited by the Examiner and ignoring the additional record evidence Randall cited to demonstrate the knowledge and perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, the Board failed to account for critical background information that could easily explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been motivated to combine or modify the cited references to arrive at the claimed inventions.
Id. at *12.
 
10/30/13
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleSynthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc., No. 2013-1047, -1059 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 29, 2013).
Issues
[1] [With regards to phrase “the third plate including a plurality of openings,”] [t]he parties appear to agree that “grooves” are a species of “opening,” but do not agree that “grooves” constitute an adequate disclosure to claim all openings that may be used in the cover plates to anchor the fiber system. In other words, the jury was asked to determine whether the written description disclosure of “grooves” “reasonably convey[ed] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of [an intervertebral implant that could utilize any sort of opening located anywhere on the cover plates to anchor the fiber system] as of the filing date.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
Synthes at *14 (text added).
[2] Synthes contends that, because we remarked in Bilstad that the “mechanical world” is a “fairly predictable field,” SK had to satisfy a heightened burden to demonstrate unpredictability. See Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1126. 18-19
Id. at *18-19.
Holdings
[1] [A]s we stated in Bilstad: [i]f the difference between members of [a species] is such that [a] person skilled in the art would not readily discern that other [species] of the genus would perform similarly to the disclosed members, i.e., if the art is unpredictable, then disclosure of more species is necessary to adequately show possession of the entire genus. Id. at 1125. […] Here, SK presented its case to the jury, and the jury inferred that, in the field of intervertebral implants, the disclosure of peripheral grooves does not adequately demonstrate possession of the entire genus of possible openings [because the specification was silent on mentioning other "opening" species, and the Expert Testimony supported the finding that other species under the genus are not fairly predictable].
Synthes at *18 (text added).
[2] [The comment in Bilstead is not a blanket statement for the entire mechanical world because,] [a]s we noted in Ariad, there are no “bright-line rules governing, for example, the number of species that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
Id. at *19 (text added).
 
10/28/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
By: Abby Lin, Contributor   
 
TitleRembrandt Vision Tech., L.P., v Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., No. 2012-1510 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7 2013).
Issues
[1] Expert Testimony: “Rembrandt argues that, because the court erroneously excluded Dr. Beebe’s testimony [under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37], [this Court] should reverse the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law”. Rembrandt at *6. “The issue is ... whether, under Rule 37(c)(1), it was “substantially justified or harmless that Dr. Beebe waited until trial to disclose the testing methodology that he claims he actually employed [as opposed to those he disclosed in his expert report].” Id. at *8 (text added).
[2] Circumstantial Evidence: “Rembrandt also argues that its circumstantial evidence that the accused lenses are generally known as ‘soft’ precludes judgment as a matter of law … the district court erred by categorically excluding that circumstantial evidence … [which] shows that accused lenses meet the ‘soft’ limitation.” Id. at *6. “JJVC argues that the court did not err … because the ‘soft’ limitation requires the lenses to meet a specific hardness measure…[and] Rembrandt did not present any admissible evidence that the accused lenses were ‘soft’”. Id. at *7.
Holdings
[1] “The district court did not err in concluding that the late disclosure was not substantially justified. The court rightly found that ‘[t]here is simply no excuse for Dr. Beebe waiting until cross-examination to disclose his testing procedure.’ … The district court [also] did not err in finding that Dr. Beebe’s failure to disclose his testing methodology harmed JJVC [because Dr. Beebe’s testimony that the errors in his report were typos was an substantive and substantial shift in his testimony and significantly hampered JJVC’s ability to adequately cross-examine Dr. Beebe and its opportunity to develop or introduce competing evidence.] … We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Beebe’s trial testimony under Rule 37.” Rembrandt at *8-9 (internal citations omitted, text added).
[2] “The court was within its discretion to exclude … evidence [which were general statements that the accused lenses are ‘soft’ because they had the potential to confuse the jury and did not bear on whether the accused lenses had a Shore D Hardness of less than five.  See FED. R. EVID. 403.” Id. at *9-10(text added). “Because Rembrandt failed to offer any admissible evidence that the accused lenses met the ‘soft gas permeable contact lens’ limitation, we affirm the district court’s judgment that JJVC does not infringe the asserted claims of the ‘327 patent.” Id. at *10.
 
10/24/13
Category: 101
 
 
 
By: Eric Paul Smith, Contributor   
 
TitleUltramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, No. 2010-1544 (Fed. Cir. Jun. 21, 2013).
Issues[In response to a motion to dismiss, the] district court dismissed Ultramercial’s claims [1] for failure to claim statutory subject matter [and 2] without formally construing the claims and, further, without requiring defendants to file answers.
Ultramercial at *5 (text added).
Holdings
[1] [A]s a practical application of the general concept of advertising as currency and an improvement to prior art technology, the claimed invention is not “so manifestly abstract as to override the statutory language of section 101[,]” [because the disclosure need not detail the particular instrumentalities for each step in the claims and the steps likely require complex computer programming.]
Ultramercial at *33 (text added).
[2] In this procedural posture, the district court should either have construed the claims in accordance with Markman, required the defendant to establish that the only plausible construction was one that, by clear and convincing evidence rendered the subject matter ineligible (with no factual inquiries), or adopted a construction most favorable to the patentee.
Id. at *25.
 
10/23/13
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIbormeith IP, LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2013-1007 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2013).
Issue"To comply with section 112(f), the specification of Ibormeith’s patent has to disclose a structure for performing the functions claimed in the “computational means” limitation, the statute providing that the claim limitation covers that disclosed structure and its equivalents. If there is no such structure, the claim limitation is indefinite, i.e., fails to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the invention, because there is insufficient definition of something that, by virtue of section 112(f), is incorporated into the claim."
Ibormeith IP, LLC at *5.
Holding"[Based on the binding admission of the patentee's own expert witness that the addition algorithm of the specification is only a general template encompassing many weighting operations] […] the two figures [of the specification] provide raw circadian information that a person of ordinary skill in the art could use to design his or her own method of weighting. A description of an algorithm that places no limitations on how values are calculated, combined, or weighted is insufficient to make the bounds of the claim understandable."
Id. at 11-23 (text added).
 
10/18/13
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Biedermann, No. 2013-1080 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2013).
IssuesThe central question in the present case is whether the Board and the examiner properly relied on the same articulated reasoning and factual underpinnings in rejecting Biedermann’s claims or whether the Board made new findings and adopted different reasons to support a new ground of rejection, thus depriving Biedermann of both notice and an opportunity to respond [by: [1] relying on an “interchangeability” obviousness finding instead of the examiner's “efficiency”
obviousness finding; [2] introducing a Machinery’s Handbook reference; and [3] not considering negative teachings of a reference concerning machinability].
In re Biedermann at *11 (text added).
Holdings[1] The thrust of the rejection changed when the Board found a new factual basis for the reason to combine [when it altered a combination premised on the efficiency of a square thread to a combination premised on 'avoidance of splaying' by using an interchangeable square thread]. The Board went beyond filling in gaps in the examiner’s reasoning because it is not clear that the examiner’s reasoning survived in the Board’s rejection. Unlike Jung, there is no indication that the Board was merely explaining the examiner’s rejection.
In re Biedermann at *15.
[2] [T]he Board used the Machinery’s Handbook to associate buttress and saw-tooth threads. [...] [T]he association between saw-tooth and buttress threads played an important role, not a minor role, in the Board’s new reasoning by providing the link to associate Cotrel’s threads with one of the threadforms grouped in Steinbock. The Machinery’s Handbook, thus, was used as part of the new ground of rejection.
Id. at *16.
[3] There is no apparent connection between machinability and the examiner’s reason to combine based on efficiency [because it was introduced merely as an additional grounds for combination].
Id. at *17 (text added).
 
10/17/13
Category: Infringement 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleKeurig, Inc. v. Sturm Foods, Inc., No. 2013-1072 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 17, 2013).
IssueKeurig argues that the district court erred by declining to apply the substantial embodiment test articulated by the Supreme Court in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), which Keurig insists is the only relevant analysis for exhaustion of its asserted method claims.
Keurig at *5.
Holding[A fact pattern necessitating application of the Quanta/Univis substantial embodiment test] is not the case before us, which presents an a fortiori fact situation in which the product sold by Keurig was patented. […] “[W]here a person ha[s] purchased a patented machine of the patentee or his assignee, this purchase carrie[s] with it the right to the use of the machine so long as it [is] capable of use.” Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873)). The Court’s decision in Quanta did not alter this principle.
Keurig at *7.
 
10/10/13
Category: Injunctions
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleNCube Corp. v. Seachange Int'l Inc., No. 2013-1066 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2013) (NCube changed name to "ARRIS Group, Inc.").
IssueThe thrust of ARRIS’s argument with respect to the colorable-differences prong [of a contempt motion] is that while [a] ClientID [address identifier] in the modified system no longer meets the “upstream physical address” limitation because it is no longer updated in the Connection Table, the Connection Table in the modified system is still updated with the SessionID[, a design-around address identifier].
NCube, at *7 (text added).
Holding[Seachange's design around is more than a colorable difference because] the ClientID was moved out of the Connection Table and placed elsewhere in the modified system […] this modification [is] significant because the ClientID still performs the same relevant functions in both systems, but does so in a way that all parties admit puts the ClientID outside the claim, i.e., not through updating in the Connection Table. That is a significant change to the system [that satisfies the colorable-differences prong in a permanent injunction contempt hearing].
Id. at *8-9 (text added).
 
10/09/13
Category: Inequitable Conduct 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleIntellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 2012-1658 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 9, 2013).
IssueIntellect argues that the district court clearly erred in its materiality finding [because] Mr. Henderson’s prosecuting attorney quickly corrected [a] false declaration by filing a revised Rule 131 declaration, which did not include facts supporting actual reduction to practice [...].
Intellect, at *4 (text added).
HoldingWe hold that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that HTC proved materiality by establishing that Mr. Henderson engaged in affirmative egregious misconduct when he filed a false declaration [because subsequent revised declarations were too obscure and failed to inform the PTO as to the misrepresentation that there was never an actual reduction to practice].
Id. at *7 (text added). 
 
10/07/13
Category: Injunctions
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleBroadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., No. 2012-1309 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2013).
Issues[1] The obviousness analysis here asks whether a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention— an electrical engineer with at least a bachelor’s degree and several years of CDR experience—would have had a reason to modify Pickering to include a ["a data path," of Pickering and the ’150 patent address two different problems.]
Broadcom, at *13 (text added).
[2] […] Emulex argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction [due to] a lack of irreparable harm because there was no link between Emulex’s and Broadcom’s market share changes and there was no causal nexus “show[ing] that the infringement caused harm in the first place.” […] Specifically, Emulex contends that Broadcom has shown no evidence of demand for the features claimed in the ’150 patent and the patented feature is only a “small” component of the infringing products.
Id. at *18 (text added, internal citations omitted).
Holdings[1] While a prior art reference may support any finding apparent to a person of ordinary skill in the art, prior art references that address different problems may not, depending on the art and circumstances, support an inference that the skilled artisan would consult both of them simultaneously. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding invention nonobvious when none of the “reference[s] relate to the [problem] described in the patents” and no evidence was proffered “indicating why a person having ordinary skill in the art would combine the references”)
Broadcom, at *14.
[2] Because of [the] market characteristics [of a 'design wins' market], the district court properly concluded that Broadcom’s “exclusion from a fair opportunity to compete for design wins constitutes irreparable harm.”
Id. at *20 (text added).
 
10/03/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleTecSec, Inc. v. Int'l Business Mach., Inc., No. 2012-1415 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2013).
Issues
[1-2] The defendants now assert that, under [1] the mandate rule and [2] the doctrine of collateral estoppel, our Rule 36 judgment [regarding claim construction at the summary judgment stage] precludes TecSec from re-raising its claim construction arguments.
TecSec, at *8 (text added).
[3] "TecSec argues that the district court erred when it concluded that the terms “system memory means” and “digital logic means” were means-plus-function limitations." Id. at *19.
[4] [The defendants] contend that the software programs recited in the specification are not sufficient to perform the recited [computer-implemented means-plus-function terms] because they are generic disclosures of software, not specific algorithms to implement the claimed functions.
Id. at at *22 (text added).
Holdings
[1] “[A] Rule 36 judgment simply confirms that the trial court entered the correct judgment. It does not endorse or reject any specific part of the trial court’s reasoning.” [...] Had claim construction been the only issue in the [summary judgment appeal], and had that claim construction been essential to sustaining the judgment of noninfringement, the preclusive effect of our Rule 36 judgment would have been undeniable. But that was not the case. Here, the mandate rule does not preclude TecSec from challenging claim construction.
TecSec, at *11 (text added, internal citations omitted).
[2] Because claim construction was neither actually determined by nor critical and necessary to our summary affirmance in the [summary judgment appeal], collateral estoppel does not preclude the present challenge.
Id. at *13 (text added).
[3] "[W]e hold that the district court erred when it concluded that the term “system memory means for storing data” was a means-plus-function limitation [because a person skilled in the art would recognize that term to mean a specific structure that stores data.]." Tecsec, at *20 (text added). "[Also,] the district court erred when it held that the term “digital logic means” was a means-plus-function limitation [because 'digital logic' defines structure and the claim further defines said term to have structural elements]." Id. at *21 (text added).
[4] [T]he examples [in the specification detailing how the software operates generally] provide detailed prose that shows how the specific software products operate to implement the claimed functions. “This court does not impose a lofty standard in its indefiniteness cases.” Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1341. Short of providing source code, it is difficult to envision a more detailed disclosure.
Id. at *24 (text added).
 
10/02/13
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleSkinmedica, Inc., v. Histogen Aesthetics, LLC., 2012-1560, (Fed. Cir. August 23, 2013).
Issue"[T]he ordinary meaning of 'culturing . . . cells in three-dimensions' would reach the use of beads. The question is whether the patentees [...] defined 'culturing . . . cells in three-dimensions' to exclude the use of beads." Skinmedica, at *13 (text added).
HoldingBased on the clear language of the specification [which: (i) disclaimed the ordinary meaning of "culturing cells … in three dimensions"; (ii) had a patent incorporated by reference which did not particularly define said term; and (iii) had an unincorporated cited patent that served only as extrinsic evidence] and the statements made by the patentees during prosecution, we hold that the inventors of the ’494 and ’796 patents disclaimed beads as a method to culture the cells that condition the medium used in their claimed inventions. We accordingly affirm the district court’s construction of the term “culturing . . . cells in three-dimensions,” common to all the assert claims, as “growing . . . cells in three dimensions (excluding growing in monolayers or on microcarrier beads).”
Id. at *43 (text added).
09/30/13
Category: Infringement  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleMeadwestvaco Corp. v. Rexam Beauty and Closures, Inc. No. 2012-1518, -1527 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2013).
Issues[1] Valois and Rexam both opposed summary judgment [of nonobviousness], arguing that material issues of fact necessitated a trial [because of the district court's nonobviousness finding was limited to EFEP use in a fragrance product].
Meadwestvaco, at *7 (text added).
[2] Rexam argues […] that [Dr. Reibenspies' expert] testimony should have been excluded because Dr. Reibenspies did not follow all of the XRD parameters listed in the ’132 patent. Therefore, according to Rexam, his testimony is legally irrelevant [and therefore inadmissable] to proving infringement.
Id. at *17 (text added).
Holding[1] Valois’s evidence created material issues of fact inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment, which necessitates a remand [because the secondary considerations analysis was limited to a field that was not recited in the claims, and because material issues of fact were resolved in favor of the moving party].
Meadwestvaco, at *11 (text added).
[2] We agree with MWV that Rexam’s arguments go to infringement and not admissibility [because] Dr. Reibenspies’s testimony was not an attempt to apply a new claim construction to the XRD crystallinity terms [but instead a way of showing infringement and that any deviation by Dr. Reibenspies' test from the XRD parameters in the specification were minor].
Id. at *17-18 (text added).
 
09/27/13
Category: Infringement
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleSunovion Pharma., Inc. v. Dr. Reddy's Lab., Ltd., No. 2013-1335 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 26, 2013).
Issue[1] Sunovion argues that the claim limitation “essentially free” should be defined as “largely but not wholly free” of the levorotatory isomer, which encompasses greater than approximately 90% dextrorotatory isomer by weight of the total weight of zopiclone.
Sunovion, at *7.
[2] Reddy […] argues that the Cappuccino certification [, which promises a non-infringing generic product under ANDA,] assured the district court that Reddy would only market generic eszopiclone tablets containing 0.3–0.6% levorotatory isomer, asserting that “literal non-infringement is as simple as 0.3 is more than 0.25.”
Id. at *11.
Holding[1] [Because the specification was silent on the meaning of the term "essentially free",] [t]he applicants’ repeated and consistent attribution [in the prosecution history] of the purity level of less than 0.25% levorotatory isomer to “the invention” and “the instant invention” thus gives meaning to the term “essentially free.”
Sunovion, at *10 (text added).
[2] We therefore hold that any so-called certification [to a district court] pledging not to infringe cannot override the conclusion that when a drug manufacturer seeks FDA approval to market a generic compound within the scope of a valid patent, it is an infringement as a matter of law. Simply saying “But I won’t do it” is not enough to avoid infringement.
Id. at *15 (text added).
 
09/26/13
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleRambus, Inc. v. Rea, No. 2012-1634 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2013).
Issue[1] [Rambus] contends that the Board erroneously placed the burden on Rambus to demonstrate nonobviousness. [2] [Rambus also] asserts that, rather than rely on the examiner’s flawed findings, the Board relied on unsubstantiated conjecture that one could combine [the] iAPX and Inagaki [references] into an operable system.
Rambus, at *9 (text added).
Holding
[1] The Board erroneously placed the burden on Rambus to prove that its claims were not obvious. In reexamination proceedings, “a preponderance of the evidence must show nonpatentability before the PTO may reject the claims of a patent application.”
Rambus, at *10-11.
[2] The Board also exceeded its limited role to “review of the examiner’s decisions during prosecution.” [by changing the grounds for combining the iAPX and Inagaki references.] In re Stepan Co., 660 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at *11 (text added).
 
09/24/13
Category: Inequitable Conduct 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleNetwork Signatures, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins., No. 2012-1492 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 24, 2013).
Issue"[In determining inequitable conduct, did] Mr. Karasek [intend] to deceive the PTO, apparently by using the PTO’s standard form petition for “unintentional” delay without setting forth the details of how or why the delay occurred[?]" Network Signatures, at *6 (text added).
Holding"Mr. Karasek’s compliance with the standard PTO procedure for delayed payment, using the PTO form for delayed payment, does not provide clear and convincing evidence of withholding of material information with the intent to deceive the Director [because the PTO does not require Applicant to provide a specific reason for the unintentional delay]." Id. at *8 (text added).
 
09/23/13
Category: Claim Construction 
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitlePlantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., No. 2012-1355 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 2013).
Issue[1] "[W]hether the district court improperly construed the terms “stabilizer support member” in claim 1 and “concha stabilizer” in claim 10 [because Plantronics elected a species limited to “elongated” structures]." Plantronics, at *7 (text added).
[2] "[W]hether the district court erred in granting Aliph’s motion for summary judgment of obviousness [based on a common sense finding]. " Id. (text added).
Holding[1] “The ‘stabilizer support member’ and the ‘concha stabilizer’ are not structurally limited either in claim language or in their corresponding description in the specification. Likewise, the election of species pertaining to Figures 1A and 1B in response to the restriction requirement does not narrow the claim scope, because the election was made without any indication that the ‘stabilizer support’ and the ‘concha stabilizer’ to one that is ‘longer than [they are] wide.’” Plantronics, at *14.
[2] “[W]hen all of the factual disputes regarding the objective evidence are resolved in favor of Plantronics, we cannot hold that the claims would have been obvious as a matter of law. […] The commercial success of Aliph’s alleged copied product and the failure of attempts to combine the prior art elements before the ’453 patent provide a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it would be ‘common sense’ to combine the elements in the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention.” Plantronics, at *21-22.
 
09/20/13
Category: Administrative Law  
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleFleming v. Coward, No. 2013-1091 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2013) (per curiam) [NON-PRECEDENTIAL].
Issue"[T]he PTO defendants [who are patent examiners] argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case because [Applicant] had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in the PTO." Fleming, at *4.
Holding"The district court was correct to dismiss the complaint against the PTO defendants because of Mr. Fleming’s lack of action in the PTO prior to instituting a civil lawsuit arising from the rejection of his patent application." Fleming, at *6.
 

09/17/13
Category: Double Patenting 
 
 
 
 By: Joshua Schwartz, Editor-In-Chief/Contributor, &
Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor
 
TitleSt. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Access Closure, Inc., No. 2012-1452 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2013).
Issue“[…] ACI agrees that the method/device restriction in the grandparent application affected the line of demarcation [for determining consonance and claiming benefit of the safe harbor provision], but argues that the election of species did not affect the line because an election of species is inherently different from a restriction requirement.” St. Jude Medical, at *14 (text added).
Holding"§ 1.146 states that if no generic claim is found allowable, then the election of species will create a restriction under 35 U.S.C. § 121. 37 C.F.R. § 1.146 […] [Because the election of species requirement on the grandparent application lacked a generic claim when asserted and subsequently allowed], we hold that the restriction resulting from the election of species affected the line of demarcation. In particular, the first restriction separated Group I from Group II, and the second restriction operated on top of the first restriction to separate the Species." St. Jude Medical, at *14-15 (text added).
 

09/13/13
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleTeva Pharma. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 2012-1567, -1568, 1569, -1570 (Fed. Cir. July 26, 2013).
Issue(s)[1 and 2: Definiteness] “Appellants argue that the term ‘molecular weight’ renders all of the asserted claims indefinite because it can refer to different measures, including Mp, Mw, and Mn. They contend that the scope of the claims varies significantly depending on the measure […] that Teva inconsistently defined “molecular weight” as Mw and Mp during prosecution of two of the familial patents […] that the specification does not resolve which molecular weight measure is intended […] [and] that their indefiniteness arguments apply equally to Group I and Group II claims.” Teva Pharma., at *6.
[3: Construction/Infringement] “The parties dispute whether the district court’s consideration of the percentages in conjunction with its consideration of the ‘approximately 6:2:5:1’ limitation constitutes a ‘derivative’ claim construction or a part of its infringement analysis. The former is a question of law; the latter is a question of fact.” Teva Pharma., at *16.
Holding(s)[1: Definiteness of Group I] “It is undisputed that Group I claims contain an ambiguity because their plain language does not indicate which average molecular weight measure is intended. Teva’s attempt to resolve this ambiguity hinges in part on the prosecution history. But two of its prosecution statements directly contradict each other and render the ambiguity insoluble.” Teva Pharma., at *8.
[2: Definiteness of Group II] “Instead of describing copolymer-1 in terms of a statistical measure, such as Mw, Group II claims recite the percentage of copolymer-1 molecules in a sample falling within an arbitrarily set molecular weight range. […] The scope of Group II claims is thus readily ascertainable. We hold that Group II claims are not invalid for indefiniteness.” Teva Pharma., at *10.
[3: Construction/Infringement] “We hold that whether the amino acid percentages in the accused products meet the ‘approximately 6:2:5:1’ limitation is a part of the district court’s infringement analysis.” Teva Pharma., at *16. 
 

09/11/13
Category: Design Patents 
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleHigh Point Design v. Meijer, Inc., No. 2012-1455 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 11, 2013).
Issue(s)[1a] “First, BDI asserts that the court erred by applying an “ordinary observer” standard, because this court’s case law requires application of an “ordinary designer” standard in an obviousness analysis relating to a design patent. […]. [1b] Second, BDI argues that the district court failed to properly communicate its reasoning in either step of the obviousness analysis [by providing a brief description of the design patent]." High Point Design, at * 13 (text added).
[2] “[Did the court err] by finding the claimed design [of a slipper] invalid merely because the design contains elements that perform functions [associated with foot wear][?]" High Point Design, at *20 (text added).
Holding(s)[1] "The use of an 'ordinary observer' standard to assess the potential obviousness of a design patent runs contrary to the precedent of this court and our predecessor court, under which the obviousness of a design patent must, instead, be assessed from the viewpoint of an ordinary designer." High Point Design, at * 14-15 (text added). "[Also, providing a brief description of a design patent] represents 'too high a level of abstraction' by failing to focus 'on the distinctive visual appearances of the reference and the claimed design.'" High Point Design, at * 16-17 (text added).
[2] "This analysis [of invalidating an entire design patent because some aspects are functional] contravenes this court’s precedent: [A] distinction exists between the functionality of an article or features thereof and the functionality of the particular design of such article or features thereof that perform a function. Were that not true, it would not be possible to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian article of manufacture . . . ." High Point Design, at *21 (text added).
 

09/09/13
 Category: 103
 
 
 
 By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor
 
TitleNovo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd., 2011-1223 (Fed. Cir. June 18, 2013).
Issue(s)
[1] Burdens under 103 Analysis
[a] “[Had] the district court misallocated the burden of persuasion […] by forcing Novo to “overcome” Caraco’s “prima facie” case of obviousness with evidence of unexpected results[?]” Novo, at *9 (text added).
[b] “[E]ven if the burdens were properly allocated in this case, [did] Caraco’s evidence insufficiently [support] the court’s ultimate obviousness findings[?]” Novo, at *9 (text added).
[c] “[S]hould [the district court] have deferred to the examiner’s original finding that the Sturis and Moses studies demonstrated unexpected synergy[?]” Novo, at *9 (text added).
[2] Inequitable Conduct“[Had] the district court clearly erred in finding that [the patentee’s] representations and omissions were material and intentional under [Therasense v. Becton, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc)?]” Novo, at *20 (text added).
Holding(s)
[1] Burdens under 103 Analysis
[a] “[A]s long as the [district] court reserved its ultimate conclusion on validity until after it considered the evidence from both sides, [analysis using terms such as “overcome” and “prima facie”] simply reflects the court’s shift of the burden of production once the court determined that the challenger has established a prima facie case of obviousness.” Novo, at *13 (text added).
[b] It is reasonable that an artisan seeking to combine a known insulin sensitizer (like metformin) with a new insulin secretagogue (like repaglinide) would base his expectations upon prior art sensitizer/secretagogue combinations.” Novo, at *15.
[c] “[W]e treat [a district court challenge to] the issued patent as having a presumption of validity that must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.” Novo, at *18 (text added).
[2] Inequitable Conduct“[The omission] is nevertheless a non-material omission because it can ‘be rendered irrelevant in light of subsequent argument or explanation by the patentee.’” Novo, at *22 (quoting Therasense, at 1294, text added).
 

09/05/13
Category: 101
 
 
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleAccenture Global Serv., GMBH v. Guidewire Soft., Inc., No. 2011-1486 (Sept. 5, 2013).
Issue(s)[1] "[Whether] system claim 1’s inclusion of an insurance claim folder, a task library database, a server component, and a task engine in attempting to show that the system claim is meaningfully different from the ’284 patent’s method claims [is enough to avoid having the claims ‘rise and fall together’ ?]" Accenture Global Serv. at *11 (text added).
[2] "[W]hether system claim 1 remains patent-eligible even after our decision in CLS Bank [by implementing] the general idea of generating tasks for insurance claim processing, but narrow[ing] it through […] recitation of a combination of computer components [?]" Accenture Global Serv. at *14 (emphasis added).
Holding(s)“In sum, the system claims of the ’284 patent are patent-ineligible both because [1] Accenture was unable to point to any substantial limitations that separate them from the similar, patent-ineligible method claim [which was found invalid by the district court and NOT appealed] and [2] because, under the two-part test of CLS Bank, the system claim does not, on its own, provide substantial limitations to the claim’s patent-ineligible abstract idea.“ Accenture Global Serv. at *18.
 
Editor's Note
A concurring-in-part/dissenting-in-part opinion in the en banc CLS Bank decision stated that "[n]o portion of any opinion issued today other than our Per Curiam Judgment garners a majority. […] nothing said today beyond our judgment has the weight of precedent." CLS Bank Int’l, Rader/Moore Op. at n1. However, the majority opinion here in Accenture Global Serv. bases its holding on CLS Bank.
 

09/04/13
Category: Administrative Law 
 
 
 
By: John Kirkpatrick, Contributor 
 
TitleIn re Adler, No. 2012-1610 (July 18, 2013).
Issue(s)[1] “The primary issue on appeal is whether the Board properly found that it would have been obvious in light of the prior art to compare reference values for healthy tissue and blood to determine whether images of the gastrointestinal tract showed “a change in the level of red color content” where that “change correlat[es] to the presence of blood […].” In re Adler, at *6.
[2] “Additionally, Adler argues that the Board relied on a new ground for rejection of the claims at issue and instead should have reopened prosecution.” In re Adler, at *8.
Holding(s)[1] “[The Board’s rationale] is a predictable variation of the combination of Hirata [which equates analyzing red color variances with bleeding] and Meron [which teaches receiving images from a swallowable device].” In re Adler, at *8 (text added).
[2] “While the Board’s explanation may go into more detail than the examiner’s, that does not amount to a new ground of rejection. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011).” In re Adler, at *10 (text added).
 

09/03/13
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 
 
TitleBayer Cropscience AG v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, No. 2013-1002 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 2013).
Issue“Bayer’s position from the outset has been that the phrase ["biological activity of 2,4-D monooxygenase "] covers any enzyme that triggers cleaving of the side chain of 2,4-D […], even if it is a dioxygenase [which is the later-discovered correct term for the enzyme] and even if it does not share other biological activities of the particular enzyme […].” Bayer Cropscience at *6 (text added).
Holding“Like the district court, we see two problems with [Bayer's] position: (A) familiar aspects of textual analysis [such as ordinary meaning and the intrinsic record] point strongly the other way [toward a narrow construction]; and (B) [interpreting per Beyer’s suggestion] would read independent claim 1 so broadly as to raise serious doubts about validity [for lack of written description].” Bayer Cropscience at *7-8 (text added).
 

08/30/13
Category: Civil Procedure
 
 Goose Family
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleTrading Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. Open E Cry, LLC, No. 2012-1583 (August 30, 2013).
Issue(s)[1-2] "[W]hether the claims of the ’411 patent[, a continuation, and the '055 patent, a CIP,] satisfied the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) in light of eSpeed [a previous case involving parent patents] [...]” Trading Tech. Int'l, Inc., at *12 (text added).
[3] "[W]hether prosecution history estoppel [and/or disclaimer in a parent patent of a CIP at issue] barred TT from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as to products with price columns that move automatically.” Id. at *12 (text added).
Holding(s)[1] “The ’411, ’768, and ’374 patents all rely on the same underlying disclosure as the ’132 and ’304 patents discussed in eSpeed. But the claims of the patents now before us are different, as are the issues at play, and eSpeed’s ruling on claim construction does not govern the written description inquiry in this case. “ Trading Tech. Int'l, Inc., at *17.
[2] “[T]he ’055 patent differs fundamentally from those at issue in eSpeed, and its unique written description was never considered in that case. […] We therefore conclude that TT is entitled to summary judgment that the claims of the ’055 patent have not been proven invalid by clear and convincing evidence for lack of adequate written description.” Id. at *20-21.
[3] “[T]he intrinsic record specific to the ’055 patent distinguishes eSpeed […]. The ’055 patent, as a continuation-in-part of the ’132 patent, includes extensive disclosures that were not present in the ’132 or ’304 patents, and those subsequent disclosures directly contradict the prosecution-based surrenders of claim scope discussed in eSpeed.” Id. at *24-25.
 

08/29/13
 
By: Idlir Fida from Vancouver, Canada, Creative Commons
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleIn re Bimeda Research & Dev. Ltd., 2012-1420 (Fed. Cir. July 25, 2013).
Issue"[T]he ’400 patent’s disclosure broadly described an invention that was free from anti-infectives, and also noted that Example 1 described an exemplary embodiment which did not include acriflavine as an ingredient. [The Patentee] therefore contended that an ordinary artisan, who would have been well aware that acriflavine could be used to prevent mastitis, would understand that its antiinfective-free invention could also be acriflavine- free." In re Bimeda, at *4 (text added).
Holding"[W]here the patent’s disclosure describes the exclusion of a broad genus, claims to embodiments which exclude particular species are only supported if the disclosure offers some guidance or “blaze marks” to guide the skilled artisan towards excluding that particular species." Id. at *5 (affirming the PTAB holding, citing In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (CCPA 1967)).
 

08/27/13

Welcome to the JPTOS Blog! The purpose of our newly created Blog is to complement the Journal publications by providing short briefs of and comments regarding IP-related case law. We hope the site will be of use to IP Practitioners (and anyone else interested).

Because our Blog will be managed by a small staff of volunteers, we will initially focus mostly on patent related matters. Eventually, as we gain capacity, we hope to widen our focus to the remaining IP fields (Trademarks, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets). Our Blog is still in its infancy and we welcome any comments/advice.

Thank you for visiting our Blog.

Joshua Schwartz, Editor-in-Chief
Jesus Hernandez, JPTOS Blog Editor
08/26/13
 Category: 103
 
Obvious to Try?
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleLeo Pharma. Prod., Ltd., v. Rea, No. 2012-1520 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2013).
Issue"[W]hether, in light of the prior art references [not specifically addressing the problem of the ‘013 patent] and objective indicia of nonobviousness, the claimed invention would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at a time just before the time of invention.” Leo Pharma. at *11 (text added).
Holding“In light of the lack of expectation of a successful result, the failure of the prior art to provide direction, and the substantial number of intervening years between the publication of the prior art and the ’013 patent’s filing date, this invention is not simply a case of '‘picking and choosing’ from a list in order to achieve a compatible and non-deleterious preparation' […]. Because the problem was not known, the possible approaches to solving the problem were not known or finite, and the solution was not predictable, it would not have been obvious for a person of ordinary skill to make the claimed invention.” Id. at *18-19.
 

08/22/13
Category: 102
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleHamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. Sunbeam Prod., Inc., No. 2012-1581 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2013).
Issue"The district court found that Hamilton Beach’s purchase order with its foreign supplier for the Stay or Go® amounted to an invalidating commercial offer for sale under the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)." Hamilton Beach, at *7.
Holding"We agree with the district court that Hamilton Beach’s transaction with its foreign supplier in early 2005 was an offer for sale of a product that anticipated the asserted claims and that the invention was ready for patenting prior to the critical date. [...] [T]herefore, we hold the asserted claims of the ’928 patent invalid under § 102(b)." Id. at *7.
 

08/20/13
 Category: Administrative Law
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor   
 
TitleVersata Dev. Corp. v. Rea, Case No. 1:13-cv-328 (GBL/IDD) (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2013).
Issues“The first issue is whether the AIA precludes judicial review of the PTAB's decision to institute post-grant review in accordance with AIA.” Versata Dev. Corp., at *1.
"The second issue is whether the PTAB's statutory interpretation regarding insistution of post-grant review proceedings constituted a "final agency decision" for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court, thereby providing Plaintiff a cause of action to bring challenge to such a decision to this Court." Id. at *1.
Holdings"The Court holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because the AIA's express language, detailed structure and scheme for administrative and judicial review, legislative purpose, and nature of the administrative action evince Congress' clear intent to preclude subject matter jurisdiction over the PTAB's decision to institute patent reexamination proceedings. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims are dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction under the clear statutory guidance provided by AIA." Id. at *1-2.
"This Court holds that the decision to institute post-grant review is merely an initial step in the PTAB's process to resolve the ultimate question of patent validity, not a final agency action as contemplated by 5 U.S.C. sec. 704." Id. at *2.
 

08/18/13
Category: Copyright
 
 
 
 By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleAmerican Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., Civ. No. 12-528 (RHK/JJK) (Minn. July 30, 2013).
Issue"[...] Publishers allege that by getting [scientific Article] copies without paying for a license, and by making internal copies within the law firm [for submission to USPTO], Schwegman infringed the Publishers’ copyrights. Both Schwegman and the USPTO assert that Schwegman’s copying of the Articles constitutes a non-infringing 'fair use.'” American Inst. of Physics, at *3-4.
Holding"Having weighed all these factors, this Court concludes that Schwegman is entitled to the fair use defense as a matter of law. The record demonstrates no genuine dispute that Schwegman’s use of the Articles was new and different than and did not merely supersede the original purpose of the Articles. Also, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the nature of the Articles is predominantly informational. Further, although Schwegman did make complete copies of the Articles in its patent prosecution practice, the only reasonable inference to draw from the record is that Schwegman’s copying of the Articles was consistent with the new and different purpose and character of Schwegman’s use. And there is no evidence to suggest that Schwegman’s copying impacted a traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market for the Articles. Thus, all four fair use factors weigh in favor of finding that Schwegman’s use in this matter is fair as a matter of law." American Inst. of Physics, at *40.


08/12/13

The Editors, Administrative Staff and Board of Governors are pleased to announce the newest issue of the Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society. 

A Critical Analysis of a Legislative Black Swan in an Age of Preconceived Notions and Special-Interest Lobbying — Charles E. Miller and Daniel P. Archibald
The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of Extortive Pornographic “Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventive Approaches — Amy Rosen
ICANN’T Help Myself: Beneficial Adjustments to the New Generic Top-Level Domain Name Expansion Process — Brandon Marsh
Lessons from the Federal Circuit: Avoiding Unpatentability for Life Science Inventions — Brandon Zuniga
08/12/13
Category: 101 
  
 
By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor  
 
TitleAsso. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12–398 (June 13, 2013).
Issue“This case […] requires us to resolve whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is patent eligible under 35 U. S. C. §101 by virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome. We also address the patent eligibility of synthetically created DNA known as complementary DNA (cDNA), which contains the same protein-coding information found in a segment of natural DNA but omits portions within the DNA segment that do not code for proteins.” Myriad, at *1.
Holding“[W]e hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.” Myriad, at *1.
 

08/08/13

Category: 101 

 

101

 

* This is a brief of the plurality opinion, and various dissents and concurrences. The majority opinion was a two sentence per curiam decision of the district court's findings.

** The SCOTUS granted cert. and affirmed the per curiam decision. Its analysis modified the plurality opinion below.  

By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor

TitleCLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., No. 2011-1301 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2013) (en banc, split).
Issue"a. What test should the court adopt to determine whether a computer-implemented invention is a patent ineligible “abstract idea”; and when, if ever, does the presence of a computer in a claim lend patent eligibility to an otherwise patent-ineligible idea?" CLS Bank Int'l, Rader/Moore Op. at *4.
"b. In assessing patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of a computer-implemented invention, should it matter whether the invention is claimed as a method, system, or storage medium; and should such claims at times be considered equivalent for § 101 purposes?" Id.
Holdinga. “[T]he following analysis should apply in determining whether a computer-implemented claim recites patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 or falls into the common law exception for abstract ideas. [Inquiry 1] The first question is whether the claimed invention fits within one of the four statutory classes set out in § 101. […] [Inquiry 2] [T]he analysis turns to the judicial exceptions to subject-matter eligibility. A preliminary question in applying the exceptions to such claims is whether the claim raises § 101 abstractness concerns at all. […] [Inquiry 3] Where bona fide § 101 concerns arise […] it is important at the outset to identify and define whatever fundamental concept appears wrapped up in the claim so that the subsequent analytical steps can proceed on a consistent footing. […] [Inquiry 4] The §101 inquiry next proceeds to the requisite preemption analysis.“ CLS Bank Int’l, at * 17-19 (emphasis/numbering added).
b. "[A]pplying a presumptively different approach to system claims generally would reward precisely the type of clever claim drafting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed us to ignore. As illustrated by the obvious parallels between the method and system claims now before us, it is often a straightforward exercise to translate a method claim into system form, and vice versa." CLS Bank Int’l, at *33.


08/06/13
  • A Critical Analysis of a Legislative Black Swan in an Age of Preconceived Notions and Special-Interest Lobbying — Charles E. Miller and Daniel P. Archibald
  • The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming: An Analysis of Extortive Pornographic “Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventive Approaches — Amy Rosen
  • ICANN’T Help Myself: Beneficial Adjustments to the New Generic Top-Level Domain Name Expansion Process — Brandon Marsh
  • Lessons from the Federal Circuit: Avoiding Unpatentability for Life Science Inventions — Brandon Zuniga
07/22/13

 Category: Administrative Law 

 

By: Jesus Hernandez, Blog Editor/Contributor 

TitleFresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., No. 2012-1334, -1335 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2013) (Newman, J., dissenting).
Issue"[T]he question in this case is whether, under the reexamination statute, the cancellation of claims by the PTO is binding in pending district court infringement litigation." Fresenius, at *9-10.
Holding"In sum, under either the reissue or reexamination statute, if the PTO confirms the original claim in identical form, a suit based on that claim may continue, but if the original claim is cancelled or amended to cure invalidity, the patentee’s cause of action is extinguished and the suit fails." Fresenius, at *9-10.


05/21/13
  • Kappos v. Hyatt and the Endangered Right of de novo Judicial Review of Administrative-Agency Decisions in the Wake of the America Invents Act — Charles E. Miller
  • A Critique Of Recent Opinions In Patent Interferences — Charles L. Gholz
  • Deficiencies in the Decision and USPTO Application of Mayo Collaborative Services, dba Mayo Medical Laboratories, et al. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. — Mark A. Litman
  • Who’s In Charge: An Analysis of BPAI Decisions Regarding Section 101 Patentability In light of Bilski and Mayo — J. Taylor Gooch
  • Exploring the Patent Surge: Increased Incentives or Multiplying Motives? — Keith Bentele and Alexander Ibsen
05/08/13
By: Jesus Hernandez
Blog Editor, Contributor  
 
A group of tech companies has submitted comments to the FTC and the DOJ requesting a probe into the business model of patent assertion entities (aka 'non-practicing entities', aka 'patent trolls').  [1] The group includes Google and Blackberry, among others.  The comments were submitted as part of a Patent Assertion Entity Activities Workshop conducted by the FTC [2]
03/07/13
  • Beyond Patents: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Relationship With The Federal Circuit — Daniel Kazhdan
  • Valuation & Assessment of Intangible Assets, and How the America Invents Act Will Affect Patent Valuations — Andrew J. Maas, esq.
  • Prometheus and the Natural Phenomenon Doctrine: Let’s not Lose Sight of the Forest for the Trees — Samantak Ghosh
  • Priority and Disclosure: Challenges and Protections to Small Inventors in a First-to-File World — Michael A. Shinall
  • Author Index (2012)
11/22/12
  • Congress Giveth and Taketh Away: A Look at Section 18 of the America Invents Act and the Review of Business Method Patents — Jeff Kettle
  • Post-eBay Economic Standards for Assessing Irreparable Harm — Stevan D. Porter, Jr.
  • Avoid Japanization: Lessons from Japanese Gridlock on the Patent Recordation System — Nahoko Ono
08/27/12
  • Betty Boop Almost Lost Her Bling-Bling: Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A. and The Re Emergence of Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Merchandising Cases — Tracy Reilly
  • The Effect of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act on Collaborative Research — N. Scott Pierce
  • Challenging Validity of Issued Patents Before the PTO: Inter Partes Reexam now or Inter Partes Review Later? — Andrei Iancu, Ben Haber, Elizabeth Iglesias
  • A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An Analysis of Europes Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System — Kevin P. Mahne
  • Multinational Enforcement of Patent Rights: National Jurisdiction Over Infringement and Validity of a Foreign Patent — Arthur O. Hall
06/13/12
  • Inducing Infringement: Specific Intent And Damages Calculations — Andrew Ward
  • A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences — Charles L. Gholz
  • Virtually Uninfringeable: Valid Patents Lacking Protection Under the Single Entity Rule — Damon Gupta
  • Future Revision Policy of Patent Classification — Kenji Mihara
  • 39th Annual Rossman Award
  • Call For Nominations for the Pasquale J. Federico Memorial Award
02/01/12
  • Dicta on Adrenalin(e): Myriad Problems with Learned Hand’s Product-of-Nature Pronouncements in Parke-Davis v. Mulford  -Jon M. Harkness
  • An Empirical Study on the Use of Technical Advisors in Patent Cases  -Joshua R. Nightingale
  • AN OVERVIEW OF PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2011: Navigating the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Including Effective Dates for Patent Reform   -Hung H. Bui, Esq
  • Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents Act   -Andrei Iancu and Ben Haber
  • Annual Index (2011)
10/31/11
  • Patently Obvious: Why The District Court's Ruling in Association for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO is Incomplete -Kristin Wall
  • Nonobviousness Standards for Hardware and Software Before and After KSR: What is the Difference? -Michelle Friedman Murray
  • The Integrity of Section 101: A "New and Useful" Test for Patentable Subject Matter -Daniel J. Klein
  • Claim Preambles: Unnecessary Matters of Chance and Confusion -Kirk M. Hartung
  • Are Intellectual Property Rights Human Rights? Patent Protection and the Right to Health -Mirela V. Hristova
08/01/11

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07/01/11
  • Patent Law Harmonization in the Age of Globalization: The Necessity and Strategy for a Pragmatic Outcome -Dongwook Chun
  • Licensing As a Means of Providing Affordability and Accessibility in Digital Markets: Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine -Johnathan C. Tobin
  • A Special Rule for Compound Protection for DNA-sequences - Impact of the ECJ "Monsanto" decision on Patent Practice -Jan B. Krauss and Toshiko Takenaka
  • You Can Run, but You Can't Hide: The Expansion of Direct Infringement and Evisceration of Preventive Contracting in Maersk -Melissa Y. Lerner
05/09/11
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03/31/11
  • Does a Utility that is “Unproved” at the Time of Filing Violate §112? Irving N. Feit
  • Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No Eric J. Rogers
  • Overcoming Babel’s Curse: Adapting the Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents Jonathan Skinner
  • Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences Charles L. Gholz
  • Keep on Rockin’ in the Free World: Trademark Remedies for Musicians Michelle Lin
  • Book Review: Joel Davidow, Patent-Related Misconduct Issues in U.S. Patent Litigation James Toupin
02/17/11
  • The EPC Exceptions to Patentable Subject Matter in the United Kingdom - Emir Aly Crowne-Mohammed, BA, LLB, LLM, LLM, PhD (cand.)
  • How a Comparative Analysis of Federal Circuit Standards of Review
  • Supports Limiting the Role of Juries in Determinations of Obviousness - Matthew Beutler
  • The Expansion Trajectory: Trademark Jurisprudence in the Modern Age - Kenneth L. Port
  • Interpretive Agency-Rulemaking vs. Statutory District Court Review-Jurisdiction In Ex Parte Patent Reexaminations - Charles E. Miller and Daniel P. Archibald
  • In Re “DDAVP” Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation: Is the Second Circuit’s “Massage” the Way to Relieve the Key Pressure Points Between the Patent System and Antitrust Laws? - Stijepko Tokic
  • Annual Index (2010)
12/09/10
  • Determination of Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art: A Post-KSR Prosecution Tool - Matthew J. Spark
  • Patent Prosecution Pitfalls: Perspectives From The Trenches Of Litigation - Benjamin Hattenbach, Andrei Iancu, Kenneth Weatherwax
  • You Infringed My Patent, Now Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co. - Marta R. Vanegas, LL.M.
  • "The Case for Financial Product Patents: What the Supreme Court got Right and Wrong in Bilski v. Kappos, and A Suggestion for a Reasonable Line on Business Method Patents” - Paul E. Schaafsma
09/05/10
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09/05/10
CONTRACT patent prosecution: experienced chem patent attorney.
Call James K. Poole, Esq. (979) 472-5061.
09/05/10
CANTOR COLBURN, LLP, seeks attorneys with 2–5 years experience...
08/19/10
  • Fellow Citizens: Be On Guard - Paul R. Michel
  • Machine-or-Transformation Test Hits The Board: Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Following Bilski - Peter Ludwig
  • The Book of Wisdom: How to Bring a Metaphorical Flourish Into the Realm of Economic Reality by Adopting a Market Reconstruction Requirement in the Calculation of a Reasonable Royalty - D. Christopher Holly
  • Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) - Juan Lapenne
  • Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog …A Story of Prolonged Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending Pirates - Warren K. Mabey, Jr.
  • Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: Defining and Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud Computing - Timothy D. Martin
05/10/10
  • A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences - Charles L. Gholz
  • Obviousness in Patents Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. - Tom Brody
  • A Correlation Between the State of the US Economy and Patent Litigation Activity - Bradley D. Riel and Paul T. Meiklejohn
  • Reconsidering Reasonable Royalty Damages Methodology in Patent Infringement Suits: Supplementing Georgia Pacific  with the Reasonable Royalty Determination Board - Erick S. Lee
  • Software Related Inventions at the Enlarged Board of Appeals - Fabian Edlund
12/31/09
  • The Supreme Court, Bilski, and Sensible Limits on Patents, John W. Schlicher
  • Beware the Inequitable Conduct Charge! (Why Practitioners Submit What They Submit) , Lisa A. Dolak
  • Winter v. NRDC: A Stricter Standard for Irreparable Harm in Trademark Cases?, Thomas M. Williams
  • Design Patent Protection for Animated Computer-Generated Icons , David Leason
  • An American View of the Patent System in Europe in 2009, John B. Pegram
  • Annual Index (2009)
11/12/09
  • Joint infringement and Internet Software Patents: An Uncertain Future?, Dolly Wu
  • The Real Problem with Patent Infringement Damages, Martha K. Gooding & William C. Rooklidge
  • How the Federal Circuit Clarified the “Muddy Concept” of Joint Inventorship, George M. Sirilla
  • Pitfalls Associated with Post-Patent Issuance Supplementation or Replacement of a Biological Culture Deposit – 37 CFR § 1.805, Tracy U. Palovich & Robert J. Duminiak
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